'The Eurasian Triangle and the Iranian Nuclear Program' is a title of a thesis that deals with the relations between the Eurasian Triangle; China, Russia and Iran, and their impact on the Iranian nuclear program. This thesis is divided into four chapters.

The first chapter gives background information on the Iranian nuclear program. From the date of its building in the mid of the last century up to now, this program has faced many changes. It has encountered completely two different periods, which are separated by the Islamic Revolution. Shah 'Mohammad Reza Pahlavi' is considered the founder of this program in 1953, with a wide scope of support and cooperation from the United States. However, when Imam 'Ayattollah Al-Khumani' has became in power, this support and cooperation have turned into aggression. In this period, the Iranian program went through three phases: cessation phase lasted for five years, revival phase during the presidency of 'Ali Khatami', and extensive development in 1989. During these periods, the international reaction differed, since the support that the program had in the first period has changed to suspicion and refusal in the second, especially after the Iranian opposition has revealed the existence of secret nuclear institution in 2002. Since then, the Iranian issue is one of the most discussed issues in the international meetings and institutions, whether in the International Atomic Energy Agency, or in the Security Council, despite the Iranian persistence on the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program.

Chapter two discusses the Chinese position towards the Iranian nuclear issue. It covers the historical relationship between China and Iran, which is characterized by friendship and cooperation, that continued after the Islamic Revolution. However, China has partially detached from the Iranian nuclear program in 1995, but this did not freeze the relations between the two countries. New areas of cooperation have been opened as a substitute for the Chinese support to the nuclear sector in Iran. These areas include cooperation in the petrochemical sector, energy and economy sector, and military sector.
Moreover, China diplomatically supports the Iranian nuclear program, believing in its peaceful nature. Therefore, it refuses imposing tough sanctions on Iran, although it voted in favor of all UNSC decisions. This position comes as a result of many motives – which include economical motives, political motives, and strategic motives – without ignoring the challenges that face them. Consequently, the Chinese position towards the Iranian nuclear program is a mixture of motives and challenges.

The Russian position towards the Iranian nuclear program is discussed in Chapter three, which begins by analyzing the relations between these two countries that have changed from hostility and competition into cooperation after the fall of the Soviet Union. The improvement in the relations between Russia and Iran has opened the chance for cooperation in various sectors including nuclear sector, military sector, and petrochemicals sector. Diplomatically, Russia supported the Iranian nuclear program, and believed in its peaceful nature. However, and although it refuses using power against Iran as a way to solve the issue, the Russian position started to change recently because of the its interests in Iran that include economical interests, geopolitical interests, and strategic interests, in addition to the obstacles and challenges that Russian – Iranian relations face.

At the end of this thesis, the fourth chapter puts the question: what is the future of the Iranian nuclear program in the view of the ‘Eurasian Axis’? This chapter tries to analyze the relations of the ‘Eurasian Triangle’: China, Russia, and Iran, besides analyzing the bilateral relations between china – Russia, China – Iran, and Russia – Iran, and their future. In light of this, the final chapter tries to figure out the potential scenarios of the Iranian nuclear issue, and the probability of each of them. These scenarios are: holding to the peaceful solution, referring to the military option, trying to impose tougher sanctions, and turning over the Iranian political system. Finally, this chapter, and the thesis in general, ends with questions about the track that the Iranian nuclear program will go through in light of this ‘Eurasian Axis’