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Using the Power of Planning to Limit the Future Development of East Jerusalem

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I dedicate this humble research of my higher educational Master Degree to my Beloved father and mother.
Preface

Planning could be defined as preparing for actions through a methodological approach that will lead to the “right” decisions to be taken. Planning is the first step in any successful project, a fact lead Israel to promote its planning strategies to adopt the planning policies in a manner that makes use of the regional political situation in which Israel can adjust its planning policies to serve its national targets. The Israeli urban planning policies has planted illegally hundred of thousands of housing units to create new civic centers and to find out new regional cities formed by the imposed settlements which are spread throughout the West Bank devastating the Palestinian agglomerations and preventing any continuity among the Palestinian cities.

The thesis deals with the Israeli planning policies followed in East Jerusalem with all its dimensions (logistical, cultural, economical, political, etc.), besides it develops a comprehensive historical analysis of the Israeli Planning Policies which created the fragmented Palestinian Landscape in East Jerusalem.

This study is organized in seven chapters, chapter one is an introductive chapter. Chapter two identifies the current planning situation in East Jerusalem. Chapter three explores the unilateral Israeli planning policies in Jerusalem. Chapter four deals with the open/green spaces and open Landscapes policies in Jerusalem. Chapter five describes the planning paradigm in East Jerusalem. Chapter six clears out conclusions and future scenarios. Finally, chapter seven draws up the recommendations.
Acknowledgement

First of all, I send my warmest gratitude to our god who has firmed me up to complete this thesis and reach this level in education.

Heartfeltly, I’m so indebted to my parents who took care of me, giving me support and courage all over my steps in life. For you my parents, the dearest to my heart, I gift this thesis, hoping that it will be worthy to serve the manners you made me believe in.

Grateful acknowledgment for Dr. Jamal Amro for his invaluable efforts for guidance, diligence, dedication, assistance, recommencement and sincerity, and supervision on this project.

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Last but not least, I am deeply appreciating my brothers and sisters, my sweet aunts Mrs. Badreiah Al-Zibdah, Mrs. Fatima Al-Zibdah, my bothers in law Mr. Ahmad and Issa for their caring and support for all these years.
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Planning is considered the first step in any successful project, planning has different types and paradigms, Urban Planning is one of the most important fields of planning that is needed for the development process needed to sustain the nations’ resources and prosperity.

After the unification of East and West Jerusalem in 1968, the Jerusalem Municipality has been preparing the master plans of the city, besides, town planning schemes for all the existing neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, so that planning has been completed for the entire built-up area. Despite the fact that East Jerusalem is considered as one region, the Israeli planners have fragmented its neighborhoods by their town planning schemes and they have disconnected it from the West Bank. As well as, the Israeli planning policies have been expropriating the Palestinian lands (24,500 dunams in East Jerusalem) mainly for the construction of new neighborhoods intended for the Jewish population.

Thus approximately one-third of East Jerusalem has been removed from the reserves of land available to the Arab population. Of the remaining area, only some 9,100 dunams (approximately 13% of the total area of East Jerusalem prior to the expropriations) are zoned for residential construction; additional planning is needed in many of these areas before building permits may be received. Thus the planning of the east of the city has almost been completed and valid town plans exist. Yet these do not meet the needs of the population that lives in East Jerusalem nor allow for the development of this area, as will be indicated in this study.

The Research deals with the Israeli planning policies followed in East Jerusalem with all its dimensions (logistical, cultural, economical, political, etc.), besides it develops a comprehensive historical analysis of the Israeli Planning Policies which created the fragmented Palestinian Landscape in East Jerusalem, and suggests future scenarios for the final status of Jerusalem.
ملخص

يعد التخطيط هو الخطوة الأساسية الأولى لأي مشروع ناجح. يشمل التخطيط عدة أنماط و أشكال، ان التخطيط الحضري يعتبر من أهم حلول التخطيط الذي يؤثر على وضع العمليات النموذجية بشكل يضمن حفاظ الموارد و حق الديمومة للأجيال القادمة.

بعد توحيد مدينة القدس (تشمل القدس الغربية والشرقية) في عام 1968م، عملت بلدية القدس على تخطيط المدينة بنطاق يخدم الأعرق الإسرائيليا من خلال وضع المخطط الهيكلي ومخططات الأحياء للقدس الشرقية. لقد جهزت بلدية القدس جميع المخططات للمناطق المكشوفة. على الرغم من أن المدينة الشرقية تعتبر من المناطق ثلاثية، إلا أن المخطط الإسرائيلي عمل على تطبيقها في كل أحياءها وعزلها عن التواصل الجغرافي فيما بينها وبين الضفة الغربية. علاوة على ذلك، فإن سياسات التخطيط الإسرائيلية تعمل على مصادرة الأراضي الفلسطينية من أهالي القدس الشرقية (2450 دونم) لأغراض إنشاء أحياء ووحد سكنية استيطانية يهودية.

نتيجة لهذه السياسات المنحازة لصالح اليهود والمستوطنين، فإن ما يقارب على ثلث أراضي القدس الشرقية تم ازالتها من الأراضي العربية الشاغرة، و المساحة المتبقية فقط 9100 دونم (13% من مساحة القدس الشرقية قبل مصادرة الأراضي منها) تم تخصيصها لاستخدام البناء السكني، و تعميد عمليات البناء. فأن التخطيط الإسرائيلي يعتبر هذه المناطق ناجحة إلى المضيق، و نجد أن مخططات الأحياء تعتبر كاملة و جاهزة لدى البلدية، إلا أن هذه المخططات لا تخدم احتياجات السكان لتلك المناطق، ولا تتيح الفرصة لعمليات التنمية بأن تتقدم كما سيتوضيح في هذه الدراسة.

جاءت الدراسة منظمة في سبع فصول دراسية، حيث كان الفصل الأول فصل مقدمة. الفصل الثاني يعرض وضع التخطيط القائم في القدس الشرقية. الفصل الثالث يتعلق بسياسات التخطيط الإسرائيلية إصداراً الجانب في القدس، الفصل الرابع يتعلق بسياسات الفضاءات الضيقة والمفتوحة بالقدس، الفصل الخامس يكشف نمط التخطيط في القدس الشرقية، و الفصل السادس يطرح ملخصات وسيناريوهات لمستقبل القدس، وفي الختام، جاء الفصل السابع ليضع التوصيات.

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References
1.1 Introduction

Planning could be defined as preparing for actions, besides, planning is the first step in any successful project, a fact lead Israel to promote its planning strategies to adopt the planning policies in a manner that makes use of the regional political situation in which Israel can adjust its planning policies to serve its national targets. The Israeli urban planning policies has planted hundred of thousands of housing units to create new civic centers and to find out new regional cities formed by the imposed settlements which are spread throughout the West Bank devastating the Palestinian agglomerations and preventing any continuity among the Palestinian cities (Efrat, 1984).

Cultures standing out of our homeland centre may have not the motivations and justifications which can stop the Israeli planners who are aiming through enlarging their settlements’ centers to impose wide changes of those centers to become new urban nodes and regional centers. This centre is apparent through the settlements which are called the stars. The existence of these settlements create subordination in the surrounding economy and policies, devour the available un built-up areas, and besiege the Palestinian agglomerations with their resources that may form the future infrastructure of the independent Palestinian state (Friedman, 2003).

1.2 Literature Review

The Israeli planning policies have witnessed different plans according to the different political situation in the area. In general, all these plans were aiming to destroy the
Palestinian landscape and to devastate the future possible hopes of self controlled Palestinian territories. One of those powerful plans is (The Stars) which has been modified to include the construction of the apartheid wall that has been established around the West Bank cities and villages. The construction of this wall made the Israeli Planners implement their plans in reduced time period, without the wall this period could extend to about 20 years to achieve the desired aims; that why this project is being implemented without returning to the Palestinian – Israeli Agreements. Objectives of the apartheid wall (Kutcher, 2004) are as follows:

1. The apartheid wall itself is a changeable political border, so that we find (Olmart) -Israel prime minister- has changed the wall path to include the vast settlements in the West Bank.

2. The apartheid wall draws the borders of the Greater Jerusalem Project, consequently; it forms a physical barrier that makes Jerusalem out of relation and continuity with the West Bank. Besides it contributes the existence of four large settlement centers around the four directions of Jerusalem. So that (Kefar Asion) will form the southern leg of Greater Jerusalem, (Ma’alieh Adomiem) shall form the eastern leg and its geography will extend to reach the area of Dead Sea. The centre of the western leg is (Giv’at Ze’ev), and the centre of the northern leg is (Chilo).

3. The apartheid wall will confiscate part of the West Bank ground water main basins.

4. The apartheid wall shall devastate the Palestinian cultural heritage centers and tourism aspects.
Besides all above, Israel has implanted within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries 16 settlements with huge Jewish population besieging the Palestinian Neighborhoods with massive Jewish blocks see (map 1).

To guarantee the success of the (The Stars) plan, (Weiss Plan) was proposed, its implementation needed 2.5 billion dollars per year for a total time period of 10 years. (Weiss) suggests that the plan shall be financed by the pubic and private sectors in Israel, besides the international monetary supports. Weiss Plan proposes the joining of almost all the main Israeli settlements, and 30 other settlements are left for future merging with other settlements (Kutcher, 2004).

According to the understanding of Sharon’s Plan, we have to determine the area that shall be given to the Palestinians to establish their state that does neither have the terrestrial land and aerial access, nor have ground/surface water under its control. When (Weiss) was asked “How shall the Palestinians drink?” he answered: “the water of Litany River in Lebanon pours in the sea, it could be transferred to the West Bank in agreement with the Lebanese Government, and could be financed annually!” (Kutcher, 2004).

“Sharon’s Plan” according to the engineering description is considered a quadripartite frame that captures West Bank within two directions, east from Jericho to the south of Hebron (to Alzaheriah and Tarkumia). This plan will provide the Zionistic residential densities needed to make the project of Greater Jerusalem within the eastern leg form the
main centre that shall form the skeleton by its bypass roads (about 80% of those roads are completed). Therefore, the southern leg will be the main artery of this plan (Kutcher, 2004).

Map 1: Areas of expansion in Jerusalem settlements between 1996 and 2005
Source: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ 2006
Sharon has proposed establishing 11 new settlements, and developing two main settlements along the Green Line (Friedman, 2003). Those two settlements are the main foundation of the Greater Jerusalem Project. One of them is (Mod’een) along the southern line that links between the southern part of Jerusalem and the eastern part besides Jericho till Alkamran Region and up to Aljalil villages. According to Sharon plan we find four settlements, (Bitar and Lahav) lie in the southern region, (Roglit and Shkiv) in the west, these two settlements are extending to complete the logistic extension of (Mod’een Settlement) and (Jiv’at Ze’ev) in the west. And to save balance of settlements growth, evidences are apparent to expand the region of (Alnabi Somail) to be extending easterly to (Al’adasi) hill that lies in the west part of Beit Hanina, see (map 1) to notice the Israeli settlements’ expansion (1996-2005).

The eleven proposed settlements are (Mas’ot Goborin, Arkhovit, Agoz, Hrob, Miged, Mertam, Debirem, Eastern Sensana, Western Sensana, Hiran, Betir north, Betir South) (Kutcher, 2004). These settlements form military areas attaining political and economical potentials for Israel. Besides, they will be the catastrophic barrier that will prevent the Palestinian rural areas to develop and get use of their agricultural lands.

(Goborin Settlement) will be expanded on the Palestinian Village called Sorif (at Hebron), Arkhovit Agoz be expanded on the Palestinian Village called Tarkomia (at Hebron), Hrob and Shkiv will be established in front of (Ethna town) in Hebron. As to (Miged settlement) shall break the continuity of the southern Palestinian villages and those Palestinian villages lying in the eastern part of the West Bank.
When (Benjamin Netanyahu – Israel Prime Minister from June, 1996 to July, 1999) announced the addition of 30,000 dwellings in (Efrat), he gave details of “Sharon’s Plan” which was called the (The Stars), when Sharon was a Housing Minister (Al-Ahmadi, 1999). Therefore, (Sharon) moved to renew his plan and to cancel Oslo Agreement by ignoring the whole Palestinian-Israeli Agreements and violating the international laws and the International Court of Justice ICJ as well as the United Nations’ decisions against the Israeli unilateral plans and strategies. “Sharon’s Plan” is that belt which is guyed around the Palestinian agglomerations in the West Bank, to deplete their resources, and break their hopes down from coming back to the occupied land in 1948.

Sharon’s Plan was put to determine the demographic densities as a form of Israeli majority that will need great residential agglomerations in the West Bank. On the other hand, it provides powerful open areas, that can be used to link the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, the southern and the northern parts of the West Bank, and the area along the Egyptian – Israeli boarders (Friedman, 2003).

The Israeli planner tries to weaken the Palestinian memory, since he/she believes that as he passes the second plan to the Palestinian, the first one will have been already forgotten. Israel has succeeded to change the Palestinian international case to become a problem. Therefore, we have to do our best to go back to the whole case and integrate it to declare to the world that Sharon’s Plan is a planned problem.
1.3 Problem Statement:

Israeli Planning paradigms ignore the Oslo Agreement, as well as, the Road Map Plan. They have made the Jerusalem Governorate a non-negotiable issue; also they hide the Palestinian refugees return hopes in the darkness files. In the absence of political stability in the region, Israel makes use of the political events to create new methodologies and planning directions to serve its benefits in a manner far away from the signed agreements with the Palestinian and against the international laws. Consequently, the Israeli scissors has not stopped neither cutting the Palestinian lands nor plundering their natural resources, besides, devastating the Palestinian Infrastructure, economy, agriculture, historical and cultural heritage, tourism, etc. This Israeli Planning Policies have damaged the Palestinian physical and social landscape (Dumper, 2002; Khamaisi, and Nasrallah, 2003).

The construction of the apartheid wall has lead to three main pivots making the Palestinians lose their natural and historical features, besides, their character components. Those pivots are, first: underground water basins are within the apartheid wall pathway. Second: The Palestinian historical and cultural heritages are within the apartheid wall pathway. Third: Isolating the West Bank. The absence of the integrated Palestinian studies that criticize and disapprove the Israeli Plans has aggravated the problem, and negatively reflected to the Palestinian potentials (economical, political, social, etc.) that are supposed to form the foundation of the Palestinian independent state, accordingly, hopes are contracted for the existence of the Palestinian independent state that has clear boundaries and jurisdictions.
1.4 Research Significance:

The Research deals with the Israeli planning policies followed in East Jerusalem with all its dimensions (logistical, cultural, economical, political, etc.), besides it develops a comprehensive historical analysis of the Israeli Planning Policies which created the fragmented Palestinian Landscape in East Jerusalem.

1.5 Objectives:

1. Analyzing the Israeli planning policies, and studying their influences upon the Palestinian and Landscape in Jerusalem.
2. Providing comprehensive study that shows the broken Palestinian Landscape resulting from the on-going Israeli Policies in Jerusalem.
3. Providing suggestions and policies that are to be followed to minimize the damage and harm.

1.6 Research Questions:

- The Israeli plans were found before occupying the West Bank, their contents were developed and expanded within the historical growth of Israel, will these plans stop developing and expanding, or shall they be reformed?
- How do the Israeli Planning Policies alternate according to the Arab demographic factor?
- What are the main planning problems in East Jerusalem?
- What are the main features of planning regime in Jerusalem?
- How do the Israeli Planning Policies use the open/green spaces to control the East Jerusalem Development?
1.7 Research Methodology:

Mainly, to cover the research dimensions, the historical, analytical, comparative, and the descriptive approaches shall be used. The current impacts resulting by the Israeli planning policies will be discussed, besides, future scenarios for Jerusalem will be proposed. Related literature and maps shall be studied and evaluated. Available Statistics were reviewed, in addition to Personal interviews.
Chapter Two

East Jerusalem – The Current Planning Situation
2.1 Introduction

East Jerusalem is the area that was annexed to the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem in 1968, extending from Kafr 'Aqab in the north to Sur Bahir in the south, this area totals approximately 70,500 dunams. The Jerusalem Municipality has prepared town planning schemes for almost all the existing neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, so that planning has been completed for the entire built-up area (with the exception of the Shu'fat refugee camp, which is included in the "East Gate" town plan, currently in the initial planning stage). It should be recalled, however, that East Jerusalem also includes some 24,500 dunams that have been expropriated, mainly for the construction of new neighborhoods intended for the Jewish population. Thus approximately one-third of East Jerusalem has been removed from the reserves of land available to the Arab population. Of the remaining area, only some 9,100 dunams (approximately 13% of the total area of East Jerusalem prior to the expropriations) are zoned for residential construction; additional planning is needed in many of these areas before building permits may be received. Thus the planning of the east of the city has almost been completed and valid town plans exist. Yet these do not meet the needs of the population that lives in East Jerusalem nor allow for the development of this area, as will be indicated in this study (Khamaisi, 2003).

The research presented in this study relates to the planning situation in East Jerusalem after forty years of Israeli rule. Statutory planning has far-reaching ramifications for the possibilities open to individual residents regarding building (whether or not they may build, and according to what conditions). It also determines the character of the public domain. Forty years of
planning have left an indelible mark on the geography and demography of East Jerusalem. As part of the research work many urban town plans for the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem were reviewed, including both approved plans and those deposited for public inspection.

2.2 Past Planning Present Situation

As a result of the Six Day War (in 1967) a planning vacuum in East Jerusalem was created which has only gradually been filled by the Israeli planners. After the city was, the formal validity of the Jordanian plans applying to this area was nullified. During the initial period after the 1967 war these plans served as "shadow plans" guiding decision makers in granting building permits on an ad hoc basis. In 1975 areas were defined in East Jerusalem in which building permits could be received subject to various conditions. These conditions established a number of permitted construction densities: in "class 5" residential areas 50% density was allowed on two floors; in "class 6" residential areas 25% was allowed on one floor. Building permits were issued subject to these conditions and in accordance with the provisions of Section 78 of the Planning and Building Law, which is designed to enable the authorities to issue building permits during the period between the announcement of the preparation of a town planning scheme and its approval (Hyman, 1996).

The use of Section 78 was intended to solve urgent problems pending the preparation of general outline plans for the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. By its very nature this was clearly intended to be a temporary arrangement. However, since the preparation of general outline plans began only in the 1980s, the provisions of Section 78 became a dominant tool
in the planning of East Jerusalem (Hyman, 1996).

In the early 1980s it was decided to prepare master plans for all the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. Most of these have since been completed: 23 have been prepared and 19 approved, while the remaining 4 plans are at advanced stages of the approval process. Four additional plans are at various stages of the planning process (East Central Business District, Slopes of the Mt. Of Olives, "East Gate", and Givat Hamatos.) A large number of small-scale urban town plans have also been submitted on behalf of private landowners; these usually relate to the local planning of a single plot, the establishment of divisions, zoning, changing the contours of a building, etc. Some of these plans have been approved, some have been rejected and some are still being considered by the planning committees (Friedman, 2003).

As noted in the introduction, more than one-third of the total area of East Jerusalem has been expropriated for the establishment of new Jewish neighborhoods in the east of the city: the Jewish Quarter, East Talpiot, Ramot, Gilo, Neve Ya'akov, Pisgat Zeev, The French Hill, Ramat Eshkol, Maalot Dafna, Atarot and, most recently, Abu Ghneim (Har Homa).

Of the 45,500 dunams remaining after the expropriations, planning has been completed and approved for approximately 38.7% of the area (17,600 dunams). Planning procedures for the remaining area (61.3%) have yet to be completed: approximately 7,100 dunams are at an advanced stage of planning, and an additional 5,000 dunams are at preliminary planning stages. Of the planned areas approximately 40% are defined as open space in which no
construction is permitted; approximately 37% are zoned for residential construction. The approved plans earmark approximately 6,100 dunams for residential construction. Of this total, approximately 1,000 dunams require the preparation of unification and reparation plans that will take many years to prepare and approve before building permits can be issued. Therefore, approximately 11.2% of the total area of East Jerusalem only is available to the Palestinian population for residential construction. A study of the aerial photographs shows that this construction is possible mainly in existing built-up areas (Arnon, 1998).

The total potential for additional housing units in the approved plans (excluding areas requiring unification and reparation) is approximately 5,000. From this number one must deduct an unknown number of housing units for which building permits cannot be received for various reasons. Of the total area of East Jerusalem prior to the expropriations, approximately 7.3% only is available for residential construction, and approximately 0.6% for commercial and industrial construction. The remaining areas are zoned for various needs that do not enable private sector exploitation, or are unplanned areas. Consequently, small area of the total area of East Jerusalem is available to the Palestinian sector for any kind of private sector development (Arnon, 1998) see figure 2.1.

According to (Arnon, 1998) anyone can clearly notice and realize the bias in the Israeli planning policies adopted in Jerusalem as shown in table 2.1.
Despite the Israeli plans and policies to restrict the development of East Jerusalem and the Palestinian Arab Neighborhoods, the Arab rate of increase was always bigger than the Jewish rate. Table 2.2 illustrates the population development of the Jewish and Arab in Jerusalem. However, further and more accurate surveys are to be run as soon as possible by Palestinian technical people (NGOs, CBOs) to clear out the real up to date population reflecting the Jewish into Jerusalem immigration and the Arab away from Jerusalem migration.

Also a comparative between “the time period of the year 1967 and the year 1997” according to the Jerusalem statistical abstract 1996 of how many houses were provided to both sectors in Jerusalem (the Arabs and the Jews) - see figure 2.2 - absolutely will clear out again the Israeli discriminative planning policies that are being practiced on the Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem to force them to leave their places and move outwards Jerusalem whether to the West Bank or even out of Palestine.
The construction density and the population density per dunam are lower in East Jerusalem than in West Jerusalem. This reflects the fact that Palestinians are unable to exploit the un-built area and are compacted in their homes. Also this reflects the low income rates in the Arab sectors. Arab residents of Jerusalem are relatively "rich" in land, but "poor" in floor space. Also this reflects the low income rates in the Arab sectors. This reflects the high rate of the Israeli horizontal expansion in West Jerusalem.
It is true that the nominal growth of the Jewish population during this period was higher than that of the Arab population. However, a calculation of the relationship between the increase in the number of housing units and the increase in the population reflects a clear asymmetry between the two sectors.

Figure 2.2: Comparison of housing providing in Jerusalem 1967-1997*
* information by (Aron, 1998)
2.3 Planning Problems in East Jerusalem

An examination of the overall planning map of East Jerusalem and an analysis of the tables of land usages reveal a number of planning problems.

2.3.1 Absence of overall planning for East Jerusalem

This is the fundamental planning problem in the east of the city. The plans for this area have been prepared in isolation without overall systemic planning relating to East Jerusalem in its entirety. The overall planning map shows that each neighborhood has been planned separately with the objective of solving local residential problems (Arnon, 1998). These plans were prepared at different periods, do not relate to the area as a whole, and do not present a perspective which unites the neighborhoods into a single urban fabric.

The result of this approach is that there is no factoring in of transportation or other services on the urban level, beyond individual neighborhoods. This includes such facilities as institutions of higher education, commercial and employment centers, leisure areas, health and cultural facilities, etc (Arnon, 1998).

2.3.2 Open landscape area

Most of the plans allocate extensive areas for open landscape area. Approximately 40% of the total planned area of East Jerusalem is zoned for this purpose. Construction is completely forbidden in open landscape area, where the permitted usages include forestry, groves, agriculture, and existing roads. Unlike open public land, open green spaces are not expropriated from their owners and remain private property. The zoning of areas for open landscape in
Jerusalem is influenced by a number of factors (McFadden, 2001):

a) The maintenance of the wadis (dry river beds) as open areas, while concentrating construction on the ridges of hills. This is one of the main planning principles in Jerusalem.

b) Preservation of the visual basin of the Old City. The visual basin of the Old City is a particularly sensitive area because of its landscape and its deep religious and historical value. This basin is both a national and international asset. Building plan (AM/9 - 1986) for the Old City, which governs this area has established planning principles intended to allow development while strictly preserving the natural and rural-style landscape of the area. The detailed plans for the neighborhoods of Abu Tor, Silwan, Ras Al-Amud, A-Shaykh, A-Suwaneh and A-Tur were all prepared on the basis of this plan.

c) Demographic and political considerations: The planning of Jerusalem is influenced by government policy dictating that a proportion of 78% Jews and 22% Arabs should be maintained in Jerusalem. To this end, it has been necessary to restrict the development of the neighborhoods in the east of the city. One consequence of this policy has been the zoning of areas for open landscape on a basis that relates not to professional planning or design considerations, but rather to arbitrary decisions establishing the limits of construction.

The clearest example of this policy is the planning for the Arab neighborhoods of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat in northern Jerusalem (Arnon, 1998). When the planning process began, extensive areas in these neighborhoods were earmarked for residential construction on the scale
of some 12,500 housing units. On the basis of government policy, the district committee decided to restrict construction to 7,500 housing units and to earmark large areas for open landscape. Numerous objections to these decisions were submitted by private landowners whose land was earmarked for open landscape. The committee decided to remove these areas from the scope of the plan, since it could not really counter the objectors' arguments in terms of planning considerations. The removal of the open landscape area from the planning in no way alters their legal status, since these areas are earmarked for open landscape in the general outline plan for north Jerusalem (Plan 3000B -1991 / Jerusalem Municipality) (McFadden, 2001).

In the south of Jerusalem, extensive areas are earmarked for open landscape. The plan for Sur Bahir earmarks approximately 42% of the planning area for open landscape, while the plan for Arab A-Sawahara allocates no less than 60% of the total area of the plan for this purpose. The areas earmarked for open landscape include several clusters of existing buildings as well as isolated buildings. Some of these buildings are long-standing while others have been built recently without permits. In Arab A-Sawahara, for example, built-up areas - particularly on the borders of the built-up zone - have been earmarked for open landscape. Zoning as open green spaces means that house owners cannot extend their homes or connect to infrastructure services. The instructions attached to the plans include a clause stating that in "lawful" existing buildings within open green spaces, no additional building will be permitted, with the exception of extensions required for the purpose of sanitary improvements to an existing building. In practice, the use of the word "lawful" prevents any building extension, since it is difficult to prove that long-standing buildings were constructed "legally," while the new buildings were built "unlawfully" (McFadden, 2001).
In conclusion, therefore, one notes that in addition to the objective and professional planning considerations dictating the zoning of certain areas for open landscape, extensive areas have been zoned for this purpose on the basis of political and demographic considerations. Decision makers have sought to limit the development of areas that are appropriate and suitable for construction. It may be assumed that if design and planning principles were the sole criterion, much of these areas would have been zoned for construction.

2.3.3 Building density

Most of the plans for East Jerusalem establish a low rate of permitted construction density, i.e. rates of 50%, 37.5% and 25% (Khamaisi, 2003) [The construction density reflects the ratio between the permitted built up space and the size of the plot. For example 50% building rights allow 500 m² built up space on a plot of 1000 m²]. These figures may be appreciated when compared to those for the Jewish sector in Jerusalem. The building plan for the new neighborhood of Ramat Beit Hakerem, for example, proposed a building density of 120%, while the plan for Ramat Rachel has a proposed density of 136% (McFadden, 2001).

The low rates of building density in East Jerusalem have been presented by Israeli decision makers as an attempt to preserve the rural-style character of these areas from the design perspective and on the basis of the assumption that the Arab population is not interested in urbanization. However, many Palestinians see this as no more than a pretext for the application of political considerations limiting the development of East Jerusalem. Since the Palestinian population is not involved in the planning process it is impossible to determine whether and to what extent this policy indeed reflects urban Palestinian culture during the relevant period.
(residence in semi-rural contexts) and/or an Israeli attempt to impose rural construction patterns on this population for demographic and political reasons. Experience suggests that both claims are partially correct (Arnon, 1998).

A summary of the data in the zoning percentages in East Jerusalem Neighborhoods shows that approximately 60% of building areas in East Jerusalem have been allocated a construction density of "Class 5" residential level, i.e. 50% in two floors; a density of 37.5% has been established for 14% of the areas; and a density of 25% has been established for 4% of the areas. Only for 21% of the areas have higher urban-level densities of 75% and 70% has been established. In fact, only the Arab neighborhoods of North Jerusalem (Beit Hanina and Shu'afat) have been defined as urban neighborhoods with a density of 75% in the central areas. Ramallah Road serves as a central commercial route, lined by construction at a density of 150% on three floors for commercial and residential purposes. Though, there has been a tendency for the planning committees to approve higher levels of density in the rural areas, both in response to existing development trends and with the goal of improving land exploitation. Thus, for example, the district committee has decided to increase the construction densities in Kafr Aqab from 50%, 25% and 10% to 75%, 70% and 50% respectively. In Sur Bahir and Um Tuba, the district committee has decided to increase the densities from 25% to 50% and from 50% to 70% respectively. This decision followed the submission of objections to the plan and reflected a desire to enable more efficient exploitation of the available land (Arnon, 1998).
2.3.4 Allocation of land for public uses

All the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem face a severe shortage of space for public use, including land for the establishment of educational institutions and other public services (health and cultural services, youth and sports facilities, welfare institutions such as senior citizens' clubs, and so on) (Kroyanker, 2002). There is a sharp discrepancy between the allocation of land for public use in East Jerusalem and in the west of the city. In the plans for East Jerusalem, approximately 6% of the planned area is zoned for public buildings, while approximately 11-14% is allocated for this purpose in West Jerusalem. The main reason for this is that most of the land in East Jerusalem is privately owned. As a result, it is difficult to locate sites for public institutions. In West Jerusalem most of the land is under public ownership. Two main approaches have been used to cope with the need to allocate land for public uses in East Jerusalem (McFadden, 2001):

a) Unification and reparceling plans have been prepared according to which a number of privately-owned plots are unified and then reparceled after deduction of approximately 40% from each plot for public uses.

b) The expropriation of entire plots owned by the village, or expropriation of 40% of large privately-owned plots.

Planning measures in themselves cannot solve the problem, however. Even if sufficient land is zoned for these purposes, both the above-mentioned procedures make it difficult to implement public building projects.
The plans for the Arab neighborhoods of North Jerusalem have addressed the problem of the allocation of land for public uses by means of unification and repacement. A public sector projected needs program has been prepared for Beit Hanina and Shu'afat (based on the standards of the Israeli Ministry of Housing) and approximately 400 dunams have been allocated for public buildings. In order to obtain these areas, numerous compounds have been earmarked for unification and repacement (Kutcher, 2004). This is a long and painstaking process that will take many years, during which construction in these areas (for both residential and public purposes) is frozen.

In plans for other areas, attempts have been made (in cooperation with the mukhtars or elders of the villages) to locate land owned by the village that may be used for public purposes, or to locate large privately-owned plots from which 40% (or even the entire plot) may be expropriated. However, this method yields only a part of the total area required for public uses, and these plans show a sharp discrepancy between the areas actually allocated for public buildings and the areas required according to the program. In the plan for Arab A-Sawahara, for example, 44 dunams were allocated for public buildings; according to a program prepared on the basis of maximum population capacity, 96 dunams are required for this purpose.

The plan for Jabal Mukabir allocates just one dunam for public buildings, on the assumption that the residents of the neighborhood will use the educational facilities of Arab A-Sawahara. The plan for Abu Tor allocates 10 dunams for the construction of public
buildings, though the program requires 55 dunams. In Shaykh Jarrah and Bab A-Zahra 22 dunams have been allocated for public uses, while the program requires 80 dunams. In A-Shaykh Jarah 19 dunams have been allocated while approximately 50 dunams are needed, and in Belt Safafa 66 dunams have been allocated although there is a need for 119 dunams. In all these neighborhoods the shortage of public buildings will only become more acute as time passes (Arnon, 1998).

In the neighborhoods of Ras Al-Amud, Isawiyah, A-Suwaneh and A-Tur, sufficient land has been allocated for public uses in the plans, but problems have emerged in financing the expropriations. This problem is due to financial difficulties on the part of the Municipality of Jerusalem, which needs funds to finance expropriations but has difficulty budgeting the necessary amounts (Arnon, 1998).

Another example of the problems involved in allocating land for public buildings is the plan for Sur Bahir, which earmarked 105 dunams for public institutions. The deposited plan determined that these areas would be obtained through the preparation of a building and development plan for compounds defined in the plan. The plans for these compounds are essentially unification and reparceling plans the approval of which depends on the consent of all the landowners within the compound. It was established that if the landowners' consent is not obtained, non-consensual plans for unification and reparceling will be prepared. As already noted, this is an extremely awkward process that has aroused considerable opposition among the residents. During the discussion of the objections, it was decided to rescind the requirement for building and development plans since this would in practice lead to the freezing
of all building in the area for many years. However, the alternative means by which land becomes available for public uses - expropriations - is no less problematic, for financial and other reasons (Arnon, 1998).

2.3.5 Allocation of open public spaces

All the plans of the Arab Neighborhoods in East Jerusalem show a profound shortage of open public land, i.e. parks and developed public gardens for the use of the local population. The limited allocation of land for gardens and parks is based on the fact that considerable areas are allocated for open landscape in East Jerusalem. However, the open spaces are actually undeveloped space that cannot serve as a substitute for public gardens, including playgrounds for children and space for leisure activities. On the other hand, in West Jerusalem in the Jewish neighborhoods and settlements large open public spaces are assigned as shown in (figure 2.3).

While in the Jewish neighborhoods whether in West Jerusalem or in East Jerusalem, there is no shortage of the public open spaces. On the contrary, the earmarked areas for the open public areas are earmarked on the high standards of planning as shown in (figure 2.3).
Each Jewish resident of the city is allocated approximately 12.4 square meters of gardens and parks close to his/her home, while each Arab resident is allocated 1.9 square meters.

Only 2.2% of the total area of East Jerusalem is earmarked for Open Public Spaces

In Ramat Beit Hakerem, 12% of the total planned area is earmarked for open public spaces

In Ramat Rachel, 19% of the total planned area is earmarked for open public spaces

This means that Arab residents have only 5.8% of the total area of parks close to their homes in the city, despite the fact that they constitute some 33% of the total population and live in residential areas that occupy 38% of the total area.

Public Parks of Jerusalem occupy a total area of 5,540 dunams

Only 324 dunams are in the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem

5216 dunams are in the Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem

Figure 2.3: Comparison of open public spaces in East & West Jerusalem*
Source: Researcher.
* Information by (Arnon, 1998)
2.3.6 Allocation of commercial areas

The plans for East Jerusalem include almost no allocation of areas for commercial use, such as hotels and industrial zones. Allocations for these purposes are mainly on the basis of local considerations reflecting existing land use rather than an overall perspective promoting the creation of employment possibilities for the residents of East Jerusalem. In all the plans for East Jerusalem, approximately 140 dunams were allocated for commercial areas - just 0.5% of the total area. In Beit Hanina and Shu'fat areas are allocated along Ramallah Road for commerce combined with residential uses. In Ras Al-Amud, Wadi Jawz and A-Suwaneh, areas are allocated for hotels in places where hotels already operate. Two additional plans - the East Central Business District and the plan for an industrial zone adjacent to the Atarot airfield - have been prepared but have not yet been deposited (Jerusalem Municipality, 2001).

Table 2.3 shows the zoning in East Jerusalem according to Israeli planning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zoning Designation</th>
<th>Area (Dunams)</th>
<th>% of Planned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>9178</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Landscape Area</td>
<td>9564</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>3613</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Public Area</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Or Industrial Areas</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Not Included In the Plan</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24655</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Zoning Designation under the Existing Town Plans in East Jerusalem
Source: Jerusalem Municipality, 1999.
2.4 Realizing Building Potential

In many neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, and particularly in central areas such as Abu Tor, Silwan, Ras Al-Amud, A-Sawani, A-Tur and Jabal Mukabir - most of the potential for construction has already been exploited. In the northern Arab neighborhoods and in the neighborhoods to the south of the city (Sur Baher and Arab A-Sawahara) considerable potential remains. In Arab A-Sawahara, for example, the maximum capacity is approximately 1,650 housing units. In Beit Hanina and Shu'afat the potential is approximately 1,800 units. However, this potential cannot be exploited in the short or medium term due to a variety of planning problems and bureaucratic, legal and financial obstacles.

The planning problems will be appreciated after examining the clauses in the planning instructions relating to the conditions for granting building permits. The bureaucratic, legal and financial problems inherent in this process are discussed separately below.

2.4.1 Special conditions required in order to obtain building permits

2.4.1.1 Tracts for unification and reparceling

"In areas defined in the plan as areas for unification and reparceling, a building permit shall be issued solely after preparation of a detailed plan including unification and reparceling."

This condition delays any possibility of new construction for many years, since the process of preparing and approving plans for unification and reparceling is prolonged and painstaking (Jerusalem Municipality, 1994). A unification and reparceling plan provides for the unification
of a number of private plots which are then re parcel ed, after deduction of up to approximately up to 40% from each plot for public uses. The objective of the plan is to expropriate areas for public uses in such a manner that land is expropriated from all the landowners in an equitable manner. This is a prolonged process even in the context of the Jewish areas of West Jerusalem, but even more so in the east of the city, for the following reasons (Hoffman, 2002):

a) Land regulation: In many sections of East Jerusalem there is no modern title registry. Not all landowners are registered in the "Tabu" (Land Registry). This may lead to lengthy delays in re parceling due to the need to examine claims of ownership and to rationalize the delineation of the new tracts of land.

b) Residents show a lack of understanding of the process of unification and re parceling and an unwillingness to accept its results. This process means that some owners receive plots in different locations than their original plots, and find this difficult to accept.

c) The areas earmarked for unification and re parceling are compounds including a large number of plots and owners. Since it is impossible to reach consensus among all the landowners, the plans are prepared without the owners' consent. This process leads to numerous objections from residents, delaying the approval of the plan for lengthy periods.

The detailed plans for Beit Hanina, Shu'fat and Kafr Aqab all include extensive areas earmarked for unification and re parceling. Indeed, most of the available areas that offer a potential for new construction are defined as compounds for unification and re parceling. The result is that building in these areas has been completely frozen pending approval of the plans - again, one must recall that this process may take years. Plan 3458A for Bayt Hanina earmarks
12 compounds for reparceling, with a total area of approximately 710 dunams. Plan 3457A for Beit Hanina earmarks 9 compounds for reparceling, with a total area of approximately 600 dunams. Plan 3456A for Shu'fat earmarks 23 compounds for reparceling, with a total area of approximately 623 dunams (Arnon, 1998). These conditions delay development since the bureaucratic procedures are extremely time-consuming, see figure 2.4.

Most of the plans for East Jerusalem establish special conditions for obtaining building permits on plots of more than one dunam

Plans for Arab A-Sawahara, Isawiyah and Abu Tor state that the granting of building permits for plots larger than one dunam will require the approval of the local committee of a building and development plan for the plot or the submission of a plan for the parceling of the plot.

Plan for Arab A-Sawahara determines that for plots larger than 6 dunams, a condition for the granting of a building permit will be the depositing and approval of a detailed plan according to the legal provisions.

Plan 3085A for A-Sheikh determines that for plots larger than 3 dunams a detailed plan will be submitted to the committee including allocations for public uses.

Figure 2.4: Special conditions for obtaining building permits on plots of more than one dunam
Source: Researcher.
* Information by (Hoffman, 2002).

2.4.1.2 Establishment of the height of adjacent roads as a condition for granting building permits

Several plans condition the granting of building permits on the establishment of the height of roads bordering the relevant site. The plan for Isawiya is an example: It includes a large number of new roads that have not yet been planned and whose vertical profile (elevations)
has not been established. This restriction will delay the provision of building permits for a long time.

2.4.1.3 Restriction on building extensions to existing buildings in open green spaces

The plans for Arab A-Sawahara and for the Arab neighborhoods of North Jerusalem determines that any additions to "lawful" existing buildings in open green spaces will be prohibited, with the exception of extensions required for the purpose of sanitary improvements to an existing building. In Arab A-Sawahara, for example, many buildings exist within the open green space; some of the buildings are very old. In practice this condition prevents extensions since most of the buildings were established unlawfully.

2.4.2 Legal, bureaucratic and financial problems

2.4.2.1 Land ownership and the problem of "absenteeism"

Most of the land in East Jerusalem has never been registered in a modern title registry. The large number of landowners and inheritors means that providing the proof of ownership, necessary in order to receive a building permit, is a lengthy, complex and expensive process. In areas that have not been registered in the “Tabu”, landowners must provide evidence of ownership from the property tax authorities (property tax is levied on undeveloped urban land with the objective of encouraging building). In East Jerusalem the possibilities for development have been artificially restricted, yet at the same time a tax has been imposed on residents who cannot build. The freezing of planning in urban areas entitles residents to exemption from property tax according to Section 79 of the Planning and Building Law. Unlike the situation in West Jerusalem, residents of the east are required to produce a certificate
proving that each and every one is not an absentee as a condition for receiving a building permit. For this purpose, even a landowner who has moved to the West Bank, but within view of his plot in Jerusalem, is considered an "absentee" landowner (Arnon, 1998).

2.4.2.2 Development levies

All residents of East Jerusalem must pay development levies (sewage, roads, etc.) in order to receive a building permit. While the development levies paid by Jewish and Arab residents are identical, the discrepancy in income levels between the two populations means that the levies constitute a greater burden for the residents of East Jerusalem. In many cases this makes building impossible for financial reasons (Kutcher, 2004).

2.4.2.3 Licensing process

In many cases the licensing process in East Jerusalem is infinitely more complex than in the west of the city, due to problems relating to existing infrastructures and bureaucracy. Most of the plans for the east of the city were prepared on the basis of imprecise photogrammetric maps on a scale of 1:1,250 or 1:2,500. As a result, when landowners attempt to receive building permits they often encounter a range of problems preventing the receipt of a license, such as access roads that do not reach the plot, unacceptable widths of access paths, steep inclines, etc. In many cases, planners find it difficult to develop solutions that are acceptable to the professionals in the municipality, and residents find themselves returning time after time to the bureaucrats' offices. In order to solve problems, residents are sometimes obliged to submit local town planning schemes for their plot - a process that creates an additional delay of several years before a building permit may be obtained. Thus the path to a building permit is paved with endless obstacles (Hoffman, 2002).
Chapter Three
The Unilateral Israeli Planning Policies in Jerusalem
3.1 Introduction

Jerusalem is the heart of every Palestinian and is the focal point for the three monotheistic religions. Since 57 years Jerusalem has been suffering from the Israeli occupation which aimed at Israelizing the city; erasing its Arabic culture and history and evacuating the city from its Arab inhabitants. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss in detail the five stages of calculated Zionist planning and implementation of conquering and controlling both East Jerusalem and what is today referred to as Greater Jerusalem. If one is able to understand the goals of Zionism concerning Jerusalem, then s/he can also understand the overall aims of Zionism concerning all of Israel and the 1967 occupied territories.

3.2 Planning Skeleton in Israeli Policies

Since 40 years, Israel had not hesitated from implementing its colonization project in the West Bank, especially in and around Jerusalem. Additionally the Israeli government imposed restrictions on the Palestinian development in Jerusalem from all aspects: the economic development, the physical and urban development, the social development and the human development. Following are the procedures the Israeli government pursued to reinforce the impediments to the physical and urban development (Jacob, 2004):

- Land confiscation
- Impose restrictions on land use
- Constructing Israeli settlements and bypass roads
3.2.1 Land confiscation

More than 32% of the lands inside the municipal boundary in east Jerusalem were confiscated. Jewish settlements were constructed on these lands.

3.2.2 Restrictions on land use

The Israeli government has imposed planning and zoning restrictions in East Jerusalem and enforced impediments on land use. Israel formulated policies that restricted land development and construction. These policies had the aim of imposing the Jewish supremacy in the city and undermining the Palestinian presence in it. The processes of obtaining building permits became long, tedious, expensive and disadvantages Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. Buildings constructed without permits are usually demolished by Israeli authorities.

Following are some of the policies that were adopted by the government in East Jerusalem (Benvenisiti, 1998):

- Confiscating the Palestinian land; nearly one third of the lands in east Jerusalem were confiscated to construct Jewish settlements.
- Decreasing the area zoned as residential in the Palestinian neighborhoods in the city.
• Imposing restrictions on the volume of construction and the floor area ratios.
• The Palestinian areas lacked a town planning scheme or zoning plans, were only 38% of the remaining two thirds had an approved zoning plan.
• House demolition under the pretext of having no building permits or for security reasons. According to a study conducted by the Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), a total of 629 Palestinian houses have been demolished in Jerusalem during the last ten years.
• 13% of the areas were zoned as green areas where construction is prohibited. The green areas will be released to build Jewish settlements as was the case with Reches Shu'fat and Abu Ghuneim (Har Homa) settlements.
• Services and infrastructure lacked in the Palestinian neighborhoods resulting in under serviced and unhealthy living environment, the pressure on Jerusalem's land and natural resources has been devastating as well.

The Israeli policies in Jerusalem have managed to reduce the urban growth within the city and forced it to the city's fringes by excluding some of the dense Palestinian Arab clusters. An example would be Al-Ram village that lies just on the outskirts of the municipal boundary whose population increased by 84 times during the fifty years (1952-2002), Also Abu Dis, Dahyet Elbarid, and Bir Nabala (ARIJ, 2005).

3.2.3 Constructing Israeli settlements and bypass roads
Israel planned to strangulate the Holy city with Israeli settlements and highways (map 3.1; map 3.2) thus decrease the possibility of Palestinian development in the city and limit the prospects for East Jerusalem to be the capital of the future Palestinian state. Illegal Israeli settlements are being built in East Jerusalem in order to increase the Jewish Israeli population, maintain the demographic majority of Jewish Israelis within the municipal boundaries and strengthen the Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem.

The Israeli government had constructed settlement blocks that grow towards each other circumventing the Palestinian neighborhoods and isolating the Palestinian city from the rest of the West Bank. The first Israeli colonization activity in Jerusalem was soon after the 1967 war where the Israeli bulldozers entered the old city and demolished a whole neighborhood to expand the Jewish neighborhood from 7 dunums to 130 dunums. Furthermore, Israel was able throughout the past 38 years to get hold of 78 Palestinian properties in the old city outside the Jewish quarter.

3.2.4 Settlement expansions

Between August 2002 and August 2004, Israel constructed around 32,632 new housing units in 58 settlements in the West Bank (PSBC, 2005). The bulk of this Israeli construction occurred in settlements in the East Jerusalem and Bethlehem regions in the region known as the 'Greater Jerusalem,' which includes the Ma'ale Adumim block, Gosh Etzion Block, Givaat Zeev and Giv'at Binyamin blocks. Approximately 15,400 units (47%) were added to Jerusalem settlements and nearly 10,500 units (32%) were constructed in the Bethlehem settlements. The largest expansion projects occurred in the following five settlements (most of them are within 'Greater Jerusalem' region):
- Ma'ale Adumim (Jerusalem): 5,712 new housing units
- Betar Illit (Bethlehem): 4,832 new housing units
- Har Homa (Bethlehem): 3,692 new housing units
- Har Adar (Jerusalem): 2,832 new housing units
- Giv'at Binyamin or Adam (Jerusalem): 1,536 new housing units
Map 3.2: Current Road Networks in East Jerusalem
Current Israeli plans call for continued settlement expansion in the West Bank, particularly within the "Greater Jerusalem" area. A report released by the Israeli daily Yedoit Aharonot on February 25, 2005 revealed that the Israeli government has planned at least 6,391 new housing units as part of Israel Lands Administration (ILA) settlement plans for 2005. A list of settlements and expansion plans printed in the article, however, places the planned expansion at 7,891 units. Furthermore the ILA plan for 2005 includes also the consolidation of 120 illegal outposts in the West Bank, for which planning and contractual arrangements will be made.

3.2.5 The Segregation Wall around Jerusalem

The segregation wall around Jerusalem (map 3.3) is planned to extend for 190 km, extending from the settlement of Har Adar, encompassing the Giva'at Ze'ev settlement block, slicing between Palestinian communities, extending eastwards and encompassing the Ma'ale Adumim settlement block, and stretching toward the south and encompassing the Gosh Etzion settlement block. 40 kilometers of the Segregation Wall were completed by mid 2005, 40 km are under construction while 110 km are planned sections, of which 40 km are for the Ma'ale Adumim settlement block envelope. The segregation wall will isolate 230km². The isolated area includes 30 km² of Palestinian built-up area, 50 km² of Israeli settlements built-up area while 65% of the isolated area in Jerusalem is an open area. The Jerusalem envelope will segregate 45% of the Jerusalem Governorate area and 13% of the Bethlehem Governorate area. There will be around 230,000 Palestinians in

Deep discussion about the segregation wall is in section 3.4
Jerusalem that will be cut from the rest of the West Bank and will be segregated by the Wall.

The wall aims in East Jerusalem, as in the rest of the West Bank, to expropriate as much Palestinian land as possible and sever the traditional connection between Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. The route of the Wall reinforces the settlement blocks and expropriates additional lands for the settlement expansions and other development projects.

3.3 Tactics in Israeli Planning Policies

The following are the main five tactical stages followed to implement the Israeli unilateral planning policies.

3.3.1 Stage 1: Planning

From the beginning, one of the most significant dilemmas facing Zionism was how to control the maximum amount of territory with a Jewish population, which was by far the demographic minority. Because Jerusalem was and remains the most extreme point of friction between the Israelis and Palestinians (Khamaisi, 2003), it was first necessary for the Israelis to develop an extensive and complicated plan to be executed slowly through various stages so that the end result was complete Jewish control of all of Jerusalem and the Greater Jerusalem area.

Shortly after the 1967 War, an inter-ministerial committee composed of the Jerusalem Municipality, the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Police and
the Israeli Army was created to fulfill the Zionist goal of controlling the land and clearing away the demographic presence of Palestinians. This committee has fulfilled and maintained its aspiration of "72% Jewish – 28% Arabs." That is, their objective is to ensure that the Palestinian population in Jerusalem never exceeds 28%. A secondary aim is to ensure that this percentage declines steadily.

The mechanisms in place to realize this goal stem from the above mentioned ministries whose work includes respectively, occupying the land, controlling the population, repressing any Palestinian national presence, and isolating the Palestinian Jerusalem population from the rest of Palestinian society.

The goal of achieving a "United Jewish Jerusalem" includes the land of West Jerusalem and the territories of the West Bank annexed to Israel in 1967. Before the war, the total area of Jerusalem was 38 square kilometers. After the Israeli annexation, the area totaled 70 square kilometers. The borders of the annexation are neither historical, nor are they borders of Jordanian Jerusalem (Jacob, 2004). They are instead the result of an order given by the Israeli government of 1967 to a group of Israeli senior officers: "maximum territory, minimum [Palestinian] population."

After officially and forcibly annexing the land, the next stage was directed at declaring the function of the lands. 92% of the "unpopulated" lands of Jerusalem were declared green areas. In Israel green areas, a more sophisticated form of land confiscation, are both used to stop the natural growth and expansion of Palestinian villages and neighborhoods and to eventually use them for the building of new Jewish settlements. From this moment on, Palestinians were forbidden to build in Jerusalem; all newly built houses were/are
considered illegal and demolished by the Israeli government. If a family wished to build a house, the Israelis happily and swiftly encouraged them to build just outside the city limits; thus, provoking the first wave of Palestinian emigration.

The Israelis effectively completed this stage of Palestinian ethnic cleansing without engaging in too much confrontation, for the Palestinians were unaware of the stages that would follow. Those Palestinians who left during this stage did so with their Jerusalem ID cards and the belief that their access to Jerusalem was not threatened.

3.3.2 Stage 2: Residency Rights

After bringing a complete stop to the expansion of Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem, the next stage, implemented in 1995, aimed at controlling the demographic issue. A policy of Palestinian residency rights was developed which aimed to deny access to all Palestinians who did not possess an Israeli-granted Jerusalem residency ID card. Furthermore, of the thousands of Palestinians, who originally left Jerusalem, due to the fact that they were forbidden to build on their land, today more than 85,000 are in jeopardy of losing their Jerusalem ID cards (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS, 2006).

Suddenly, Palestinians, who were not originally from Jerusalem, despite, for example, the fact that their spouse was from the city, were denied to lawfully reside (and eventually even enter) Jerusalem. That is, no Palestinian from outside the Jerusalem municipal boundaries has the legal right to live with family members who have Jerusalem residency
rights; therefore, this policy acts as the second stage of Palestinian ethnic cleansing in Jerusalem. Clearly, most married couples, for example, given no choice will consequently move outside the municipal borders in order to simply live together. In doing so, the Jerusalem-Palestinian must relinquish his/her Jerusalem ID card and all of his/her rights to ever live in Jerusalem (Arnon, 1998).

Residency rights also affect Palestinians from Jerusalem who wish to leave the country for business or to study abroad. After a certain period of time (2 years), which of course is determined by the Israelis, Palestinians lose their residency rights.

This stage of cleansing Jerusalem of Palestinians leaves them with two options: leave Jerusalem and never return, or stay in Jerusalem and never leave, even for a short-term period – and often under appalling conditions.

3.3.3 Stage 3: Jewish Settlement Building

Stage one and two were cleverly executed by Israel; however, it was not enough to stop Palestinian growth geographically and demographically. The third stage aimed at populating East Jerusalem area with Jews by implementing Israel’s policy of massive Jewish settlement. In 1993, for the first time ever, the Palestinians became the minority population (49%) inside East Jerusalem. In other words, the Jewish-Israeli presence in East Jerusalem grew from 0% to 51%. Still, it was not good enough, but rather a mere start (Kroyanker, 2002).

The settlements, so-called the "inner-ring," of Gilo, Ramot, Pisgat Zeev, Neeve Ya’akov, Atarot Industrial Zone, and soon to be completed Har Homa, have precisely been built to
surround all of Jerusalem, including the somewhat large Palestinian neighborhoods and villages trapped in between. The settlements gain their strength not by their demographic population but rather by their mere strategic location and the series of sophisticated bypass roads which both connect them to each other as well as to Jerusalem. The goal of settlement building, which continues to expand today, clearly fulfills the aim of controlling the maximum amount of space or land, by an amazingly small number of Jewish settlers, with a minimum Palestinian presence. Today there are 16 Israeli settlements inside the Jerusalem municipal boundary (table 3.1), these are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement name</th>
<th>Date of establishment</th>
<th>Area in 2005 (in dunom)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mamilla</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Quarter</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>135.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atarot</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1377.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Talpiyot</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1829.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilo</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2749.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Hamatos</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>287.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Shappira</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>687.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew University (Har HaTzofim)</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>957.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Yaacov</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1240.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgat Amir</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2515.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgat Zeev</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1545.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Eshkol</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1118.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramot</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3343.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rekhes Shuafat</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1624.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras al A'mud (Ma'ale Ha zeitim)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Homa</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Israeli settlements inside the Jerusalem municipal boundary
There are 32 settlements within the Jerusalem governorate boundaries (table 3.2), see (map 3.4), these are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement name</th>
<th>Date of establishment</th>
<th>Area in 2005 (in dunom)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sha'ar Benyamin</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>574.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamilla</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Quarter</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>135.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalya</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>867.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settler Houses in Old City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allon</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>294.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almon ( Anatot )</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>807.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atarot</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1377.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Talpiyot</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1829.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Hadasha</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>313.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Hadasha B</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Shappira</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>687.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givat Zeev</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1545.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Har Adar (Givat HaRadar)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1192.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebrew University (Har HaTzofim)</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>957.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedar</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kfar Adummim</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>751.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maale Adummim</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>6510.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mizpe Yedude</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>310.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Shamual</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>391.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Yaakov</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1240.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgat Amir</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2515.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisgat Zeev</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1545.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Eshkol</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1118.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramot</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3343.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rekhes Shuafat</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1624.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Givon</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>118.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mishr Adummim (Industrial Center)</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3377.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neve Brat</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>871.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokhav Yaakov</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2311.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam ( Geva Benyamin)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1194.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ras al A'mud (Ma'ale Ha zeitim)

Table 3.2: Israeli settlements within the Jerusalem governorate boundaries Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS, 2006.

Map 3.4: Israeli settlements inside Jerusalem Governorate

3.3.4 Stage 4: Separation and Closure
To achieve the Israeli planning policies goals in controlling Jerusalem and making subordination in the economical and institutional aspects, Israel adopted the policy of separating Jerusalem from the West Bank.

The fourth stage, implemented in March 1993, consisted of creating a series of nine military checkpoints around Jerusalem as a way in which to close Jerusalem from the neighboring Palestinian cities and villages. The checkpoints which have been established for the pretext of "security," monitor and prohibit Palestinian movement from the West Bank to Jerusalem and were put in place to delineate a border between the West Bank and "United Jewish Jerusalem" (Najib, 2004). They furthermore serve the purpose of completely separating the West Bank from the remaining Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. This forced disconnection of Palestinian residents living in the West Bank to East Jerusalem consequently aids in the Israeli goal of strangling East Jerusalem politically, economically, socially, and culturally. In order to "deal" with the presence of Palestinians, the Israelis have had to invent sophisticated forms of dispossession and ethnic cleansing.

Jerusalem was once the center of cultural, administrative, and political life for the Palestinians – not to mention the fact that it contains some of the most holy sites for both Muslims and Christians (Hoffman, 2002). Today, for example, Makased Hospital operates at only 65% of its capacity, for those in need of health services are denied access to Jerusalem by the soldiers at the checkpoints. This reality raises a serious dilemma for Palestinians: on the one hand, they are struggling to keep Palestinian Jerusalem alive, on the other hand, their "clients" and those in need of services as important as health, are
denied access to the facilities in East Jerusalem. If the hospital, for example, moves to Ramallah to meet the needs of the people, they will be accused of helping the Israelis cleanse Jerusalem; if they stay they cannot help those who need it most.

During stage two, Palestinians were denied the right to live in Jerusalem. Stage four ensures that no Palestinian is even allowed to enter Jerusalem – not even for a single hour. The closure has culminated in the fourth stage of ethnic cleansing, where Palestinian businessmen of all types are forced to leave the city in order to survive economically. Furthermore, East Jerusalem is dying culturally: why host a Palestinian film festival or music concert if no Palestinians can attend? The culture itself is also being forcibly shifted to the West Bank, particularly Ramallah.

The closure also accomplishes another important Zionist goal: the complete separation of the northern West Bank from the southern West Bank. Ramallah, in the north, and Bethlehem in the south, are completely separated from each other as a direct result of the closure of Jerusalem to Palestinians (Najib, 2004). The only way in which over 1.5 million Palestinians can travel from the north to the south is through the dangerous and often deadly road, Wadi Nar, which means the Valley of Fire or the Valley of Hell. This "trans-Palestinian" highway was [re]built after the closure and remains the only route on which Palestinians can travel from north to south. This road is perhaps the highlight of the Settlement Tour in that the participants feel the life of the Palestinians as they traverse through the valley and around the steep and dangerous curves which does not and will not sustain the heavy traffic. The closure has both successfully separated any continuity
in the West Bank as well as created terrible roads on which the Palestinians must travel, tripling the time it would normally take them to go from Bethlehem to Ramallah.

3.3.5 Stage 5: Greater Jerusalem

The above four stages cleverly Judaized East Jerusalem. The battle has now shifted to Greater Jerusalem (map 3.5). This new concept of Greater or Metropolitan Jerusalem erupted after Oslo when the Israeli governments no longer proclaimed that Jerusalem will be forever Jewish but rather that Greater Jerusalem will be forever Jewish. This stage was implemented to ensure that the land already confiscated by Israelis as well as the "space" would forever remain in the hands of Jews. It furthermore aimed to annex approximately 40% more land from the West Bank. The implementation of this final stage includes the building of a series of by-pass roads, which connect the settlements to each other as well as the settlers. Consequently, the former discussion of withdrawal from the West Bank has shifted to a discussion of what percentage of the West Bank can the Israelis afford to give to the Palestinians (Kroyanker, 2002).

Conquering Greater Jerusalem would not be possible in the absence of by-pass roads. The roads are essential in controlling the maximum amount of space with the minimum amount of Jewish settlers. This stage is further aimed at the idea of ensuring that the Palestinians (the demographic majority in Greater Jerusalem) are surrounded by Jewish
continuity, which comes in the form of these by-pass roads connected to the various settlements.

The most important settlement blocks in the "external ring" of Greater Jerusalem are Givat Zeev, built on the Palestinian lands of el-Jib and Biddo, which includes Givon Hahadash, Mahane Guivon, and Givat Zeev, and Maalai Adumim – the largest Israeli settlement outside Jerusalem. Some of the land formerly belonged to the Bedouin from
Map 3.5: Projection for the Israeli proposal for Jerusalem's final status
the Jahalin tribe who have now been evicted and transferred to the municipal garbage
dump and are even forced to live in garbage-like containers (Friedman, 2003).

Maalai Adumim is an excellent example of what Yitzhak Rabin really meant when he
made a verbal agreement to the United States administration guaranteeing that
"settlements would not be expanded substantially." The formal "municipal territory" of
Maalai Adumim as decided by the Israeli Civil Administration, includes all of the land
between East Jerusalem and Azaryeh Abu Dis and the settlement of Vered Jericho
(located at the border of Jericho). Every new settlement built in this area is considered to
be "enlarging, not substantially," the existing settlement of Maalai Adumim (Kroyanker,
2002).

The other important settlements in the Greater Jerusalem area include the Gush Etsion
Block, which is connected to Jerusalem by a by-pass road beginning in Gilo, (by-passing
Bethlehem and its surrounding villages). This same road leads to Efrat, a settlement
which is steadily creeping along from south to north in order to connect the Estonia
Block to Jerusalem as well as to surround Bethlehem.

3.4 The Apartheid Wall

3.4.1 Background

Until (recently - 2003), when any of the hundred thousand people in Al Eizarya, Abu Dis
or Sawahre wanted to reach Jerusalem, all they had to do was take Al Eizarya's main
road, which connects to the Jerusalem-Jericho road, and within minutes they could reach
the Old City, those days are gone (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, 2005).
Today the Al Eizarya road comes to a sudden halt at a wall eight meters high, topped by rolls of barbed wire. What was once a major artery has become a parking lot for service cabs. If you want to get to Jerusalem, you must turn around, drive east to a checkpoint at the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, turn around again and head northwest to the A Zaim checkpoint, then to French Hill… and finally to East Jerusalem.

Even if you take this approach, however, your arrival in Jerusalem – supposing you're a Palestinian – depends on additional factors. First, the checkpoints: the soldiers don’t always let Palestinians through. Second, anyone seeking to enter Jerusalem must have a blue identity card (Jerusalemite) and not a green one (West Banker). This measure rules out half the people of East Sawahre and the vast majority of those from Abu Dis. These may enter only by a special permit, rarely granted.

3.4.1.1 Security?

The barrier looks like it's meant for security. In open areas, it is more than 40 meters wide (figure3.1), consisting of barbed wire, an anti-vehicle ditch, a dirt path to pick up footprints, an electric fence, another dirt path, an asphalt road, yet another dirt path, and more barbed wire. In built-up areas, it becomes a wall eight meters high (figure3.2).
Figure 3.1: Section in the Apartheid Wall in the un built-up areas

Figure 3.2: Section in the Apartheid Wall in the built-up areas
If the barrier is intended for security, however, its course is very odd. It does not separate Jews from Arabs, or Arab villages from settlements. It separates Arabs from Arabs. It includes about 60,000 West Bank Palestinians who are not Jerusalem residents, while fencing out 26,000 of the 230,000 who are Jerusalem residents can travel anywhere in Israel.

By nipping off pieces beyond the municipal border, the wall continues the policy of annexation begun in 1967. Until the June war of that year, Arab Jerusalem amounted to a modest 6000 dunams (1500 acres), which comprised the Old City and several neighborhoods. On the 1967 war's last day, the Knesset decided to annex it along with another 64,000 dunams. The guiding principle was this: as much land and as few Arabs as possible. Israel annexed the refugee camp in Shuafat (it isn't including the camp within the new wall), Jabal Mukabir, parts of Al Eizarya, parts of Abu Dis, parts of Beit Hanina,

and parts of a dozen other West Bank villages. Jerusalem, thus enlarged, stretched from the fringe of Bethlehem to that of Ramallah. It divided the West Bank into separate cantons, north and south.

Jerusalem had always played an essential role in the lives of the villages surrounding it, whether or not these became part of the city after 1967. It has the commercial centers, hospitals, universities, government agencies, news agencies, and of course the holy places. It supplied the villages not only with goods and services, but also with great job opportunities. The wall cuts through all that. Take, for example, the tribe of Arab al-Sawahre. Some of its members live in Jabal Mukabir, which was annexed to Jerusalem

Figure 3.2: The 8-meters height Apartheid Wall in an overview of Qalandiya fortified checkpoint Source: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ 2006.
and is inside the new barrier. But others live in East Sawahre and Sheikh Sa'ad, which were not annexed and will be fenced outside. In pre-barrier times the tribal members could visit one another without impediment. There was marriage, friendship, commerce—all the relationships that go to make up a human life. As a result of marriages, half the tribal members wound up with blue ID's and the rest with green. Now comes the barrier, dividing blues and greens on one side from blues and greens on the other, separating the store from its customers, the farmer from his lands, the pupils from their school, the sick from the hospital, the dead from the cemetery (Cheshin, 2005).

Security, as said, is a pretext. The barrier establishes the new border intended for Jerusalem. Its purpose is to isolate the surrounding Palestinian villages, cutting them off from each other, and strengthen the Israeli settlements, creating continuity between them. It will prevent the establishment of Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. The broader aim is to prevent the possibility of a normal Palestinian state or, for that matter, a normal Palestinian life.

### 3.4.2 The Convergence Plan

Map 3.6 shows the new Occupation scheme to ensure Palestinian rights continue to be negated and violated: the Convergence Plan. The plan is Israel’s latest attempt to legitimize the Palestinian ghettos, to permanently annex territory in the west of the West Bank, seal Palestinians in from the east, and surround a series of Palestinian Bantustans. Within the ruins of these leftover territories is to be found the future state of Palestine.
The project for which the Occupation now seeks the complicity of the international community will (The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs PASSIA, 2006):

- Annex all territories and resources west of the Apartheid Wall.
- Consolidate the annexation and ethnic cleansing of Jerusalem by confining further Palestinian residential areas outside the Wall.
- Create 3 Bantustans and 5 ghettos in and around Jerusalem for Palestinians which fall dramatically short for providing the means by which development can occur, whilst denying Palestinians the right to a dignified life.
- Cover up a further 20% increase of settlement capacity within the West Bank.
- Bypass the International Court of Justice ICJ decision on the illegality of the Wall, as well as numerous international laws and the UN resolutions.
- Continue to deny Palestinian refugees their legal and just right of return.

The territory to be under Palestinian “administrative responsibility” reveals the same structures of miserable ghettos evident in all previous plans: Palestinians will have no control over borders. Living between razor wire fencing and the Apartheid means a prison regardless of its size.
Map 3.6: The Occupation’s Convergence Plan
3.4.3 Judaizing Jerusalem - the Ethnic Cleansing

The Apartheid Wall is almost completed in Jerusalem, snaking around Palestinian communities and shutting them out of the city. Settlements expand and new colonies emerge on the Palestinian lands left isolated behind the Wall. A railway project seeks to integrate the illegal settlements into the city.

In East Jerusalem - like the rest of Palestine - life and existence is suffocated into ever-smaller ghettos and expulsion an imminent threat. For over a thousand years the city has been a hub of cultural, religious and social activity. It reflected a diversity of cultures, a rich ethnic diversity. However, enormous changes since 1948 threaten not only to destroy the unique fabric of the city, but the rights of the Palestinian people to reside in their capital. Jerusalem has always been a central demand of Zionist ideology and leaders who wished to see it cleansed of Palestinians for Jewish settlers. That demand is now becoming a reality (The Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ, 2005).

3.4.3.1 The Judaization of Jerusalem since 1948

Destruction in the Old City directly after the 1967 saw the demolition of the Maghariba Quarter containing 125 houses for a plaza for the Western Wall. Meanwhile, West Jerusalem was cleansed of its Palestinian residents in the first half of 1948. Its Judaization was secured by the forced expulsion of approximately 80,000 Palestinians from their homes and properties. 38 Palestinian villages in West Jerusalem were
destroyed during the 1948 war. Numerous settlements were built on the ruins and occupied lands of these villages (The Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ, 2005).

The creation of the "Jewish Quarter" in the Old City came from the transfer of Palestinians from their homes and from the confiscation of property for the benefit of Jews. More settlements sprang up around Jerusalem, on land confiscated from the districts of Ramallah and Bethlehem. Their presence isolated remaining Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem and formed a physical outer ring around the city. This cuts Palestinians in Jerusalem off from the rest of Palestine (Najib, 2004).

A policy of systematic and deliberate discrimination against the Palestinian population was developed in Jerusalem through land expropriation, planning permission and building laws. Like Apartheid South Africa, the Occupation uses a racist ID card system. In Jerusalem Palestinians hold "temporary residency" ID and are subjugated to discriminatory laws and taxes. Moreover, hundreds of Palestinians have these IDs revoked on a yearly basis, reflecting a common tactic used to drive Palestinians out of the capital (Najib, 2004).

In a rapid amount of time the Occupation constructed an illegal settlement municipality of Jerusalem at odds with international law and the rights of the Palestinian people. Over half of the Occupation municipality today was not part of the city before 1967, but parts of Bethlehem and 28 other West Bank towns.

During the Oslo process new measures were taken to shut Palestinians out of their capital. Checkpoints were placed on the entrances to the city. Palestinians in Gaza and the
West Bank were refused entry. After the outbreak of the Intifada (September, 2001), Palestinians in Jerusalem have been forbidden to enter West Bank except for Ramallah. A steady exodus of Palestinian organizations and commerce began from the centre of Jerusalem into outlying areas such as Abu Dis, Ezawiya, Beir Naballa and Al-Ram so they could continue to operate (Kutcher, 2004). The social and cultural life of the city began to disintegrate under the Occupation closures and continued the suffocation of Palestinian areas.

3.4.3.2 The Segregation Wall

Once the wall is finished throughout Jerusalem it will total 181km. By December 2005, over 130km of the 8-meter high concrete structure had been constructed. Completion by early 2006 has left the majority of Palestinians in and around Jerusalem – around 190,000 people - facing two options. To stay in Jerusalem's ghetto neighborhoods, subjected to high Occupation taxes, imprisoned by Walls and a life under siege. Secondly, exile into what remains of the West Bank and Gaza or abroad, and permanent loss of the right to live in the Palestinian capital (McBlack, 2004).

Given that Palestinians rely on Jerusalem for employment, basic services and education, the Wall is beginning to depopulate these villages as well as tearing families and communities apart. In the last months (of the year 2006) 80% of the population of West Esawiya village have deserted their homes in order to remain in Jerusalem. Out of a population of 5000 people, only around 1000 Palestinians now remain in this village and
with the wall's completion they will be prevented from entering Jerusalem (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS 2006).

The Wall around Jerusalem ensures the annexation of all the settlement blocs around the city (also known as "the Jerusalem Envelope") and their expansion on the Palestinian lands stolen by the Wall. A chain of 181 Km, the concrete Wall forms a series of ghettoized Palestinian neighborhood Palestinians are being shut in by the Wall and the settler roads into 4 main ghettos (The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs PASSIA, 2006):

**Northwest** Beit Duqqu, Beit Ijza, Qbeba, Beit Sourik, Beit Anan, and Qatana will be merged into one ghetto. Occupation Forces have confiscated and isolated 14,669 dunums from these villages. The North West ghetto has lost 5 martyrs so far in demonstrations against the Apartheid Wall.

**North** Beit Hanina, Qalandiya, Beir Nabala, al- Jeeb and Jodaira form a ghetto. Between them the villages will lose at least 10635 dunums from the Wall.

**East** where Ar-Ram, Jaba', Hizma, and Shoffat form a ghetto, isolated from 6500 dunums of their lands.

**Southeast** Abu Dis, Anata and Eizarya Ghetto where the 8-meter high concrete wall runs through the school playground sealing off around 13,000 dunums for Maale Adumim.
Map 3.7: The Apartheid Wall in Jerusalem
3.4.3.3 Major Impact on the segregation plan on Jerusalem Governorate

The construction of the segregation wall has negative impacts on the economical, social as well as environmental aspects of the Palestinians’ lives. Following is a summary of those major impacts (Geopolitical Status in Jerusalem Governorate – Applied Research Institute Jerusalem 2006).

3.4.3.3.1 Political impacts

- For the second time, Israel will have redrawn unilaterally the political boundary of occupied Jerusalem.
- the segregation wall will manipulate the geographical balance of the governorate with more than 44% of its area taken in towards Israel, thus forces Jewish majority to the city’s demography.
- The plan will serve the organic tie between Jerusalem and other Palestinian Governorate.

3.4.3.3.2 Economic impacts

- The segregation plan stands to cause severe damage to the Palestinian agriculture sector and to the Palestinian farmers as a result of land confiscation and the constraints imposed on mobility and marketing.
- Israel maintains control over the Palestinian trade and tourism.
- Increase the unemployment and poverty levels.
- Inflammation in land prices and more diminishing investment opportunities.
3.4.3.3 Impacts on social life

- Thousands of Palestinian citizens will be cut-off from the main urban centres where health, educational and social services located.
- Harsh measures are imposed on Palestinian mobility and movement, transportation from or to the segregated areas will be extremely difficult.
- Increased urbanization pressure and population densities.
- Palestinian Christian and Muslims will not have access to the holy sites in Jerusalem unless they have special permits to enter Jerusalem issued by the Israeli civil administration.

3.4.3.4 Impacts on the Palestinian Environment

- Decline the space area designated for landfills and wastewater treatment sites.
- Diminish in area designated as natural reservations, forests, pastures, open spaces, and recreation.
- Loss of grazing area and increase in desertification.
- Distort wildlife cycle and cuts-off different kinds of animals from their natural habitat particularly during migration seasons.
- The segregation plan is altering the Palestinian natural landscape.
- Many archaeological and historical related to Palestinian cultural heritage will be segregated behind the wall.
- Loss of open space which poses a threat to the sustainability of the urban and rural areas as well as a threat to more loss of the natural resources and biodiversity.

3.4.4 The New Israeli Disengagement Plan

The New Disengagement Plan (map 3.8) shows the completed sections of the Apartheid Wall in the northern West Bank (in black) and the remaining planned sections in blue.
The Occupation’s first phase of the Wall in the northern West Bank, from Zububa village in the Jenin district to Masha village in the south of the Qalqiliya district, resulted in 51 villages losing most of their agricultural lands behind the Wall. In villages like Jayyus in Qalqilya and Qaffin in Tulkarem, the Wall annexed some of the most fertile lands in the West Bank, leaving Palestinians with nothing. Here Israeli settlements like Alfe Minashe are expanding on lands isolated behind the Wall, while a new settlement is now under construction just behind the Wall on the isolated lands of Jayyus (The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network PENGON 2005).

The Occupation Government, in an attempt to conceal its colonial expansionist plans behind the building of the Wall, claims a new route for the Wall has been designed. However, although some changes in the Wall route were made in individual villages like Zawiya in Salfit, and Biet Inan and Beit Surik in northwest Jerusalem, and in the southern, and western Hebron areas, the Wall route continues as before in the rest of the West Bank, annexing some 47% of the West Bank. It will leave Palestinians in ghettos or semi-ghettos, linked together with tunnels and bridges under Occupation control. What is new in this fresh Wall route is that it is done under the title of a disengagement plan approved by Americans and Europeans who chose to consider it as part of the “road map”. What is “new” now is that the Wall is built in line with the Israeli /western visions of peace, while in reality perpetuating the Zionist, colonialist project (The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network PENGON 2005 / Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ 2006).
Map 3.8: The Wall and the New Disengagement Plan
The blue line on the map shows the uncompleted planned phases of the Wall as approved by the Israeli cabinet on February 20th, 2005. The Analysis of the disengagement plan reveals the following (The Apartheid Wall 2005 Report - The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network PENGON):

1. The completed parts of the Wall are some 145 km, while the second phase in which work for the new sections of the Wall has started since last year extends some 210 km on the West bank lands in addition to more than 90 km for the so-called Jerusalem Envelope.

2. The Wall annexes large areas of lands, cutting through the middle of the West Bank in Salfit to annex Ariel and the Shomron settlement blocks, and in Jerusalem annexing the Etzion, Giv’at Ze’ev and Ma’ale Adumim settlement blocks leaving Palestinians in ghettos with no expansion potential. Annexing these settlement blocs with the already annexed settlements in the northern West Bank will result in the loss of 554 km2 of the West Bank. This is almost 9.5% of the total West Bank land mass.

3. Excessive area taken in by the Wall is located in East Jerusalem and its surroundings, leaving the Palestinian City and its suburbs as a fractured cluster of semi-ghettos, robbing Palestinian citizens of their last remaining prospects for urban development in their capital and fatally depleting the West Bank’s capacity for socio-economic rehabilitation.

4. However, Israel does not count Jerusalem as part of its figures regarding the Wall and the West Bank. The Wall as projected around Jerusalem practically
annexing all what is included in the current occupation municipal boundaries of East Jerusalem (except Kafr Aqab, North of Qalandiya). Yet in an attempt to mislead the world about the real size of lands annexed behind the Wall, Israel doesn’t include the 70 km2 taken from Jerusalem, totaling 1.2% of the West Bank. Furthermore, Israeli calculations exclude the 46 km2 (0.8% West Bank) stolen in Latrun. Both areas taken together make some 116 km2, or 2% of the West Bank. This 2% of the West Bank should be added to the 7.6% of land annexed by the Wall.

5. The so-called “Jerusalem Envelope” extends form Beit Horon in the northwest of the city to the southwest Kfar Etzion settlement in the Bethlehem district. The Envelope will annex the Ma’ale Adumim settlement block, to the east of Jerusalem city, annexing 62 km2 (just over 1% of the West Bank), 71 km2 from Etzion West in southwest Jerusalem, and 31 km2 in the Giv’on block northwest of Jerusalem. Altogether this adds up to 237 km2.

6. In the west Bethlehem area and in northwest Jerusalem two main settler road bypasses cut in the middle of the West Bank Highway 60 (Beit Jala-Khadr) and Highway 443 (South of Rafat), functioning as separation and ghettoizing tools. Both roads, already parts of them are, will be walled in on both sides.

7. In the Etzion settlement block the wall is projected to extend from Har Gilo moving around the Palestinian villages of Walaja (including Ain Juwaizeh) and Battir isolating them behind the Wall toward Wadi Fukin where it ends, leaving a huge gap with where the Wall is coming from (Bethlehem). This gap
can be best explained by the huge expansion plans Israel has for its settlements in this area, both West and East of the Green Line (Zur Hadassah, Geva’ot and Bat Ayin) which it does not want to become unlinked by a Wall in this area.

8. The Ariel settlement finger, will upon completion annex 123 km2, totaling 2.1% of the West Bank.

9. The Jordan Valley, as shown in the map, remains, with or without a wall, under Occupation’s control except for Jericho. Settlements built to the east of almost every Palestinian city establish a “belt” isolating these cities from their eastern lands and from the Valley. This is in addition to settlements inside the Valley itself. Moreover, the presence of occupation military training camps, settler controlled water resources and the isolation of Palestinian villages all strengthen the Occupation’s control over the Valley. Annexing the Jordan Valley will mean the further annexation of 28% of the total West Bank land.

10. The Wall as completed and with the planned sections, form part of the Israeli “disengagement plan”, considered by the Europeans and Americans as part of the “Roadmap” and the Israeli/western vision of a “viable state”. It will lead to the creation of a Bantustan state. In principle the Israeli rhetoric around “viability” serves to legitimize the illegal activities of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank. The West Bank is one unit. It forms one piece of territory. Yet in the realities being carved out on the ground the term continuity or contiguity will never apply except within the misleading rhetoric of the United
States and Europe, whose support for the Apartheid system that Israel is creating is vital. They are willing to accept the creation of this Apartheid with its cantons, and ghettos and call it a state.

3.4.5 Settler Roads and Tunnels

A spider network of settler roads, bridges and tunnels continue to surround Palestinians villages and towns further ghettoizing them. The Occupation Forces have begun constructing 24 tunnels for Palestinian use while they remain barred from settler-only roads. Such roads, and the obligatory security zones which accompany them, separate Palestinians from their lands, isolating villages and towns from each other. Six tunnels are already completed, the rest under construction or pending.

Tunnels and settler roads will imprison Palestinians in a system of apartheid forging scattered and separated ghettos. This network of roads, together with the Wall, encircles Palestinians and perpetuates the Occupation’s control over the Palestinian ghettos and people. With one road leading to one village, or a group of villages or a whole district, the Occupation Forces can invade, bomb or destroy a whole community, and withdraw, leaving Palestinians trapped with no sovereignty, no security, and no control over their lives (The Apartheid Wall 2005 Report - The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network PENGON).

These roads and tunnels, along with the Apartheid Wall create the borders for a final settlement to be enforced upon the Palestinians. The occupying forces call this “a viable state” - creating separated ghettos linked by a system of tunnels and low roads controlled by Occupation Forces - satisfying American calls for “maximum contiguity” (The Apartheid Wall 2005 Report - The Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network PENGON).
Facilitating Disengagement - Israel's West Bank Road Plan - 2004

Map 3.9: The Israeli's West Bank Road Plan 2004
Chapter Four

Green Spaces and Open Landscapes Policies in East Jerusalem
4.1 Introduction

Open landscapes besides greenbelts have long been considered an effective tool in containing and shaping the urban growth. Other purposes of open spaces have competed for priority throughout the twentieth century, which sophisticates the application and analysis of this tool. Greenbelts concepts were developed in London and diffused to many cities, including Jerusalem, where the British controlled planning from 1917 to 1948. After the Israeli occupation of West Jerusalem in 1948 and the unification of East and West Jerusalem in 1967, Israel has created planning policies using open landscapes to restrict the future development of the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and disintegrate them ethnically as will be shown in this chapter.

Rapid urbanization is a global phenomenon, and cities require an increasing amount of land and other resources (Yokohari et al., 2000). Expanding cities also generate air, soil, water, light, and noise pollution (Haughton and Hunter, 1996). However, urban citizens expect a high quality of life, including good public health, an unpolluted environment, good food and safe drinking water, as well as possibilities for recreation in open green spaces (Botkin and Beveridge, 1997). Satisfying these aspects, along with economic and social well-being are the important components in the development of sustainable urban environment (WCED, 1987; UN, 1992). This chapter explores the Israeli planning policies stressing on the open landscape as a planning tool used to restrict the future development of the Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem.
4.2 Topic Terminology
The study of urban landscape, often known as ‘urban morphology’, has attracted the interests of scholars in a number of fields; most importantly in geography, but also in architecture, planning and, to lesser extent, history. Within geography, urban morphology ‘belongs as much to historical geography as to urban geography; a fact that reflects the longevity of the urban landscape that is the urban morphologist’s object of study (Whitehand, 1987a). In particular, its roots are in the morphogenetic research tradition of central Europe, dating back to the work of Schlueter. He postulated a morphology of the cultural landscape as a counterpart in human geography of geomorphology within physical geography (Schlueter, 1899). Within industrial countries, this made the urban landscape a major research topic. Much of the recent work by geographers and other interested in planning and management of landscape attaches considerable importance to the historical forms created by previous generation (Slater, 1990a). Jerusalem by its texture combines the historical and the modern landscape perspectives; this makes planners give it special value.

4.3 Historical Perspective
The history of urban morphology during the first half of the twentieth century, and its diverse research traditions, have been the subject of recent investigation (Whitehand 1981, 1987a, 1987b; Slater 1990b). Publications dealing with the physical form of urban areas became more evident during the 1980s. Nevertheless, they formed only 12% of geographical papers on the internal structure of cities in the middle of the decade (Whitehand 1986). By 1990 it was felt that there was sufficient international interest in the
urban landscape amongst academics and professionals in a range of disciplines for the
international Conference of Urban Landscape which was convened in (Stockholm-1991)
(Whitehand and Larkham 1992). Jerusalem has acquired special attention in the related
planning literature, since it forms an invaluable mixture of the cultural heritage of the main
monolithic religions on the globe.

When Ebenezer Howard put forth the idea of the garden city in 1898, he was looking, in
part, for an antidote to the ills of the urban life. His solution, idyllic in concept, called for a
town set against a background of the country. Various sources contributed to the thinking
of Howard and his contemporaries, as the search for an improved community was not new.
Part of the inspiration may have been the Livitical city of the Bible (Osborn 1969, p. 167).
Howard (1966, p. 1) began his classic “Garden Cities of To-morrow” with a reference by
the poet William Blake to the preeminent Biblical city. “I will not cease from mental strife /
nor shall my sword sleep in my hand / till we have built Jerusalem / in England’s green and
pleasant land”.

4.4 Policies of Green-Open Spaces

The origins of the concept of greenbelts long predate the initial use of the term (Thomas
1970). Definition of the greenbelts has clear confusion in Jerusalem, indeed, there is no
hard-and-fast definition. In Jerusalem no statutory status distinguishes the land included in
the belt or its use. Instead, the title greenbelt is applied by the quasi-governmental agency
responsible for afforesting and maintaining a portion of the public land in and around the
city. The Jerusalem greenbelt ranges from several kilometers at its broadest to as few as
twenty meters at its narrowest and covers an area of approximately thirteen square 
kilometers (Cohen, 1994, p. 75). The benefits of greenbelts are to improve the city 
aesthetics and health. Therefore in East Jerusalem those green spaces are not noticeable and 
rare. On the other hand, open landscapes are widely allocated, since they damage the Arab 
neighborhoods and devastate their landscape integrity and restrict their future development. 
Green area zone in the master plan of Jerusalem is about 12.7 percent of total land of East 
Jerusalem (map 4.1) (Abdelrazek, 2004). The master plan of East Jerusalem (map 4.2) 
shows that all the Arab neighborhoods are surrounded with lands regarded as green zone 
except Beit Safafa and Kafr ‘Aqab. This means that these lands are to remain park zone 
or agricultural lands. On the other hand, lands surrounding Israeli settlements are 
classified under planning zone which permit a future possible expansion. In practice, 
lands that were classified as green area in the planning schemes would eventually be 
confiscated for Israeli use in building new Jewish settlements. This policy is used to 
block the Palestinian development in one hand whereas to expand the Jewish growth on 
the other.

Greenbelts have been firstly used by the British in Jerusalem. British plans for Jerusalem 
predated official commencement of the mandate: they had been initiated in 1917 before the 
final breakup of the Ottoman regime in Palestine. With Turkish troops still in the town of 
Nablus, slightly more than eighty kilometers from the gates of Jerusalem, the British 
commander General Allenby summoned the city engineer of Alexandria, William McLean, 
to Jerusalem to advise the army on urban development (Kendall, 1948, p. 4).
Map 4.1: Lands declared green within East Jerusalem
Source: Mapping & G.I.S Dept. of the A.S.S., 2004
proclamation in 1918 limited construction within two and-

Map 4.2  The Master Plan of East Jerusalem


NOTICE HOW AREA ZONED AS GREEN LANDS
ENVELOPE THE ARAB NEIGHBOURHOODS
AND LIMIT THEIR FUTURE EXPANSION
preserve the special character of Jerusalem, which was best expressed in concern of the Old City and its immediate surrounds, the areas of scenic vistas to the east and, to lesser extent, the south, and the approaches to the city from the four points of the compass (Cohen, 1994).

A year later the Pro-Jerusalem Society commissioned Patrick Geddes to prepare a plan for the city. It, like the 1918 scheme, proposed severe restrictions on building immediately adjacent to the external side of the Old City wall. That land was occupied in many places by ramshackle structures, and the British authorities sought to convert it into strip of green parkland that would beautify and set the Old City apart from the surrounding built-up area. In 1921 the Town Planning Commission was established, and initial ordinances on development were issued. A 1922 scheme proposed by the commission had four zones, one of which was a “park system composed of public and private open spaces”. A 1929 scheme contained a map labeled “Showing Green Belt Around the City Walls” (Kendall, 1948, p. 10). The concept of a greenbelt was also evident in the work of the Jewish Agency who were engaged in planning new Jewish neighborhoods and communities in Palestine, an activity officially sanctioned by the mandate authorities (Kauffman, 1926, p. 106).

Despite the high level of concern for the maintenance of open spaces, the impetus for the British planning of Jerusalem in the interwar years was aesthetic and historical. The efforts were primarily for preservation or, perhaps more accurately, restoration rather than as guides for the evolution of the city. This position was indicated in Kendall’s comment about the lack of trees in Jerusalem. “There can be little doubt that by 1919 the Central
Commission and all the persons interested in the appearance of Jerusalem were impressed by the inadequacy of tree planting generally” (Kendall, 1948).

The 1944 plan for Jerusalem was intended to address the needs of the city as a whole, and discussion of open space indicated a shortage for the entire area (Kendall, 1948). It gave details only for the areas of traditional concern to the British planners and for a small number of prominent locations. In addition to continued focus on the Old City and the Mount of Olives, the section on open space described a ring road that was an integral part of the green strategy. Where the road was to transverse existent open spaces, provision was to be made to transplant olive trees from the road way to adjacent plots. The road itself was to include a bridle path in some areas and to be landscaped so that it would be an amenity in the future neighborhood development (Kendall, 1948).

In the wake of the dissolution of the British mandate in Palestine and the first Arab-Israeli war, planning and control of the western portion of a divided Jerusalem came into Israel hands, while eastern Jerusalem was under the Jordanian control. Kendall continued to serve as advisor on planning to the latter, but except for some discussion of afforestation bracketing the east sector. Little came to pass (Efrat, 1984). After the war Israel located some of the forests and the newly established agricultural communities on the sites of the depopulated Arab Villages.

Main purpose of the greenbelts is to prevent urban sprawl by creating buffer zones that define the new zones of urban clusters and make it possible to reduce the side effects of the
urbanization process (noise, pollution, etc.), a secondary purpose of is “to provide escape from noise, congestion and strain of the city life and to seek recreation in the countryside” (DOE, 1962, p.8); in Jerusalem it had a seemingly a contradictory function; Israel has used the forest block as a key tool in separating Jerusalem from the surrounding landscape (Cohen, 1994) i.e. the West Bank to devastate the contiguity between them, and to prevent the accessibility of the Palestinians to reach it.

Although some afforestation was soon undertaken after the reunification of Jerusalem after the 1967 war, it was piecemeal and not guided by greenbelt planning. Instead, it was noticeably intended to beautify specific areas, especially along the approaches to the city and in the pre 1967 No Man’s Land. An additional function of tree planting was to prevent alternative landuse, mainly by the Palestinians (Cohen, 1993).

4.5 Discussion

The Jerusalem green spaces were planned in Jewish perspectives that serve to support Jewish majority in the Jerusalem lands. So that, Israel can use those spaces for future uses, preventing the amalgamation of Jewish and Arab neighborhoods in the city and merger with surrounding settlements (figure 4.1). The Israel Lands Authority wanted to maintain or establish dominion over unused tracts that, instead of afforestation, by being put into private use would challenge governmental tenure or lead to premature sale and less revenue for the state. The Ministry of Housing wanted to restrict for future Jewish settlement and neighborhood construction, to ensure distance between these and Palestinian communities (Cohen, 1994, p.86). Tree planting in Jerusalem has an explicit function of ethnic
separation (between the Arab Palestinians and Jewish populations), an example of which can be found between the Jewish neighborhood of East Talpiot and the Palestinian village of Sur Baher (Cohen, 1993).

Israeli government created sly mechanisms and methods to achieve expropriating Palestinian Lands. One of the main methods is green land method. For example, 500 acres from shu’fat village were designated as green area in 1968. The area was planted with cypress trees and remained untouched for many years till in 1994 when a new settlement were approved to be built on these lands. Reches Shu’fat, consisting 2,500 units, was built as new neighborhood for religious Jews (figure 4.2) (Hodgkins, 1996).

Most of the East Jerusalem plans allocate extensive areas for open landscape area. Approximately 40% of the total planned area of East Jerusalem is zoned for this purpose. Construction is completely forbidden in open landscape area, where the permitted usages include forestry, groves, agriculture, and existing roads. Unlike open public land, open green spaces are not expropriated from their owners and remain private property (Arnon, 1998).
Figure 4.1: Green Spaces are changed to Jewish Settlements; above is the Abu-Ghneim Mountain Replaced by Jewish Housing Units.
The clearest example of this policy is the planning for the Arab neighborhoods of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat in northern Jerusalem (figures 4.3–4.4). When the planning process began, extensive areas in these neighborhoods were earmarked for residential construction on the scale of some 12,500 housing units. On the basis of government policy, the district committee decided to restrict construction to 7,500 housing units and to earmark large areas for open landscape. Numerous objections to these decisions were submitted by private landowners whose land was earmarked for open landscape.

The neighborhoods of Beit Hanina and Shu'fat are located in the north of Jerusalem, to the south of the Atarot Industrial Zone and to the west of the Pisgat Zeev neighborhood and Road 1. These neighborhoods form a contiguous Arab urban residential area in the north of the city. Three detailed town plans apply to this area; these are based on the general outline plan for north Jerusalem (#3000B) approved in 1991. The general outline plan established the
population capacity, land usages, construction densities and road system for the area. The residential capacity of the area was based on a political decision and fixed at 12,000 housing units, so that the number of additional housing units will not exceed 7,500. The area of plan #3457A - South Beit Hanina - is 1,920 dunams. The area of plan #3458A - North Beit Hanina - is 3,410 dunams. The area of plan #3456A - Shu'fat - is 1,840 dunams. Total area: 7,170 dunams (McFadden, 2001).

4.5.1 Beit Hanina and Shu’fat

4.5.1.1 Land usages

The neighborhoods were planned as urban neighborhoods with Ramallah Road serving as a commercial urban axis with high-density construction. The construction density declines as one moves away from the center toward the margins of the neighborhood. "Class 1" residential area - All the built-up areas close to Ramallah Road are earmarked as a residential area with a construction density of 75% on three floors. This reflects the decision to plan the area as an urban neighborhood rather than a rural area, and to enable the owners of built-up plots to extend existing buildings. This area totals approximately 1,022 dunams or 42% of the total area earmarked for residential use. "Class 5" residential area - The remaining areas for building are located on the margins of the neighborhood in vacant areas intended for low-density residential construction: 50% on two floors. This area includes approximately 1,043 dunams or 42% of the total area earmarked for residential use. Special commercial area - All the plots on either side of Ramallah Rd. are planned as a commercial area with high-density construction: 150% on three floors. The ground floors are intended for commercial
use, while the remaining two floors are earmarked for offices, institutions and residential use. This area totals approximately 400 dunams or 16% of the total area earmarked for residential use (McFadden, 2001).

4.5.1.1 Public buildings - The plan earmarks approximately 390 dunams for public buildings, including elementary schools, kindergartens, high schools, special education schools, day-care centers, a mother and child clinic and a general clinic.

4.5.1.2 Area for institutions - The plan earmarks approximately 90 dunams for existing or future private institutions belonging to the Church or the Waqf (the Muslim religious authorities).

4.5.1.3 Open public space - The plan earmarks approximately 145 dunams, or approximately 4% of the total planned area, for public parks.

4.5.1.4 Open landscape space - Large areas are earmarked for open landscape, particularly on the western margins of the plan area. A border has been established for construction in this area, beyond which all the land is earmarked for open landscape. The Tel Al-Ful area to the east of the area has also been earmarked as open landscape. Plan 3456A earmarks 785 dunams, or 42% of the total planned area, as open landscape. Plan 3457A earmarks 642 dunams, or 33% of the total planned area, as open landscape. Plan 3458A earmarks 1,538 dunams, or 45% of the total planned area, as open landscape.

From a landscape and planning perspective large sections of these areas are suitable for construction. They were earmarked as open green spaces for political reasons. The approved
plans have reduced the open green spaces following objections, but in legal terms these areas continue to be earmarked as open green spaces in accordance with the general outline plan for north Jerusalem (#3000B - 1991).

4.5.1.1.5 **Roads** - A road system has been developed to meet the needs of an urban area. The total area earmarked for roads is approximately 980 dunams.

Following (table 4.1) shows the categories and Percentage of Planned Areas of Beit Hanina and Shu’fat Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beit Hanina and Shu’fat</th>
<th>Area (Dunams)</th>
<th>Percentage of Planned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area Of Plan</td>
<td>7171</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Core</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling Area 4-70%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling Area 5-50%</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling Area 1-75%</td>
<td>1022</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Dwelling Area</strong></td>
<td>2109</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paths for Pedestrians</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Roads</strong></td>
<td>985</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Public Areas (Parks, ATC.)</td>
<td>145</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cemetery</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Facilities</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Public Areas</strong></td>
<td>642</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hotels and Recreation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Plus Residential Areas</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Station</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Light Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Commercial Areas</strong></td>
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<td>2965</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Area For Future Planning</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<td>Other Unutilized Areas</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Unutilized Areas</strong></td>
<td>3037</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: Bayt Hanina and Shu’fat Plan categories and Percentage of Planned Areas
Figure 4.3: Bayt Hanina – (Plan #3457A, 3458A -1991)

Source: Jerusalem Municipality, 1998. Edited by Researcher

**Key of aerial photographs:**

- **Border of town planning scheme**
- **Border of area zoned for residential area**
- **Area zoned for open spaces**
- **Border of expropriated lands**
- **Municipality boundary**
The plan earmarks free lands as open landscapes, preventing future expansion.

Scale: 1:10000

Key of aerial photographs:

- Border of town planning scheme
- Border of area zoned for residential area
- Area zoned for open spaces
- Border of expropriated lands
- Municipality boundary

Figure 4.4: Shu‘fat – (Plans #3456A -1991)
Source: Jerusalem Municipality, 1998. Edited by Researcher
4.5.2 Arab A-Sawahara

In the south of Jerusalem, too, extensive areas are earmarked for open landscape. The plan for Sur Bahir earmarks approximately 42% of the planning area for open landscape, while the plan for Arab A-Sawahara plan (figure 4.5) allocates no less than 60% of the total area of the plan for this purpose. The areas earmarked for open landscape include several clusters of existing buildings as well as isolated buildings. Some of these buildings are long-standing while others have been built recently without permits. In Arab A-Sawahara, for example, built-up areas - particularly on the borders of the built-up zone - have been earmarked for open landscape. Zoning as open green spaces means that house owners cannot extend their homes or connect to infrastructure services. The instructions attached to the plans include a clause stating that in lawful existing buildings within open green spaces, no additional building will be permitted, with the exception of extensions required for the purpose of sanitary improvements to an existing building. In practice, the use of the word lawful prevents any building extension, since it is difficult to prove that long-standing buildings were constructed legally, while the new buildings were built unlawfully (McFadden, 2001).

The neighborhood of Arab A-Sawahara is located in the south-east of the city, between Sur Bahir to the south, Jabal Mukabir to the north, the city limits to the east and East Talpiot to the west. This neighborhood is the largest neighborhood of East Jerusalem and is inhabited mainly by origins. The neighborhood is built on a number of ridges separated by dry rivers. The total planned area is approximately 4,600 dunams.
4.5.2.1 Land uses

4.5.2.1.1 Residential areas - constitute approximately 24% of the total planned area - some 1,109 dunams. Construction is of a rural and low-density character - 37.5% on two floors.

4.5.2.1.2 Public buildings - The plan earmarks approximately 59 dunams for public buildings, including: two elementary schools, two high schools, kindergartens, a mother and child clinic, and a youth club. These areas constitute approximately half of the required allocation according to the public institutions program.

4.5.2.1.3 Open landscape space - The plan earmarks extensive areas constituting approximately 60% of the plan area as open landscape. The open green spaces form a broad band along the city limits, in the wadis and on the slopes between the ridges. These areas include a number of existing clusters of buildings as well as isolated buildings.

4.5.2.1.4 Roads - Two urban roads were planned to cross the neighborhood: the American Road from north to south, with a width of 26 meters, and the Railway Road from west to east. Internal roads are planned at widths of 12 and 9 meters.

Following (table 4.2) shows the categories and Percentage of Planned Areas of Beit Hanina and Shu’fat Plan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab A-Sawahara</th>
<th>Area (Dunams)</th>
<th>Percentage of Planned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area of Plan</td>
<td>4642</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Core</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling Area 4-70%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling Area 5-50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dwelling Area 6-25%</td>
<td>1109</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Dwelling Area</strong></td>
<td><strong>1109</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paths for Pedestrians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Roads</strong></td>
<td><strong>622</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Buildings</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Public Areas (Parks, ETC.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cemetery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Areas for Public Use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Public Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and Recreation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Station</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Commercial Areas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Landscape Area</td>
<td>2763</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Not Included In The Plan</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area For Future Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Unutilized Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Unutilized Areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>2852</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Arab A-Sawahara Plan categories and Percentage of Planned Areas
Figure 4.5: Arab A-Sawahara Plan (#2683A -1991)
The following (table 4.3) clears out the excessive percentages of the earmarked open landscape areas in some of the remaining main neighborhoods in East Jerusalem:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Name</th>
<th>% Residential Areas</th>
<th>% Open Landscape Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isawiyah - Town Plan 2316</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaykh Jarrah, Wadi El-Jawz - Town Plan 2591, 2639</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Al-Amud - Town Plan 2668-A</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Tor - Town Plan 1864-A</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sur Bahir, Um Tuba - Town Plan 2302</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabal Mukabir - Town Plan 2691</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Percentages of the residential and open landscape areas in some neighborhoods in East Jerusalem*


Note: Plans are with accordance to the general outline plan (3000B-1991) of Jerusalem


The previous discussion figures out how do the Israeli planning policies use the open landscape policy to limit the future development of the East Jerusalem Arabs neighborhoods, as shown in the above table, it is evident how are the earmarked residential areas (including the already built up space) are not allowed to be expanded in the future because of the excessive allocation of open landscapes in the available free un-built up spaces; moreover, these spaces are used for the future expansion of the Jewish neighborhoods and settlements.

Palestinian development is strongly minimized through the land use law and zoning policies forced by planning scheme of Jerusalem. Israeli planners preserved the Palestinian lands virgins and prevented any kind of development until they expropriated it for Jewish settlement. In order to legitimate their steps of expropriations, the master
plan (map 4.2) is used as a most powerful means to achieve their control as the next analysis indicates.

The total area of Jerusalem (West and East) is about 126,000 Dunams. The area of East Jerusalem master plan is 71,055 Dunams of lands which is annexed to the city, after 1967 War, including 6,000 Dunams of Jordanian Jerusalem. After the War, Israel confiscated about 24,193 Dunams to build Jewish settlements, exploiting the British mandatory land ordinance put in 1943 that permit the expropriation of the private lands for public purpose (Abdelrazek, 2004).

This means that 46862 Dunams remained after the expropriation from the total area of the master plan. Of the 46862 Dunams, Planning schemes have been approved for 26 neighborhoods consisting of 26,141.3 dunams, whereas another 7 planning schemes consisting of 2,754.1 dunams have not yet been approved. About 9,995 dunams is defined as a green area shaping 35% of the total area of the planned schemes. While residential area constitute approximately 32% of the total planned area, some of 9178 dunams. Figure (2.1) – in chapter two- presents the percentages of approved, unapproved plans, unplanned zone and confiscation lands according to the total area of East Jerusalem, and (figure 4.6) indicates the process of minimizing lands for Arabs development.
There is still seven planning schemes forming an area about 2,754.1 dunams do not approved till this day, like Anata mater plan (No.6131) which has an area about 353 dunams and Kafr Aqab (No.2521B) which has an area about 1933 dunams (Jerusalem Municipality, 2005).

Source: (Margalit, 2006), edited by researcher.
municipality, 2005). In addition to that, most of planning schemes permits a low rate housing density (25%-50%) meaning one or two stories. However, the building density in the Jewish areas can reach 200 percent and eight stories. For example a plan for building a Jewish neighborhood in the heart of the Palestinians Ras Al-Amud neighborhood allows for a building percentage of 112 percent and four stories while the plan for the Palestinians in Ras Al-Amud permits only 50% percent or two stories (B’tselem, 1995). The absence of a town planning schemes and the restrictions of housing density towns form obstacles for residents to obtain building permit.

In normal conditions planning scheme guarantees proper and efficient development for residential areas and acts for the prosperity of people’s life, but unfortunately in our case, planning schemes are utilized in hindering and limiting the Palestinian development in East Jerusalem as seen in this chapter.

4.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, the Jerusalem greenbelt lacks legal definition; therefore, some of the greenbelt plans falls within the open-space regulation, which is very powerful in Israel, Palestinians protest Israeli use of land in East Jerusalem and the West Bank (Cohen, 1994, p.87), especially as these uses are discriminative and paradoxical with the Palestinians needs. Israel uses its planning acts such that it does not need to buy lands to keep them opened and use them for its future settlements expansion and establishment; it can easily consider them to be open landscapes and do not give permission for any kind of development there, attaining the restriction on using the potential free lands in East Jerusalem and saving the Jewish majority in Jerusalem.
Chapter Five

The Planning Paradigm in East Jerusalem
5.1 Background

It is only partly accurate to conclude that the planning defects described in the previous chapters are the product of a deliberate and conscious policy intended to block the development of the Palestinian sector. It is simplistic to view political discrimination as the sole factor shaping the planning regime in East Jerusalem. Thus even if the policies were changed; the planning and development needs of the residents of East Jerusalem would not be met fully. The planning regime created in this area reflects a fundamental and undisputed fact: although Israelis and Palestinians have shared the space in the city for forty years, they are not partners in a common political or cultural community. They are not part of the same "public". Planning is the point where the dominant Israeli aspiration in the city -the consolidation of Israeli rule over all parts of Jerusalem - clashes with the Palestinian counter-aspiration: a categorical rejection of the legitimacy of that rule. Virtually all else is derivative.

The planning mechanism finds it difficult to cope with the needs of the Arab population in East Jerusalem not only because of demographic and political factors, but also because the governmental and municipal authorities address the demands and problems of a specific civil consumer community: the Israeli Jewish public. Even when no deliberate policy of discrimination is implemented, the authorities tend to be unaware of the needs of a public that is not part of the "civil society" - the Palestinian community. Moreover, the absence of a joint civil society clearly reflects not only the desire of the Jewish majority but also the aspirations of the Palestinian minority (Kroyanker, 2002).
Throughout the world urban planning is a profoundly political field and Jerusalem is by no means unique in this respect. Planning defines what individuals may do in their own domain as well as in that of the public to which they belong; it influences the nature of the public domain; and, above all, it determines which individuals and sectors within the population as a whole will gain or lose from the planning process. As elsewhere, these decisions are made in Jerusalem by means of statutory committees composed of elected officials, civil servants who are subject to the authority and instructions of the political echelons, and public representatives.

The Palestinian public has not remained passive or indifferent during the struggle that has taken place over the planning of Jerusalem for the past four decades. A single key decision made by this public has had a direct influence on planning problems and the way these are addressed: the Palestinian public has shown a willingness to make the most of the rights and entitlements it enjoys under the present system, but only insofar as this does not entail acknowledging the legitimacy of Israeli rule in the east of the city. For example, the Palestinians have refused to accept compensation for expropriated land. The price for this symbolic expression of refusal to accept the legitimacy of overtly political land expropriations has been heavy. The Israeli authorities have been able to expropriate land without paying billions of dollars in compensation (Jacob, 2004).

Another example is involvement in municipal elections. The vast majority of the Palestinian population does not exercise its right to vote in the elections for the municipal council and the mayor. In this way the residents of East Jerusalem stress their Palestinian identity and the fact that they do not see themselves as "Israeli Arabs", since they believe that East Jerusalem is an occupied
territory that must have separate municipality/council than West Jerusalem run by Palestinians. However, they thereby reinforce the tendency among municipal decision makers to ignore Palestinian needs and demands. These behavioral patterns have had far-reaching consequences in various fields affecting the planning of East Jerusalem (Kutcher, 2004; Abdelrazek, 2004; Khamaisi, 2003):

5.1.1 The planning process

There are little Palestinian representative in the municipal planning institution. This situation reflects the Palestinian detachment from the power structures of the city. It also reflects the Palestinian refusal to participate in a system viewed as illegitimate by the Palestinian political community.

5.1.2 Financial allocation

The appalling state of the infrastructures in East Jerusalem impairs urban development drastically. Israel inherited ragged infrastructures from the Jordanian government. However the situation has worsened over the past four decades, due in large part to the unequal allocation of budgets to the two parts of the city. Cautious estimates suggest that only 7% of the budget of the Municipality of Jerusalem is invested in the Palestinian sector, which comprises approximately 30% of the city's population. This statistic reflects not only discrimination on the grounds of nationality, but also an immutable political law: elected officials are not inclined to promote the interests of residents who do not vote.
5.1.3 The economics of licensing

The licensing levies imposed on the residents of Jerusalem who apply for building permits are completely egalitarian and are identical in both sides of the city. Yet per capita income in East Jerusalem is approximately one-third of that in the West Jerusalem. The determination of a reasonable cost for services and levies was based on the standards of the Jewish sector, meaning that many residents of East Jerusalem cannot afford to bear these costs. The authorities can redress this situation only by recognizing the economic discrepancies between the two parts of united Jerusalem.

5.1.4 Land registration

As noted before (in chapter two), the system for registration of land ownership in East Jerusalem allows neither rational planning nor the development of an entrepreneurial culture among the Palestinian public. Comprehensive reform and the regulation of land are an essential condition for any change in this situation. However, the introduction of reforms is a complex and sensitive procedure that requires at least a minimal level of trust between the authorities and the landowners. Given the century-old dispute between Jews and Arabs over the control of land in Israel/Palestine, and the real danger of the loss of land due to the provisions of laws such as the Absentees' Properties Law, there is no chance that Israel would be able to implement the reforms needed. Any attempt to introduce changes would inevitably be seen by the Arab population as a further act of "aggression."

Rational planning does not only benefit landowners; it also detracts from their property rights due to the need to allocate land for public uses (public institutions, roads, parks, etc.) The rational way to
take private land for public needs is through unification and reparceling plans that distribute the "damage" among landowners in the most equitable possible way. Even in West Jerusalem such plans are usually implemented through official coercion. Since there is no common civil community and no relationship of trust between the authorities and the Palestinian public, it is extremely doubtful whether Israel could implement unification and reparceling plans in the Arab sector. Without such plans the development of this sector will be significantly impaired.

Several hesitant attempts have been made in Jerusalem in recent years to develop a more equitable and objective planning policy toward the Palestinian sector. However, these decisions have been perceived as an attempt by the authorities to prove that Israel "deserves" to enjoy exclusive rule over all parts of the city. Palestinian residents are willing to enjoy benefits if no recognition of the legitimacy of Israeli control is involved. Thus, municipal decision makers demonstrate generosity toward the Palestinians precisely those situations in which the Palestinians will be unwilling to pay the political "price" for the benefits (Arnon, 1998).

This is a zero-sum game in which any gain by one side is automatically perceived as a loss by the other. Therefore, the existing planning policy is virtually "immune" to any attempts at improvement, however well intentioned. The partial redressing of discrimination might alleviate the suffering of individual residents and create a more favorable climate for dialogue. However, the problem is not "discrimination" against a civil minority within a shared political community. The humiliation and discrimination faced by Palestinian residents of the city do not cause them to aspire to become "Israelis" enjoying equal rights. Rather they wish to control their individual and communal life as Palestinians.
Israelis cannot plan East Jerusalem for its Palestinian residents. This is not because Israel lacks planners with the professional skills and public sensitivity necessary for this task. Rather, planning for an entire public must be rooted in the political culture of that public. Thus, while changes in the planning policy in order to promote a more objective, equitable and sensitive approach are a vital step, they will not be sufficient to enable the substantive questions of planning in East Jerusalem to be addressed properly.

5.2 The limitations of reform in the planning regime

To challenge the existing conditions, still within the existing boundaries it is possible to enable some residents to exploit their property assets on a more reasonable basis, while avoiding injury to the city landscape or to fellow residents. Thus, for example, numerous compounds are available for construction and may be planned without delay. Construction percentages may be increased and buildings may be made taller and denser in areas that are already built-up. Areas that have been artificially declared "green zones" may be earmarked for construction. Resources may be distributed in a more equitable manner (Abdelrazek, 2004).

Despite this, it must be stated in the clearest possible terms that even if far-reaching changes are introduced within the context of the existing planning regime, this will constitute no more than the first step toward addressing the real planning problems of East Jerusalem, and indeed of the entire city.
The planning regime has created a situation that almost entirely prevents the operation of a rational land market in East Jerusalem, the emergence of an entrepreneurial culture in the Palestinian community, and the development of general planning outlines for the development of this area. Expropriations on the one hand, and discriminatory planning on the other, have created a paradox whereby land in East Jerusalem is simultaneously both priceless and worthless. The land is priceless because these plots are the main asset left in Palestinian hands; it is "worthless" because there will be no possibility of effectively exploiting this asset for the foreseeable future. Corrective measures may go some way toward meeting individual needs but will not address public requirements; nor will they enable the macro-level planning of East Jerusalem in a manner that could facilitate its integration in the planning of the entire city. In order to promote rational planning, the registration system must be modernized, unification and reparceling plans prepared, and the Palestinian residents involved in the planning processes themselves (Abdelrazek, 2004).

The last point is of crucial importance. The fundamental issues relating to the development of East Jerusalem - the desired urban culture; the integration of the east of the city with the metropolis that extends from Ramallah in the north to Bethlehem in the south; integration with West Jerusalem; the development of the area in a manner consonant with its unique character; the development of an entrepreneurial culture among the Palestinians, etc. - all require the empowerment of the Palestinian public to both plan and implement.

This empowerment does not necessarily require the sharing of sovereignty over Jerusalem, however it implies in practical and symbolic terms the national identification of the residents of East
Jerusalem, including the imposition of limits on Israel's authority in this respect. Thus, it will be impossible to "professionalize" the planning problems of East Jerusalem, and to address them thoroughly without political or quasi-political arrangements relating to functional powers in the city (Dumper, 2002).

Granting planning autonomy to the residents of East Jerusalem does not necessarily mean breaking the connection with the Israeli planning authorities. Nor does it imply that Israel does not have a legitimate interest in planning matters in East Jerusalem. Such a step, however, would reflect a new perception of the Israeli interest: Israel's interest in recognizing the right of a national collective that has its home in the city to develop within agreed planning parameters (Dumper, 2002).

If and when such autonomous planning mechanisms are created for the Palestinian residents of the city, this population will, perhaps for the first time, face complex problems that the present regime has prevented them from addressing. Thus, for example, the Palestinians will need to tackle such issues as how to maintain the character of the Arab neighborhoods while at the same time promoting development and modernization; how to enable the area to be involved both in developments in the west of the city and in the metropolis on the West Bank; how to rationalize the process of registration and reparceling. With all the political, financial and statutory problems entailed; how to protect Palestinian national interest without threatening Israeli interests (Friedman, 2003).

In coping with these questions, Palestinian planners will be obliged to face the changes and facts that have been created in Jerusalem over the past four decades. Most of these changes have been
unpopular among Palestinian residents. However, it is important to stress that there is still considerable potential for the development of East Jerusalem. It is true that the new Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem have changed the face of the city beyond recognition. Yet it is also true that despite strong governmental incentives and the investment of billions of “shekels” in the Jewish neighborhoods, and despite the authorities' efforts to limit development in the Arab sector, the proportion of Palestinians in the city has increased from 25.6% in 1967 to 33% in 2002. The character of many parts of East Jerusalem has changed, but the Palestinian character of most of the area is an undisputed fact. West Jerusalem has not been expanded in planning terms, since the Israeli planners want to implant their new Jewish built up areas in East Jerusalem, to diminish the Arab existence, and to make Jewish majority instead. The Palestinians continue to be poor in "floor space" yet relatively rich in land that has the potential for exploitation. Tens of thousands of housing units may be built on this land for the Palestinian population (Dumper, 2002).

Because of years of closure and the surrounding of East Jerusalem by new Israeli neighborhoods, East Jerusalem no longer can function as the cultural, commercial, educational and political center of the West Bank, besides there has been severe degradation in all the (social / institutional / economical / environmental / etc.) aspects of life in East Jerusalem forcing the Jerusalemites to leave their country whether to the West Bank or aboard.
Chapter Six

Conclusions & Scenarios
6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses one of the most prominent issues that preoccupies the minds and hearts of everyone, which is the future of Jerusalem. Discussing the status and the future of Jerusalem has been postponed ever since the beginning of the peace process. Nevertheless, many Palestinian and Israeli intellectuals do share some common ideas regarding the future of the city. They do acknowledge the importance of Jerusalem in terms of its historical and religious values to Moslems, Christians and Jews. They are convinced that the three faiths should have free access to the holy city, and the best way to achieve this is by making Jerusalem the capital of the two separate states, the Palestinian and the Israeli state.

6.2 Literature Review

Dr. “Meron Benvenisti” (former deputy mayor of Jerusalem 1971 to 1978), lists in an article of his three scenarios for the future of Jerusalem. One scenario contemplates Jerusalem as an undivided capital of a single geopolitical unit encompassing all of mandatory Palestine with provisions necessitated by the city's unique character. Another scenario contemplates Jerusalem as a divided capital to two separate geopolitical units with provisions that ensure the continuation of functions as a shared urban unit thus maintaining the physical unity of the city. A third scenario contemplates Jerusalem as a distinct geopolitical enclave administered apart from the separate sovereign domains of the former mandatory Palestine. This option removes Jerusalem from the division between the States of Israel and Palestine (Shtayyeh, 1998).
“Naomi Chazan”, member of the Knesset from the (Meretz Party), puts forward four scenarios for the future of Jerusalem. The first puts Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty with full autonomy to Palestinians. That is, Palestinian citizens would enjoy autonomy and hold Palestinian citizenship while sovereignty remains in the Israeli hands. The second scenario reflects the split sovereignty option by which two municipalities are formed, Palestinian and Israeli. However, this option creates major problems in the actual administration of the city. For example, the transportation lines would become difficult and complicated. The third scenario is joint sovereignty and the creation of one municipality with parity and equality, geographically and demographically between Palestinians and Israelis. This option, though, requires the modification of the city's boundaries in order to achieve a balance. The fourth scenario is a mixed option. It takes elements from the preceding two and tries to construct an overall approach, which is shared sovereignty. It suggests two separate municipalities working under the umbrella of a balanced super-municipality. This option answers the sovereignty question and the need for cooperation. It thus fosters integration and recognizes differences at the same time (Amirav, 2000).

In his paper, Dr. “Moshe Ma'oz” (professor in history in the Middle East) suggests that Jerusalem should remain undivided and should serve as a capital of two states: the State of Israel in West Jerusalem and the State of Palestine in East Jerusalem. He briefly outlines the development of Jewish, Zionist and Israeli positions regarding Jerusalem and tries to suggest options for an equitable solution for its future status. Most Jews consider Jerusalem the heart of their national, religious and cultural ethos, as well as their historical and eternal capital. Since 1967, the policy of the Israeli governments, both (Labor and Likud) was to maintain a unified
Jerusalem by Judaizing it demographically and politically. Before the Oslo Agreement of 1993, Jerusalem was never put on the negotiating table, but Moslems and Christians (in Palestine only) were allowed limited access to their holy sites. The Israeli Labor Party is more likely to suggest a Palestinian autonomy or self-determination in East Jerusalem in municipal, cultural, social and economic affairs, but not in political matters. The Israeli official position, which is supported by most Israeli Jews, has not changed: United Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty would remain Israel's "eternal and exclusive capital". These people ignore the fact that East Jerusalem has for centuries been veneered by Moslems and Christians and for decades been the political and spiritual center of the Palestinian National Movement. According to Dr. Ma'oz's, most Israelis and Palestinians agree that Jerusalem should remain undivided. Some of them support the creation of two municipalities. Other solutions for the future status of Jerusalem suggested in paper are: scattered sovereignty, shared sovereignty, functional or divided sovereignty, with the Old City having a special status, administered by both the Israeli and the Palestinian governments or by a representative of the three religions (Ma'oz, 1998).

Dr. “Manuel Hassassian” (executive Vice President of Bethlehem University) suggested a paper that attempts to dissuade ways of thought, which approach the question of Jerusalem as a "Zero-sum conflict" so, his paper tries to propose working solutions to what appears to be an enigma without a solution. According to Dr. Hassassian, the only solution for the question of Jerusalem is to integrate communities that hold Jerusalem sacred for one reason or another. So far, Israel is predetermining the outcome of any future negotiations on the status of Jerusalem by slowly eroding East Jerusalem's Arab identity. We all know that the status of Jerusalem is the most intractable issue of the Arab Israeli conflict, especially that it is based on the emotional
sensitivity of those who value it. Dr. Hassassian's paper does not reflect any official position, rather it's a purely academic work, which attempts to shed light upon the problems facing future negotiations over Jerusalem. Exactly as Jerusalem is the heart of the Jewish people, it is the center of Palestinian nationalistic aspirations. Israel's policy of annexing East Jerusalem to "unify" the city, is nothing less than a deliberate claim to delegitimize Palestinian statehood and right to national self-determination. The historical presence of both Christians and Moslems in the old city of Jerusalem reflect the fact that they own more than 90% of private land in the old city, but the yearning to be in Jerusalem has always played a central role in Jewish identity. According to Dr. Hassassian, the question of sovereignty is one of the main difficulties in negotiating over Jerusalem. Possible categories of sovereignty include excessive Israeli sovereignty, spilt sovereignty, scattered sovereignty and joint sovereignty. The question of Jerusalem is a political one before being religious, ethnic or cultural, therefore, we must seek a political solution. Dr. Hassassian believes that the best alternative for a working solution is a joint sovereignty approach, which fosters integration, as well as separation. In order to achieve peace, sovereignty should stress inclusion, equality and justice among the three faiths. Dr. Hassassian's approach calls for the ability of both Jews and Palestinians to build in all parts of Jerusalem. This is the only way to integrate communities and to return a semblance of justice to a situation that has remained unjust for too long. Dr. Hassassian's paper is an intellectual exercise that attempts to outline the problem of Jerusalem in a comprehensive form and to suggest possible solutions (Shtayyeh, 1998).

In his paper, Dr. “Ron Pundak” maintains the idea that a settlement to the Jerusalem issue cannot be achieved without a permanent status agreement. Both Israel and Palestine should agree upon a
political border between their sovereign territories. According to Dr. Pundak, one of the most complex challenges of Israeli-Palestinian permanent status is the establishment of an effective cross-border regime, which provides for Israeli and Palestinian security concerns while guaranteeing free movement of persons and economic factors. Dr. Pundak advocates the idea of having a Palestinian State with Al-Quds or East Jerusalem as its capital, and an Israeli State with Yerushalaim or West Jerusalem as its capital. He also believes that the municipal border of Jerusalem should be expanded beyond the current municipal borders to include Arab-Israeli areas north and South of Jerusalem. Moreover, Jerusalem should be divided into three areas of sovereignty: full Israeli sovereignty, full Palestinian sovereignty and disputed areas. The holy sites within the old city of Jerusalem should be given a special status, for Moslems, Christians and Jews should be allowed access to their religious sites (Pundak, 2001).

6.3 Scenarios of Future Impacts

The prospects of a peaceful settlement generated the need for developing a Palestinian vision on the future of East Jerusalem and for a strategy to promote sustained development and living conditions. The following scenarios will formulate this strategy. The strategy is based on the development potential of key sectors in East Jerusalem. The simultaneous and integrated development of key sectors will enhance the effectiveness of the strategy in generating growth and improvement in levels of living.

Given the uncertainties presently characterizing future political developments, the strategy has been elaborated assuming two scenarios regarding the political situation, i.e. a status quo scenario implying continuation of the present political situation, incidence of violence, high
security and isolation from the West Bank. Under this scenario urgent problems in the economic and social fields should be addressed making intensive use of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) without, however, much prospects for sustainability. The alternative scenario is the settlement scenario whereby progress is made in the peace process, violence subsides, and there prospects for increased Palestinian control over Palestinian East Jerusalem.

The sectors being addressed by the multi sector strategy include the economic sectors (land, housing, urban infrastructure, private sector and tourism), the social sectors (education, vocational training, health, welfare and youth), and culture and heritage.

6.3.1 Political situation

East Jerusalem was part of Jordan until 1967, when it was occupied by Israel during the June six-day war. Within weeks (on 28 June 1967) the Government of Israel issued an order incorporating East Jerusalem within the municipality of Jerusalem under Israeli law, effectively involving annexation, though this annexation has to date not been recognized by the international community. Since 1967, Palestinians have actively resisted the Israeli occupation by boycotting municipal elections and, as much as possible continued relying on Palestinian institutions.

The political environment has strongly shaped economic and social development in East Jerusalem. Israel has pursued a geo-political policy aimed at establishing a united Jerusalem under exclusive Israeli jurisdiction. The policies implemented to achieve this aim have included strengthening the Jewish presence in Jerusalem and restricting Palestinian development by large-
scale expropriations of Arab-owned land, and restrictions on land use and housing construction by Arabs (Jacob, 2004).

The political situation has also created considerable ambivalence among the Palestinians with respect to Israeli rule. Collective negotiations and legal actions in order to pursue rights from government and municipal authorities are considered unacceptable for fear to appear to legitimize Israeli rule in East Jerusalem. However, at the individual level Palestinians feel entitled to what they consider as their rights under Israeli law and is it more acceptable to negotiate with Israeli authorities or use legal means to obtain these rights (Jacob, 2004).

6.3.2 Population and economy

From an economic perspective Palestinian East Jerusalem can be considered a mid-sized medium income urban community with a population of presently about 240,000 people and with a per capita income of about US$ 2,000 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS, 2007). On the social side problems relate to poverty and difficulties in attaining access to social services. There is substantial poverty. According to Israeli criteria 40 percent of the population of East Jerusalem is below the poverty line. According to Palestinian criteria, only 3 percent is below the poverty line (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ). Of course the latter estimate is based on criteria for minimum levels of living applying to the West Bank and Gaza, where the cost of living is much lower than in Jerusalem. The first measure is therefore the most appropriate one.

Israeli’s demographic policies have resulted in a considerable shift in the geographical distribution of Palestinians and Jews, with Palestinians increasingly concentrated on the northern
and southern fringes of Jerusalem and large numbers of Jews now living in East Jerusalem. Economic activities have followed this demographic trend, whereby a large number of Palestinian businesses have relocated from East Jerusalem to the West Bank areas.

The development constraints in East Jerusalem have resulted in forcing an increased reliance on the economy of West Jerusalem/Israel for employment and income generation during the 1990s. More than 40 percent of the workers of East Jerusalem work in West Jerusalem/Israel generating close to half of the disposable income in East Jerusalem. Labour force participation is relatively low at 39 percent of the working age population. The labour force has moderate levels of educational attainment, and most workers are engaged in basic occupations (Khamaisi, and Nasrallah, 2003).

East Jerusalem has a narrow economic base with tourism as the leading sector supplemented by small trading and work shop activities. The tourism sector accounted for between 20 and 25 percent of the general domestic production GDP of East Jerusalem in the late 1990s, but as a consequence of the Intifada which started in September 2001, the number of tourists visiting East Jerusalem declined by close to 90 percent, resulting in a direct decline of GDP of some 15 percent. The closure of the West Bank has furthermore resulted in a considerable loss of business for the retail sector, which catered to an important extent to buyers from the West Bank. As a result of the economic decline, unemployment has increased sharply to around 15 percent in 2002 and poverty will also have risen (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PCBS, 2007).
Obviously, the main condition for reinvigorating growth in East Jerusalem is the return to more peaceful conditions. Nevertheless, there is also scope for improving conditions and preparing for a longer-term political settlement through a number of key initiatives as proposed in this strategy.

6.3.3 Economic sectors

An important constraint to development in East Jerusalem concerns the lack of transparency in the operation of the land market. This lack of transparency is the result of a complicated system of regulation of land use, lack of clarity about land ownership, as well as poor information on procedures for transferring and developing land. Therefore, under the status quo the strategy for land aims at improving the transparency of land markets by strengthening data bases on land, improving co-operation among professionals in the sector, strengthening informal land dispute mechanisms and improving public awareness on land issues. Under settlement conditions there is a need to set up a formal land registry and a town planning authority to deal with land zoning issues.

The poor functioning of the land market also adversely affect the housing sector. In addition, the process of getting housing schemes and building permits approved is slow and many projects are not approved (as discussed in chapter two). In recent years municipal obstacles have become even more restrictive requiring “Tabu” registration as proof of ownership of land. Another obstacle is the high cost of obtaining building permits. As a result of these obstacles a large number of new housing units are built without permits. Under the status quo the development of

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\[\text{The Jerusalem Economical Report, Orient House – Jerusalem, 2002.}\]
housing and commercial building development can be promoted by providing support to the design, planning and building permit process for real estate projects and by improving access to finance in the realization of these projects. Housing support should also be available to the refugee camps under UNWRA control. Under a settlement scenario the process of planning for housing and commercial development, including the issuing of building permits should be streamlined by setting up an appropriate authority at municipal level, applying swift and transparent procedures in processing applications for building permits.

The Israeli municipality operates most urban infrastructure services, such as water supply, sewage and solid waste disposal. In East Jerusalem access to these services is poorly developed, especially with respect to sewage and solid waste disposal. Under a status quo the main option for improving access to such services is through the implementation of projects at community level. Under a settlement, these services need to be transferred to Palestinian control, requiring, however, substantial capability in planning and operating such systems, with adequate attention being paid to efficiency and cost recovery. Involvement of the private sector in operating these services should be considered. With respect to electricity, improving the efficiency of operations of the Jerusalem Electricity Company is an urgent issue, as well as the collection of outstanding debts from its clients.

Improving efficiency requires computerization, training of staff and upgrading its facilities. Private Palestinian transport companies largely run urban transport in East Jerusalem. Under the status quo better co-operation between operators could result in more favorable conditions for operating routes and in better service to the public. Under a settlement, the system of urban transport needs to be reviewed to ensure the development of an efficient public transport system.
Since the early 1990s, the private sector in East Jerusalem has suffered from the removal of many businesses to the West Bank, where operating conditions were more favorable in terms of less restrictive regulations, lower taxes, lower land costs and lower labour costs. Since the start of the Intifada (September, 2001) the operating conditions have further deteriorated. However, a substantial private sector remains, in spite of the adverse conditions. The private sector plays a key role in generating employment and incomes. Improved political conditions are a main condition for private sector growth, benefiting in particular the expansion of the tourism sector. With prospects for a settlement, there is also scope for diversification of private sector activities. There are good possibilities in information technology IT and various other service activities (health, financial sector, business services, and real estate development). Opening up of borders with the West Bank will stimulate the retail sector, but also logistics and transport. There may also be scope for taking advantage of East Jerusalem’s open access to markets abroad for warehousing and certain assembly operations making use of workers from the West Bank. Several of these activities may benefit from co-operation with foreign/Israeli firms. Strengthening links with firms in Arab countries should also be promoted. Under the status quo the strategy for the private sector addresses both internal and external constraints, involving the provision of business support services, linked with and applying similar principles and approaches as business support programmes currently implemented in the Palestinian Territories by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the German Government. Assistance to firms should include improving business organization and operation with special emphasis on the introduction of IT, as well as strengthening private sector representative organizations. It is also proposed to improve access to credit by introducing
special credit and credit guarantee programmes targeted at Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and micro businesses. Given the cash crunch experienced by many businesses due to the present economic depression, there is a case for making such financing available at concessional terms with respect to interest rates, collateral requirements and loan periods. Furthermore improvements in selected business locations such as Wadi Al-Jawz may be pursued as a community programme. Under settlement conditions, financial support programmes should focus at strengthening Palestinian financial institutions which will then start operating in East Jerusalem. Several innovative programmes supporting private sector development could be implemented, including the establishment of IT incubators, promoting of crafts for the tourism market and foreign investment promotion. Plans should be made for rehabilitating and reinvigorating the Atarot industrial estate for attracting externally oriented warehousing and industrial activities.

Many of the problems facing the private sector apply to tourism, being the main area of private sector activity in East Jerusalem. Under the status quo, the tourism sector will especially involve strengthening of the main representative institution, the Higher Arab Tourism Council building on a tourism project supported by the German Government. Other activities to be supported are training of tourism workers, assisting tourism companies becoming better organized and efficient, with emphasis again on introducing IT technology for accounting, business organization and marketing. Such support should include assisting souvenir shops selling locally produced crafts in diversifying markets. Tourism awareness programmes should be supported, especially at schools. Tourism companies will be the main beneficiaries of the proposed private
sector emergency loan and guarantee programmes. Under settlement public-private partnerships in promoting tourism should be promoted.

6.3.4 Social sectors

In education, the problems include lack of access, quality and lack of incentives to attend schools, because of lack of job opportunities. The latter factor results in relatively high drop out rates. Lack of access is the result of lack of places in the municipal school system and lack of space in schools run by the Waqf/government and in some private schools. Waqf/Government and private schools combined cater for about 45 percent of primary and secondary school pupils in East Jerusalem. In both municipal, Waqf/government and private schools the Palestinian curricula are used (Margalit, 2006). Under the status quo a school rehabilitation and expansion programme is required. Expansion is required to meet the increasing demand for education resulting from the increase in the population. A master plan for education should be prepared for East Jerusalem, taking into account municipal school expansion programmes in order to assess additional school expansion needs. Lack of quality is to a large extent associated with low salaries for teachers in the Awkaf/Government schools. The salary issue is difficult to resolve, because of the link with the Palestinian school system and the unwillingness to introduce different salary scales in different locations. Further study on this issue is required. A partial solution may be to relate higher salaries to higher workloads and incentives. An issue is furthermore, how to ensure the future financial sustainability of an improved Palestinian-based school system. There is also scope for improving education quality by improving pedagogical and didactical methods. Upgrading and training of teachers is an ongoing activity of the Education Directorate in which also municipal school teachers participate and needs to be
strengthened. At early childhood education level, teacher training is a priority because of the high turnover. More intensive efforts are also needed to pursue legal means in increasing municipal/Ministry of Education financing for education in East Jerusalem in order to ensure the right of free education to which also Palestinian children in East Jerusalem are entitled by Israeli law. At university level there is a need for strategic study on the role of Al Quds University and on the scope of introducing modern teaching methods such as distance learning. Under a settlement transfer of the education system to Palestinian control can be anticipated. A plan should be developed dealing with organizational and financial issues to ensure a smooth transition. Main issues will be teachers’ salary scales, other operational costs, and payment of fees.

Fact finding on vocational training has found that there are many more providers than was anticipated and also that the programmes are varied and are quite effectively meeting the requirements of the labour market. Many cover their costs from tuition fees. Over the past forty years the Israeli Ministry of Labour has opened several new vocational training centers in East Jerusalem (Jacob, 2004). In vocational training the strategy focuses on improving quality, standardization and accreditation through more active co-operation between providers. Upgrading of equipment and teacher training is a continuing requirement in which selective support is required.

In the health sector the main issues at primary health care levels are lack of co-ordination of health care providers. At secondary level there is a need to improve co-ordination between hospitals and improving efficiency of operations. The status quo strategy focuses on strengthening the primary health care system by setting up an umbrella organisation of primary
health care providers and to integrate it better with the secondary health care system. Furthermore strengthening of mental health care and of emergency care is needed. Other health problems which need to be addressed include the revalidation for disabled persons and combating drug abuse. At the secondary level the strategy aims at making existing hospital services more cost effective by improving efficiency and increased co-operation in procurement and use of facilities. Under a settlement upgrading of secondary hospital functions should be considered in a wider regional context. Further study is needed on how to address a possible disengagement from the Israeli health insurance, which quite effectively covers the cost for medical services for Palestinians in East Jerusalem, and its replacement by a Palestinian system.

With respect to welfare, the population of East Jerusalem derives considerable benefits from the Israeli National Insurance Institute (NII), though access can be problematic. Under a status quo strategy there is little scope for improving the social security system, but there is scope for strengthening NGOs, which are assisting the population in accessing (NII) benefits to which they are entitled. There is also a need to strengthen NGOs and community based organizations (CBOs) which provide other welfare-related services to groups of the Palestinian population and youth in East Jerusalem, such as human rights, legal advise, care for the elderly, combating drug abuse, care for disabled, and so on. A demand driven approach should be adopted whereby well formulated institutional strengthening initiatives and projects can be supported. NGOs should have a proven capacity in terms of organizational capability and financial transparency in implementing such programmes. With respect to youth the strategy also envisages strengthening of the Youth Development Department of the Arab Studies Society in supporting youth organizations. Under settlement, the question should be addressed of whether and how to replace
the Israeli NII system by a Palestinian system. An option is to continue buying this service from the Israeli NII, but premiums may have to increase or benefits may need to be reduced, to compensate for the likely withdrawal of Israeli government subsidies, which currently meet 37 percent of the costs of the system (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem ARIJ). Under settlement more formal policies should be formulated with respect to the provision of various welfare services, integrated with those in the West Bank and Gaza, but maintaining considerable inputs from NGOs.

6.3.5 Culture and heritage

In the culture and heritage strategy it is stressed that there are quite a few NGOs active in heritage preservation, which are doing an excellent job (Khamaisi, and Nasrallah, 2003). The strategy focuses on the following areas: (i) preparing an inventory of buildings and settlement structures, (ii) conservation and rehabilitation of the cultural heritage of East Jerusalem, and (iii) the preparation of a cultural heritage master plan. Under a status quo strategy a key requirement for East Jerusalem is to catalogue the entire culture and heritage resource as an essential first step to forming a consensus on the present and future management of the resource. This process will also help to improve collaboration among culture/heritage institutions. Conservation and rehabilitation programmes are difficult to carry out under the present situation, but support of NGOs active in culture/heritage conservation should be provided. This support should also include support for preservation of old houses in the Old City. Furthermore, there is scope for organizing training in restoration skills. The present situation must be used to achieve a consensus on the future development of the cultural heritage of East Jerusalem, to be enshrined in a culture/heritage master plan consulting the views of representative culture/heritage
organizations. The culture and heritage strategy also includes support for strengthening of the cultural life of the city, supporting libraries, exhibitions, other cultural events. The strategy also proposes the preparation of a feasibility study and plan for establishing a multi purpose cultural centre, which would facilitate and promote performing arts. Under settlement, realizing the cross-sectoral potential of cultural heritage will be both a governmental and a private-sector objective. With regard to the former, an effective cultural heritage strategy will need “joined-up” government and key to this is getting the right governmental structure in place to manage cultural heritage resources. In the context of East Jerusalem this should be a single dedicated body with sector-wide responsibilities. It should not be linked directly to other sectors (such as tourism or information), as has happened elsewhere to the detriment of the cultural heritage resource. A settlement will also offer the opportunity to introduce statutory controls to enforce conservation standards across the private sector and thereby limit the damage caused by new and unsympathetic building work. Settlement is also likely to make additional demands on human resources: key positions in any statutory body will need to be filled initially by cultural heritage specialists from the NGOs sector. The goal for cultural heritage organizations in the immediate aftermath of settlement will be to work for implementation of the proposals worked out in the master plan.

6.3.6 Institutional framework

An important question addressed by the strategy concerns the institutional framework that needs to be established to ensure broad Palestinian ownership of the strategy, as well as of its effective implementation in the absence of formal Palestinian government structures in East Jerusalem.
For actual project and programme implementation existing institutions in the form of NGOs, and sectoral representative organizations can be used. However, there is need for a supervisory body which is representative of the various groups in the Palestinian community of East Jerusalem. This body should be supported by a technical unit “Strategy Monitoring and Coordination Unit” (SMCU), which co-ordinates the programming and implementation of programmes in the different sectors, and undertakes public relations in providing information about the programme and in mobilizing funding. In the case of settlement there is a need to set up an appropriate municipal administration and to ensure its sustainability by mobilizing the required human and financial resources. In order to provide the services expected by the population these resource requirements are considerable. It is doubtful whether resources raised from local taxes, which are already considered high will be sufficient. Additional resources from a central authority may be required.
Chapter Seven

Recommendations
7.1 Recommendations for Economic Development

The most important constraint to economic and social development in East Jerusalem is its unsettled political situation and the associated unrest. Also in the medium term developments in the political situation will play a determining role in shaping economic and social development in East Jerusalem. The development strategy, the feasibility of programmes and projects and the institutional environment are all strongly affected by developments in the political situation. How the political situation will develop in the coming years is difficult to predict. During the 1990s there were clear prospects for a settlement. However, the second Intifada (started in September, 2001) and subsequent Israeli military actions have brought the peace process to a stand still and it this stage it cannot be predicted whether and when the peace negotiations would be resumed. For the proposed strategy for East Jerusalem, I will formulate strategies under two different scenarios regarding the future political situation. These scenarios include:

- Continuation of the present situation, the status quo.
- Achievement of more peaceful conditions and outlook for a settlement.

The implications of these scenarios for strategy formulation are reviewed below.

7.1.1 Continuation of the Status Quo

The continuation of the status quo situation implies continued Israeli control over East Jerusalem, isolation of the economy of East Jerusalem from that of the West Bank and Gaza and only limited integration with the economy of Israel. Links with the economy of Israel will mainly consist of employment of Jerusalem’s workers in West Jerusalem/Israel, but business links will
remain incidental as a result of mutual animosity and distrust. As a result of continued incidences of violence tourism will also remain stagnant. Investments in the local economy of East Jerusalem will furthermore continue to be constrained by regulatory impediments imposed by Israeli authorities, as well as by poor access to finance. Foreign investment will equally be discouraged. The institutional environment for implementing programmes and projects will remain uncertain. Israeli authorities will continue to neglect services for Palestinian communities and vehicles for implementing programmes will mainly be NGOs. Emphasis will need to be put on basic needs types of programmes and on emergency support to local institutions for survival. The results of this scenario are likely to be low or stagnating economic growth, increasing unemployment rates, increased informal sector activity and increasing poverty, as well as out migration of skilled and professional workers, and increasing alienation of young people.

Therefore, as Palestinians we have to make East Jerusalem more integrated in our economical activities and investments. So, all the hub centres of the commercial and industrial sectors must – if possible - locate their administrative centres in East Jerusalem, to create an economical pole there, relating all the commercial decisions and future visions with Jerusalem as an economical pivot for the West Bank.

7.1.2 Prospects for Settlement

Achieving a more peaceful and stable situation will require moving towards a political agreement between Israel and Palestinian authorities on the status of East Jerusalem, involving a substantial and sustained drop in unrest and violence. It is difficult to anticipate what a political agreement on East Jerusalem would entail. Over the years, a large number of options have been
presented, but none have been agreed, although broad commonalities between different options can be identified. However, no speculations on the nature of the political settlement to be made will be made here. It will be assumed, however, that it will result in prospects for Palestinian autonomy in East Jerusalem. It is also assumed that restrictions on links with the West Bank will be reduced, facilitating a more liberal movement of people, goods, services and capital between East Jerusalem and Israel. This scenario will also facilitate the provision of donor assistance to East Jerusalem. On the institutional side some uncertainty remains, depending on the agreements to be reached regarding autonomy/sovereignty. Agreements on this issue will determine to what extent Palestinian disengagement from institutions and Israeli government services should be considered.

7.2 Strategy for Improving the Operation of the Land Market

The issues and problems related to land described above reveal the complexity of the subject of land and land use. These issues have a direct effect on private sector development, housing and the social sector. In the current situation many of the problems are a direct result of the Israeli occupation policies, and are therefore difficult to resolve. There are, however, issues which can be addressed even in the current situation which could contribute to a more effective land use:

- The development of a central and integrated database on land and real estate. The difficulty of obtaining data and information on East Jerusalem as a whole or on specific lots is an obstacle to the private sector dealing with the issues of land and real estate.
Existing islands of data should be included in any new central database. A suitable and sustainable institutional set up has to be devised to develop and maintain this database.

- Strengthen community-based organizations to facilitate grassroots activism and civil action. Through community involvement and co-operation procedural constraints in land use issues can more effectively be addressed. Strengthening community-based organizations to realize better control of the use of land by the Palestinian population can be part of a wider programme of support to community-based organizations under the welfare strategy.

- Develop and strengthen organizations of real estate professionals such as town planners, engineers, surveyors, attorneys, middlemen, consultants, developers, investors and contractors and improving their awareness on legal and technical regulations. This activity should be part of the business support programme proposed under the private sector development strategy.

- Strengthening of alternative land disputes resolution means. The Palestinian population tends to avoid resorting to the Israeli legal system, but prefer using traditional local mediation. Strengthening traditional mediation mechanisms will make them more effective. A study is needed to assess the current effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Palestinian neighborhoods, as well as to recommend the scope for improving these mechanisms.

With Palestinian autonomy over East Jerusalem many of the current legislative and regulatory problems related to the use of land can be resolved. The challenge will then be completing the land titling and settlement process and integrating that with that of the West Bank/Gaza, as well as developing a town planning capability at the municipal level.
7.3 Urban Infrastructure

In East Jerusalem, the municipality partly controls water supply and fully controls the public sewage and solid waste disposal services. Consequently the Palestinian influence in planning and implementing improvement and expansion schemes for these services is limited. Lobbying and advocacy, especially of community groups can have some success in realizing improvements in these services in some neighborhood, though the success of past efforts have been limited. Through community organizations there is also scope to provide outside support for local improvements in water supply, sewage and solid waste disposal in some neighborhoods, especially at the edge of the city. Such projects should be preceded by the conducting of feasibility studies. Other activities which can be implemented include:

7.3.1 Water Supply

There is a need to conduct a study to determine the future water requirements of Arab Jerusalem, and to assess the availability of water resources. There is also the need to study the possibility of building water reservoirs to respond to the future demand of Arab residents, assessing costs and benefits.

7.3.2 Sewage

Studies need to be conducted at neighbourhood level to assess sewage infrastructure needs and to identify projects at this level. To implement theses projects a proper organisational set up should be established for operation and maintenance and it’s financing, including the collection of
charges. Such projects can include sewage infrastructure and wastewater treatment facilities, as well as projects to clean up contaminated valleys.

7.3.3 Solid Waste
At community level, Jerusalemites have to identify technical people able to study and implement projects to establish solid waste collection and disposal systems.

7.3.4 Urban Transport
Bus and transit van operators should have access to credit facilities to improve and replace their vehicles. Palestinian organisations should encourage operators to establish a code of conduct for their drivers.

In anticipation of a settlement there is a need to conduct further study on the need for urban infrastructure services, on how to organise the operation of these services and on how to disengage them from Israeli control. Under a settlement the scope for investing in urban structure will be significantly enhanced.

7.4 Strategies for the Tourism Industry in East Jerusalem

In the status quo to deal with the current emergency situation and to facilitate the reinvigoration of the tourism sector once conditions improve the following strategic priorities can be identified.
Emergency support to companies in the industry in the form of technical assistance and credit at concessional terms to assist companies in dealing with their debts and to assist them in short-term restructuring.

**Institutional strengthening.** The current crisis should be utilized to review the current performance of the various tourism private sector organizations in East Jerusalem and propose ways to restructure them and build effective and more responsive associations that will undertake the responsibility of protecting and promoting the interests of its members in crisis and during normal times. There is a need to strengthen training programs for the tourism industry in East Jerusalem. These programs should be subsidized and should offer recognized certificates upon the successful completion of these courses.

**Business support services.** Companies in the sector need assistance in formulating and implementing medium-term restructuring and expansion plans, covering also introduction of IT, rehabilitation of premises, marketing and legal advisory services to deal with the Israeli regulatory environment. There is also a need for tourism awareness improvement.

### 7.5 International level

The recommendations regarding the international community have to contain two major issues:

- The basic issues concerning Jerusalem such as: the occupation, settlements, Apartheid Wall, and sovereignty.
- Issues related to enhance and support the Arab existence in East Jerusalem.

These recommendations are the following:
1- Establishing Arab council devoted to Jerusalem affairs and has a consistent communication with Palestinian institutions that deal with the issue of Jerusalem to negotiate any emerging issue regarding Jerusalem.

2- This council works to activate the issue of Jerusalem as a central issue and an essential crucial case to the Arab and Islamic countries.

3- This council will establish a fund especially to Jerusalem to encourage the Arab and Islamic governments’ institutions and people to donate for creating new projects that enhance and strengthen the Arab existence in Jerusalem.

4- To communicate with the international community (foreign countries) in order to push Israel to solve the basic crucial issues regarding Jerusalem as the apartheid wall and settlements.

5- Develop an international curriculum about Jerusalem to be taught in the Arabic / Islamic Universities and schools.

### 7.6 Institutional level

1- Establishing a Palestinian research center under the supervision of the Palestinian National Authority (like the Orient House).

2- Forming a well designed strategic plan that aims to secure suitable and sufficient housing units for Arab and to expand their housing sector range to the utmost limit available. The
following points are suggested to take them into consideration while preparing the housing strategic plan:

A- Making use of the vacant lands in East Jerusalem by getting building permits.

B- Make use of the available Israeli planning schemes by modifying the capacity of those plans to include more Arab residents.

C- Designing plans schemes for the unplanned areas in the master plan of Jerusalem as a preliminary step for transforming those areas to residential Arab areas.

7.7 Public Level

Several courses, workshops and discussions should be held to enlighten Palestinian Jerusalemite of the following:

1- Using the un-reside apartments and houses in Jerusalem in amore effective way rather than leaving these properties empty.

2- Encouraging the property owners in Jerusalem not to demand excessive prices for rental purchase.

3- Enlightening the Palestinian Jerusalemite residents for their rights decreed to them by the law from the municipality.

4- Encouraging the private sector to build multi-story buildings.

Finally, I believe that the application of these recommendations would grant the preservation of the Arab identity of the city regardless the obstacles put by the Israeli planners and government.
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