Abstract

This study discusses the actual role of the United States of America in the Second Camp David Summit based on the United States’ role as a controversial mediator. It also questions the reasons for the failure of the summit and the impact of the absence of any supporting parties on the results of the summit. Moreover, this thesis refers to the factors that led to the success of the first Camp David Summit compared to the results of the second Camp David Summit which ended with failure that the Palestinians had already expected.

This thesis tracks the course of the Camp David Summit, the introductions to the summit and its consequences. As well, the thesis highlights the non-neutral role the US played in the different stages of the summit, and also reveals the fact that the US worked as an exclusive mediator in the peace process. The thesis discusses the US foreign policy and the influence of the Zionist Lobby on forming the US foreign policy.

Based on the situations and conditions that emerged during and after the summit the study hypothesizes that the United States of America played a biased role in the second Camp David summit. The US was highly influenced by the interior American and Israeli affairs which in result led the summit to the inevitable failure. This failure was inevitable because the negotiations were not based on sound bases that should have referred to the basics of the peace process like the UN resolutions and the international legitimacy resolutions. The American role as an exclusive mediator had a negative impact that could have been avoided if there was a joint mediation with another country or if the US was
a rightful mediator on both the political and procedural aspect. The talks also were based on the assumption that the interior Palestinian situation and the international situation will force Arafat to accept solutions that are beneath his usual demands.

The thesis is formed of five chapters, beginning with the first chapter that contains the hypothesis of the thesis, explains the research problem, gives a review of the related literature and the theoretical framework, explains the objective of the study and discusses the importance of the study. The second chapter, on the other hand, explains the details of the foreign policies from a theoretical viewpoint and explains the details of forming the foreign policy of the US and Israel in addition to the Palestinian foreign policy. The third chapter gives a detailed description and analysis of the events of the second Camp David summit, beginning with the preparations, moving to the arrival to Camp David and ending with leaving Camp David. The fourth chapter of the study shows the similarity between the American and the Israeli position after the summit and compares it to the Palestinian position. The chapter also talks about the subsequent attempts to reviving the peace process and the intervention of Egypt and France in the peace process.

Conclusion and results:

This study concludes that the US foreign Policy is influenced by internal and external factors, some of these factors are affected by the Zionist Lobby which is controlling the decision making process in the Congress and the centers of power in the US. The US made a huge mistake in urging holding a summit that was doomed to failure before the opening. This mistake was followed by a series of other mistakes during the negotiations. For instance, the negotiating parties used the summaries and the vocal proposals in the negotiation process and were not well informed about all the related documents in a professional way. In addition to the previous mistakes, one more mistake was that Arafat and Barak did not meet face-to-face for the days of the summit.

Another conclusion of the study is that the Palestinians did not promote the truth of what happened in the summit unlike Israel and the US who worked hard on promoting their image after the summit. This promotion in result led to blaming the Palestinians for the failure of the summit which is a denial of the promises that Clinton made to Arafat about not holding the Palestinians responsible for the failure of the summit.

Furthermore, the Study concludes that the First Camp David Summit did not only succeed because of the way how Carter managed it, but other reasons also contributed to the success of the summit like the insistence of the Egyptian President to achieve peace no matter what it cost and the pressure on both parties was also another factor. The U.S.-Israeli interests were present at the time and Carter was concerned about the common interests and the special US-Israeli
relations. The subsidies that resulted from the first Camp David Accords like the grants and the aid packages were awarded to Israel in larger amounts and better qualities than to Egypt, which was an evidence of the different US attitudes towards each of the parties of the conflict.