

**Abstract**

The study, 'Egypt and Hamas---Necessity of Relationship and its Path', aimed at exploring the reasons of conflict between Mubarak regime and Hamas Movement. It also aimed at identifying the major consequences of this conflict and uncovering the essential consideration in which each side tried to maintain a minimum degree of relationship to guarantee a future prospective. The study used the descriptive analytical approach.

The study showed that there were many reasons that had lead to the conflict between Hamas and Mubarak regime. Firstly, Mubarak and Hamas had different strategies concerning the Arab Israeli conflict and the Arab International problems. Secondly, Mubarak regime was so alarmed of the 'Islamic Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Party' that Hamas is considered affiliated to. Consequently, the relationship with Hamas had deteriorated by the closure of Rafah crossing, demolition of the secret tunnels and building the Steel Wall along the borders between Gaza Strip and Egypt.

The conflict had deteriorated the regional international role of Mubarak regime. This conflict had increased the political isolation of Hamas and therefore restricted its ability to provide Gaza Strip with major life necessities. It had also frozen the prisoners swap between Hamas and Israel. Furthermore, it had slowed down the conciliation between Hamas and Fatah Movement.

According to the study, the link between the two sides had not reached to a critical point and had not developed to crisis. Both of them had kept the lowest level of relationship for many reasons. Firstly, Hamas had perceived Egypt as an entrance to get international legitimacy to end its political isolation. Secondly, Egypt had been (and still is) considered as
the only artery for the sustainability of Gaza due to the Israeli siege. Moreover, Egypt had been considered the major power that sustained the harmony between Hamas and Fatah Movements. In addition, Egypt had been considered the only power that could mediate the prisoners swap. More importantly, the Egyptian regime had continually been alarmed by the idea that Israel might place Gaza Strip under the Egyptian Authority.

The study showed that there was an improvement in the relationship between Hamas and the new Egyptian regime but necessarily a radical change. The study has shed light on some facts that the new Egyptian leadership had to consider when dealing with Hamas as a strategic counterpart. First, Egypt has to recognize that the main conflict of Hamas with the Israeli occupation is restricted inside the Palestinian territories. Hamas, on the other hand, has no plans to intervene with the internal affairs of the Arab-Islamic countries including Egypt. Furthermore, Hamas reaches its decisions independently away from any influences. Moreover, the unbalanced policies of Mubarak regime towards Hamas and Fatah movements had lead to more disturbances between both movements. The closure of Rafah crossing had no legal or moral side.

The study recommended that Hamas had to follow certain strategies to create a balanced relationship with the new Egyptian regime. Firstly, Hamas has to reassure the Egyptians that it is not willing to establish an Islamic Religious State. Hamas has also to assure others that it believes in the principles of political partnership and peaceful transition of authority and to review its strategic resistance policy that serves the Palestinians without embarrassing Egypt or other Arab countries. Finally, Hamas has to show that protecting the Egyptian National Security is part of its own security.