Abstract
This study discusses the failure of Camp David II Summit, through highlighting the reasons behind its failure, despite the American led international momentum dedicated to the summit’s support. Such support was considered a significant factor that meant to increase the Summit's chances of success. The study illuminates the Pre-Camp David transitional era, the events of that era –that played a major factor in defining the results of Camp David II -, the Israeli practices, the intersection of the Israeli-American interests, the absence of a fair sponsor, the practice of determination through force and the evaporation of trust between the negotiators, which were the main characterizing factors of that era.

The hypothesis of the study is that the size of the sensitive issues that were postponed to be finalized in the awaited summit was too many to accomplish in a two week summit of marathonic negotiations. In addition, the match and intersection of the Israeli-American interests created an American-Israeli conviction that through covert and often overt American pressure, Palestinians may accept a deal that satisfies the minimum level of their demands considering that this was the first time the Palestinians were presented with such offers. The mistaken American conviction was a result of Denis Ross’ assessments and his aides who assumed that the Palestinians will accept any agreement that meets the Israeli’s needs, satisfies the minimum demands of the Palestinians and offers them any form of a state.
The Palestinians’ rejection surprised the Americans and prompted Clinton to quickly offer the Palestinians –following his return from Okinawa– much more than what he initially offered them in attempt to salvage the situation.

This study consists of three chapters, beginning with the first chapter which paves the way to the study through a structure based on the main and secondary hypothesis, the research problem, review of references focusing on the hypothetical frame and the goal of the study and its importance. The second chapter focuses on the application stages of Oslo Agreement from three dimensions. The last chapter highlights the events of the summit itself, the American offer accompanied by the claimed Israeli concessions. It also highlights the positions of all parties before the summit, during the two week summit of tough negotiations and after the Camp David II Summit. It also highlights the role of the factions and the interference of all parties, especially the strong one (the American) in an attempt that to salvage the situation and led to the Palestinian Al-Aqsa Uprising.
Conclusion and results:
This study concludes that the complete match between the American and Israeli interests led to the failure of the summit, through the offer they presented to the Palestinians. An offer that did not satisfy the minimum aspiration of the Palestinians in regards to their state, since all the presented offers did not meet the conditions of establishing a Palestinian state and could never be approved by the Palestinian public.
The study also concludes that both the Americans and the Israelis managed to make the Palestinians bear the consequences of the failure of the summit by utilizing strong media machines that was able to promote their claims in the absence of any Arab-Palestinian with their friendly countries coordination to explain what took place in Camp David. And thus, the Americans and the Israelis managed to shift the presumed conflict between Israel and the world based on Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land, to a conflict between the Palestinians and the world for the latter’s rejection of Israel’s Prime Ministers’ claimed generous offer.
We also conclude that the results of the Palestinians rejection to participate in Camp David Summit in 2000 could have been much less damaging to them than participating without any guarantees that ensured the success of the negotiations. It is also important to note that the International community, the Americans and the Arabs pressured Arafat to participate in the summit. They claimed that his abstain could destroy what they called “the peace camp” in Israel. Few months after the Summit’s failure proved a complete destruction of the peace camp and no Palestinian state in the near future.