Title

Decision Making in the Iraq War 2003
An Analytical Study of Tony Blair’s Foreign Policy

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To whom I owe this success proudly
To my caring father, my excellent teacher and my precious friend

Taisir Hammad

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Abstract

On 15 February 2003, more than one million people had taken to the streets of London to protest against the prospect of war. Later that month, British Prime Minister Tony Blair faced the largest parliamentary rebellion in over a hundred years where 121 of his Labour Party colleagues voted against the government’s policy of support for US military action against Iraq. Blair has faced a fierce opposition from Britain’s major partners in Europe—France and Germany—who believed that the unilateral decision of Blair’s government to go to war has undermined Britain’s pivotal role of providing a bridge of understanding between Europe and the United States and damaged the multilateral approach to world problems. Prime Minister Blair even faced personal attacks in the media which threatened his political survival.

Facing such constraints, it would have been conceivable if the Blair-led government had taken a less determined position on Iraq. But that was not the case. Ignoring the UN, the public, the party, the parliament, and the EU partners, Blair decided enthusiastically to join the war, not only verbally but militarily.

In an attempt to explain Blair’s foreign policy decision making in the Iraq War 2003, I recall the underpinnings of Tony Blair’s Third Way Labour (New Labour) which I expect to assist me in understanding Blair’s decision. Principles of humanitarian intervention, international community, multilateralism and interconnectedness between domestic and foreign policies resonated in his New Labour discourse. Putting these principles into the Iraq war test, I discovered an exacerbating gulf between this policy and Blair’s actual political action on the ground.
Faced with a challenging dilemma and trying to understand that dilemma, I formulated the thesis hypothesis which stated that Blair used the New Labour teachings in his discourse to knit a list of pretexts and justifications in an attempt to manipulate his public, party members, and parliament into believing in the legality of the war. This in turn would conceal the real reasons of intervention behind a screen of pluralist and moral rhetoric devising evidence to support decisions that had already been agreed upon especially at the level of Blair-Bush.

Methodologically and through the use of both primary and secondary data, I exploited three international relations perspectives suggested by a first analysis of Blair’s New Labour Policy and discourse. These are normative, pluralist and realist perspectives. Both the first and second perspectives failed to unravel the dilemma and explain Blair’s decision in the Iraq war due to the fact that the actual performance on the ground violated the moral values of peace, human rights, and democracy. It also undermined the credibility of the UN as an international organization, damaged the multilateral approach to world issues and neglected (through Blair’s prime ministerial style of leadership) both the public and parliament; the very basis of a democratic nation.

The thesis then, through relating the resultant hypothesis with the assumptions of the realist school of thought mainly bandwagoning, public opinion and power of interests, contends that Blair’s real motivation behind the Iraq war was advancement of British interests through tightening the relationship with the US hegemon. These interests are composed but not limited to the nuclear build-up (and what relates to Britain’ security and survival), unrestricted flow of oil (and what relates to Britain’s economic and industrial prosperity), and Britain’s influential role in the international arena as a pivotal power.
في 15 شباط 2003، انطلق ما يقارب المليون بريطاني إلى شوارع لندن معربين عن معارضتهم لقرار الحرب على العراق. وفي 23 من نفس الشهر، شهدت بريطانيا أيضاً أنف ثورة برلمانية في تاريخها حين قررت 121 عضواً التصويت ضد قرار الحكومة خوض الحرب. وفي نفس الشهر، ظهرت أصوات الدول الأوروبية الخليفة لبريطانيا. أمثال فرنسا والمانيا. والدنمارك بناية بيار أحادياً الإكتمال لبوش في حرية على العراق من قبل ذلك تعاليم طريقه الثالث (حرب العمال الجديد 1997) التي تسود على لعب دور الجسر الذي يربط بين ضفتي الأطلسي والتي تنادي بحل متعدد الاطراف للمشاكل الدولية. إن بيلر بقراره خوض الحرب عرض وحده مع أوروبا للخطر كما عرض حياة السياسة للفشل الذريع.

بالنظر إلى هذه الخلفية، يكون من الواضح أن بلير أن يمتنع عن جر بلاده لحرب تواجه مثل هذه الحدة في المعارضة من كافة الاطراف. إلا أن بيلر تحدى الجميع ليقف في صف الشريك التاريخي، الولايات المتحدة.

في محاولة لفهم قرار بلير، اتبعت لمسح أولي لتعاليم الطريق الثالث تلك والتي من الممكن أن يكون قد استند إليها بلير في الوصول إلى قراره. لكن ما تكشف عنه البحث هو تناقض واضح بين ما السياسة التي بنى عليها الطريق الثالث وبين الواقع على الأرض. فيما تحت تلك التعاليم على نشر الفهم الأخلاقية واحترام المؤسسات الدولية وتبني الحل المتعدد الاطراف للقضايا الدولية واحترام أسس الديمقراطية، نرى أن بيلر لم يتقيد بهذه التعاليم في الحرب على العراق بل وناقضها تماماً في بعض الحالات.

هل من الممكن أن يكون بيلر متناضقاً في سياسته الخارجية؟ وإن كان هناك تناقضًا حقيقًا، كيف نستطيع تفسيره؟

من خلال البحث، قمت بصياغة الفرضية لتفسير المعضلة وهي أن بيلر استخدم الخطاب التعددي والأخلاقي الموجود في تعاليم الطريق الثالث لتجسيد جملة من الذرائع يسطيع من خلالها إقناع شعوبه وحكومته والمجتمع الدولي أن ما يقوم به هو الحل الصافي والشرعي. لكن ما يكشف تحت هذه اللمحة من الذرائع الأمنية والأخلاقية والدولية دوافع حقيقة جيوسياسية حسب ما يكشفه البحث عند تقنيق هذه الذرائع واحدة تلو الأخرى.
وكمنهجية لإثبات هذه الفرضية باستخدام كل من المراجع الأولية والثانوية، استعرضت ثلاث مدارس في العلاقات الدولية ألا وهي المدرسة المحاسية، والمدرسة التعادية والمدرسة الواقعة وذلك لأن دراسة أولية لسياسة الخارجية البريطانية الموجودة ضمن تعاليم الطريق الثلاث تلائم احتمالية استخدام هذه المدارس في تفسير هذه السياسة. كما أن هذه المدارس تمتلك القوة التفسيرية القادرية على تفسير أسباب الحرب من عدة جوانب.

وبعد تطبيق تعاليم كل من هذه المدارس على قرار بلير السياسي خوض الحرب، نستنتج أن المدرستين الأولى والثانية فشلتا في تفسير القرار كليا لأسباب نذكر منها عدم قدرة المدرستين على تفسير أنتهاك المنظومة الأخلاقية خلال الحرب وإهمال صوت الشعب والحكومة والمجتمع الدولي مملا بالأمم المتحدة. بينما توصلت المدرسة الواقعة من خلال افتراضاتها (الانحياز، الرأي العام، قوة المصالح) التي ربطتها مع فرضية البحث نفسه وأسلحته إلى تحليل كامل للأسباب التي دفعت بلير إلى الحرب والتي جعلته لا يتفقا جانبا للانتهاكات السالفة الذكر.

ويخلص البحث إلى أن الأسباب الحقيقية وراء انضمام بلير للحرب غير أبعاد أحداث 11/9 وهيمنة الولايات المتحدة على الساحة الدولية وما ينتج عنها من مصالح إقتصادية وسياسية وعسكرية أبرزها تقوية الترسانة النووية لبريطانيا وضمان الوفير غير المقدبة (بأنظمة سياسية متحدة كالنظام العراقي) للنقطة، مصدر الطاقة الأساسي للدول الصناعية أمثال بريطانيا.
I. Introduction

The decision by the Blair government to support the US in its invasion of Iraq made many academics, observers, journalists and commentators try to give rational explanations for seemingly unanswerable questions. The decision has been perceived by some as a defining moment in the UK foreign policy, one that has caused great damage to Blair’s premiership.

Why did Blair decide to join the US-led invasion against Iraq despite public protest, parliamentary revolt, party opposition and European objection? Why did he choose to subordinate to the US knowing that this might incur a high political cost domestically? Why did Blair not adopt a more diplomatic and less militaristic approach to show support to the US, on one hand, but that would have been less costly, at the same time? Why did he, as a Leftist New Labourist, rely on the right both in the parliament and the public opinion to gain the support for his already-taken-decision? Why did he not, as a democratic leader, involve the public in the decision-making process of going to war through, for example, a referendum?

Although on February 15, 2003, an estimated one million people took to the streets of Britain’s major cities to protest against the looming conflict, Blair insisted on going to war alongside the Conservative American leader. Despite his decreasing personal ratings in opinion polls, which showed strong majorities opposed to any war without the authorization of the United Nations, Blair commented that this was the price of conviction. In the face of fierce objection from his most important European allies: France and Germany, Blair decided to join the war. In addition, a debate in the House of Commons in the same month showed 121 Labour MPs vote against war who by the end of February reached
200 warning the Prime Minister of an even larger rebellion. Nonetheless, he described this as the cost of leadership. In fact, he did not accept “No for an answer”, (Stephans 2004, 234). On March 18, 2003, Blair spoke to the Parliament with great confidence in which his New Labourist rhetoric of multilateralism and ethics strive was exploited to incur the required majority supporting his decision to go to the war¹.

Observing this context closely through the international news motivated me to look for answers and try to explain the reason behind Blair’s insistence on joining the war despite such consistent domestic and regional disturbances. Through my review of the available literature, I noticed that there were three basic arguments that Blair has offered for intervention - the security case, the global case and the modernizing case for war (Hogget 2005, 418). All three were described by Blair in his crucial speech to the House of Commons on March 18, 2003. The security case hinges upon a concept of threat posed by Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction; this threat, however, failed to distinguish between what is potentially a threat and what is imminent; a fact which caused criticism and investigations about the truth of the whole case. The global strategic case hinges around the idea that the UK should work closely with the US to minimize its unilateralism in solving world issues especially the ‘war on terrorism’. Conversely, this proved controversial when Blair decided deliberately to go to war without a UN authorization or consensus. The final case made by Blair is the modernizing moralizing case which has two aims of both exporting democracy and liberalism, on one hand, and appealing to humanitarian intervention, on the other hand. However, this did not constitute a solid justification taking into

consideration the actual deeds that took place on the ground most importantly the long history of supporting this dictate person of Saddam himself and the likes, the years of sanctions, the random bombing and shelling of targets causing mass killings, the prioritization to protect oil-related premises rather schools, hospitals and museums, and the illegality of the war according the UN Charter.

Despite the counterarguments which I summarized above challenging Blair’s justifications, his arguments were said to be based in his Third Way Labourism proposed by him in 1997 where his premiership resonated the principles of humanitarian intervention, international community, multilateralism and interconnection between domestic and foreign policies. According to Coates and Krieger (2004), New Labour harnesses the forces of globalization to advance internationalism, multilateralism and cooperation in the economic, environmental and security dimensions of foreign affairs. It promotes the idea that foreign and domestic policies are integrally connected by a set of principles entailing that being strong internationally requires being strong domestically.

For Blair, these same principles laid the ground for justifying the war against Saddam Hussein. However, these justifications represented in the “war on terrorism, unregulated weapons of mass destruction, threat of a rogue regime and material defiance of the UN security council” (Coates and Krieger 2004, 66) caused a loud public controversy- towards the end of the war especially following the failure to find any weapons of mass destruction- over whether Blair’s government deliberately exaggerated the extent of the threat posed by the Iraqi leader and his capabilities (Stephans 2004, xviii) through relying on the governments intelligence reports of September 2002 and February 2003 in an attempt to win the support of the public.
This fact made me look deeper into the teachings of the Third Way Labourism and try to understand whether they really constitute the basis on which Blair rested his case or they were only exploited cleverly by him to pass his own decision of going to war. In the following chapter, I make a comparison between Blair’s New Labour Policy, on one hand, and his actual political action on the ground in an attempt to test this. Discovering the gulf between the “policy” and the “politics”, I attempt to formulate a hypothesis based on the questions above: that Blair has used those teachings of his Third Way Labourism to formulate a list of pretexts and justifications in an attempt to manipulate his public, party members, and parliament into believing in the legality of the war. This in turn would conceal the real reasons of intervention behind a screen of liberal rhetoric devising evidence to support decisions that had already been agreed upon especially at the level of Blair-Bush.

This hypothesis generated a list of questions in this same chapter that required me to exploit three different international relations viewpoints to understand the puzzle clearly.

The first explanation was proposed by many authors such as Kramer who believed that Blair performs and decides based on his ethical disposition and moral conviction that the world is lead by a set of values and principles. It is based in his Third Way Labourism that Britain should be a good citizen and a force for good in the world. Hence, one should act within this set to promote world peace, safety and security. This can be explained from the normative viewpoint of international relations which perceives the leader as a moral politician who chooses political principles that are consistent with those of morality and ethical principles.
Many authors such as Coates and Krieger have also looked into the wordings of Blair’s speeches to try to understand his motivations. Blair’s speeches encouraged multilateral approach to world conflicts, justified the closeness to the US by the attempt to decrease its unilateralism and respect for international institutions, defended the war as a just one aiming at alleviating the suffering of the poor and spreading democracy and economic welfare, believed that his behavior as a good citizen of the world spreading freedom and human rights is the basis by which he was elected by his people, the legitimizing power behind his premiership. To explain such trends, I attempted to use the pluralist school of thought to try finding convincing reasoning for Blair’s decisions. Through relying on its main assumptions accentuating the impact of international institutions, prioritizing the domestic system over the international system in trying to explain a certain act, elaborating the insight that state-society relations- the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded- have a fundamental impact on state behaviour in world politics and highlighting that state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments...matters most in world politics” (Moravcsik 1997, 513), I tested whether this school can be applied to our case here and, thus explain the puzzle, or not. Criteria such as respect for international institutions, societal factors such as the public and party, humanitarian intervention and human rights were used in this context.

Other authors attempted to find an explanation for Blair’s decisions in the Iraq through relying on the international structure and the power of interests. One such author is Azubuike (2003). According to Azubuike,
“The degree of zealfulness with which Tony Blair committed himself and Britain to the support the US campaign following the September 11th terrorist attacks was impressive. In justifying that level of commitment, Blair with these principles of Third Way Labourism cited as his principal motivations the punishment of the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks, and the eradication of the injustice, poverty, and sufferings that breed terrorism. Despite the persuasiveness of the argument, these messianic motivations are only a façade for Britain’s real motivations embodied in advancing British national interests by reinvigorating a special relationship\(^2\) that was purportedly becoming less special” (2003, 64).

These authors represented a third explanatory framework and that is the realist school of thought. Its main assumptions highlight the importance of the international structure, the state as a unitary unit in that structure, the anarchic self-help system that requires the state to seek its survival and security and maximize its national interests and power relative to those of other nation states.

\(^2\) This special relationship was forged during the First and Second World Wars and manifested clearly in 1940 when France collapsed and Britain’s sole hope not to loose the war was only in accepting the American intervention. Any attempt by Britain to reshape the world faded away as the British Empire crumbled and Great Britain’s relative poverty and military weakness became increasingly evident. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain was forced to abandon a joint military operation in the Middle East with France in the face of an American disapproval. By then, Britain learned to consult and cooperate with the United States knowing the limitations of its military independence (Rachman, Gideon 2001, 8).
Will this school of thought be the most appropriate explanatory theory for my case? That is what I will test in the fourth chapter through reading different scholars that adopted the realist theory in explaining the case study.

In the final chapter, I shall try to give appropriate explanation to prove my hypothesis and consequently answer the questions which I proposed in this context. It is also expected, through looking at excerpts from Blair’s speeches and actions throughout the war, that I will be able to judge for myself as well as for the reader, in the context of the Anglo-American special relationship as well as the peculiarity of the British political system especially under Blair’s reign, that Blair used the teachings of the pluralist and moralist thought as a façade-embodied namely in using the ideas of collective community and spreading democracy to the outer world as means of mitigating “terrorism” worldwide- for his real motivations. By looking at the political principles underpinning the British notion of special relationship with the USA, the research contends that “Blair’s involvement in the US-led war against Iraq was mainly motivated by his desire to advance British national interests through tightening the historical Anglo-American special relationship (Azubuike 2003, 65).

My methodological approach using the aforementioned international relations viewpoints to test Blair’s foreign policy decision making in the Iraq war will be through analyzing primary as well as secondary resources of information (books, articles, online journals, and speeches) related to my topic of research.

As part of the limitations to the research, the denied access to highly classified governmental documents prevented me from pursuing the complete information. Not only that, but the limitation of resources has added to my
difficulties as a researcher. In fact, I have been faced during my research with lack of references and resources that are relevant to my topic. Since the Iraq war 2003 is considered to be a relatively new event in the international arena, all I could find in our libraries was only survey of the Iraq war events with little bit of reflections, mostly non-academic. Therefore, I had to leave for the UK on my own expenses, visit both Manchester and Newcastle universities to collect as much academic papers as possible. I had also to borrow an Athens password from a friend studying at Westminster University in London to be able to open up the electronic journals (which otherwise would be extremely expensive) that might be of relevance.

Despite these limitations that greatly constrained me to an extent that I was willing to change the whole topic, I am pleased to present this thesis that I believe might be the first study to tackle Blair’s foreign policy decision making analytically. Although studies attempted to depict his behaviour, they only gave mere description to that decision or an insinuation to how it can be explained, as the maximum. However, throughout my study, I tried to test his behaviour against three international relations perspectives in order to arrive at a reasonable explanation that enables us to 1. Understand the discrepancy between Blair’s rhetoric existent in his New Labourist line of thought that he attempted to exploit in justifying the war against Iraq and his real political course of action; and 2. Highlight the real reasons behind Blair’s decision to go to war.

Throughout the thesis, emphasis was given to Tony Blair as a leader, the Prime Minister of Britain who made a decision to go to war in the name of his country. Based on the realist tradition which I expect to be the most appropriate theory to
explain my hypothesis, the unitary and rational state is represented by one voice and that is its leader. No matter differences of view among political figures or bureaucracies within the states there are, they are ultimately resolved so that the state speaks by one voice, (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 55). Therefore, references to Blair as a leader and Britain as a state are employed interchangeably for the purpose understanding Blair’s foreign policy decision of going to the Iraqi war. According to Machiavelli, politicians and statesmen find meaning in the state, even though they may not have created it. They subordinate personal interests to its interests; they dedicate their lives to its preservation and pursuit of power. They do what is necessary to ensure its survival and prosperity, (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 59). The Prince is responsible for the wellbeing of his state, of its security and survival. The survival of Britain, as a unit in the international system, is identified with and dependant on the ruling prince, in our case here, Tony Blair.

Leaders such as Tony Blair fashion the international order through their diplomacy and foreign policy decisions (Kissinger1994, 27). In fact, they build international systems, while researchers attempt to analyze their operations and mechanisms. As an analyst, I tried to explain Blair’s foreign policy decision of joining for war and the reasons behind it through looking into the ways he managed and assessed the “problem: going to war” under certain circumstances; most importantly of which is the constraining surrounding international system and Britain’s place within it; both of which dictated Blair’s decision. According to Waltz, “the best way to understand human behavior is to understand it as conditioned by society; we are products of a social environment. The same holds true for international relations”, (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 135).
2. British Foreign Policy under Blair

2.1 The Emergence of New Labour

Since achieving power in 1997, New Labour has been extensively making claims about concepts of multilaterism, internationalism, interdependence, and morality existent in its foreign policies and wanting to be a ‘force for good in the world’. However, the Iraq crisis has proved that there is real gap between Blair’s policy claims and the reality of such policy on the ground.

This chapter will focus on the puzzle of my research whereby I shall present the development of the Blairite New Labour. The foreign policy decision made by Blair to invade Iraq is expected to be reflective of and emanating from the framing premises of his New Labour. However, to the contrary, Blair by joining the unilateral US-led war against Iraq has retreated from the principles that were shaping the emerging New Labour to fall within what Coates and Krieger labelled as “New Labour defiant internationalism” that has traditional state-centric foreign policy instincts of power capabilities and interests in which British foreign policy should be rewritten to meet the security threats of the post9/11 order, domestic preferences should give way to war on “terrorism” and should be subordinated to the UK-US alliance. In this context, Blair’s Britain is acting as the dependable ally to the US hegemonic power, benefiting Western corporations particularly oil companies and maximizing Britain’s independent political standing in the world to remain, if not great, at least, a middle power. This New Labour has proved throughout the Iraq crisis that both domestic preferences and international institutions are irrelevant when it comes to the nation’s survival and interests.
In an attempt to explain the gap between Blair’s New Labour discourse and actual action on the ground in our case here, I shall first present Blair’s New Labour foreign policy supported by excerpts from speeches made by Blair on different occasions. Then I argue that Blair’s New Labour foreign policy dialogue is only a veil for his actual action regarding the Iraq crisis especially that he decided to go to the war despite the 1. Lack of a Second UN resolution; and 2. Opposition at the domestic level, mainly his party and the public opinion which opposed the war especially without a clear UN Resolution. 3. He also exploited the pretexts for attack- based on eradicating terrorism, regime change of a dictatorship, proliferations of Weapons of Mass Destruction threatening world peace and stability and intervention for humanitarian necessities -as tools supported by the government’s two intelligence reports and the legal advice of Lord Goldsmith to make opposing voices of both Blair’s party and nation believe that his course of action is the ‘right thing to do’.

Prior analyzing this gap, an overview of Blair’s New Labour would be helpful. A summary of his course of action will be followed to show the contrast between policy and actual performance.

### 2.1.1 Blair’s New Labour Policy

New Labour came into force in May 1997 determined to transform UK’s foreign policy completely from the classical traditional foreign policy of the past. Blair’s New Labour rhetoric involved two dimensions that were used extensively by Blair speeches in justifying the war against Iraq: internationalism and interdependence. These two notions, as he believes, should be the basis for dealing with world problems through multilateral rather than unilateral channels. These two pillars were combined with a sense of principle that guides
the Labour party to be a force for good in the world where narrow relapolitik interests are inferior to global concerns such as human rights and world security (Coates and Krieger 2004, 11-12).

In their book, *Blair’s Wars*, Coates and Krieger run through these ideas of the New Labour elaborately. They define internationalism as the desire to transcend national boundaries to find solutions to international issues through a strong international community and the willingness to take a multilateral rather than a purely state-centric approach to those issues through *international institutions* and bodies such as the UN" (2004, 13). Through the framework of internationalism, Blair’s New Labour believed in the **interdependence** of both sides of the Atlantic: EU and US in order “to change the world, to reorder it and spread prosperity, democracy and freedom through peaceful means, through collaboration and multilateralism rather than through confrontation”, (Coates and Krieger 2004, 13).

Thus, in order for Britain to play a pivotal role in maintaining a safer more decent international order, it should be stronger on both sides rather choose between Europe and the US.

Sensitivity to public was also another major factor that characterized Blair’s New Labour. Some commentators such as Driver and Martell described the New Labour as “a Post Thatcherism tradition; where it is both attracted and repulsed by it. New Labour is repelled by the individualistic message of Thatcherism and loss of touch with people. In fact, New Labour offered greater *popular sensitivity*  

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3 Keohane and Nye (1977) in their article: “Realism and Complex Interdependence” identified three characteristics of interdependence:

1. Multiple Channels connecting societies including formal and informal ties;
2. The agenda of relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a consistent hierarchy;
3. Military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the region.

in politics and concern for the many not just the few”, (1998, 3). Even Blair himself highlighted the inclusion of the public in the decision making process in his Labour Party Speech in 1997⁴ where he believed that grass root people have the power to change the course of the nation’s politics. Their will, needs, and desires are to be respected in order to win their trust. As Blair puts it, “New Labour is the political arm of none other than the British people as a whole. Our values are the same: the equal worth of all, with no one cast aside; fairness and justice within strong communities”. According to Driver and Martell, “Blair’s populist appeal to Labour’s values and conception of national identity as those of the people is part of this process of re-identifying with voters and making the party electable”, (2002, 150). It is also compatible with the principle of ‘let the people decide’ that has been reflected in the growth of referenda which are used to measure the public mood to certain government decisions; joining the Euro currency decision would be a perfect example. In fact, Jones and Kavanagh state that referenda and opinion polling were highly used by Blair as indicators of the public mood to redress the citizens’ concerns (2003).

Blair, since taking over in 1997, has been exemplifying with great sense of pragmatism what Almond and Verba described in their book, The Civic Culture, about the style in which politics is conducted whereby values of citizen participation are balanced against a trust in the elites and a responsiveness to their laws; a policy that is neither totally right nor left but some way in the middle which Blair calls ‘Third Way’. This comes in total agreement with what Beetham states that public expression of opinion either through election or protest acts as a continuous discipline on the elected, requiring them to give

public account of their actions and to take constant notice of public opinion”, (as quoted in Judge 2004, 685).

2.1.2 Third Way Labourism

“This ‘Third Way’ has been developed as a political guide that shifted the British foreign policy from at least five angles” (Wheeler and Dunne 1998, 848):

- “Projecting a different identity for Britain”: As opposed to Thatcherism foreign policy of the imperial power, the New Labour’s Third way of the British identity projected a more forward looking image of Britain on the international stage which is not based on the imperial past or the military strength. But rather on the values of ‘inclusive society’ in which people would be proud of their counties for its pluralist values which allow them to hold their leaders accountable for their actions.

- “A new language of International Relations”: A concept such as internationalism was formulated in the Third Way teachings in which world issues mattered to all; hence, they should be looked at from an international multilateral perspective rather unilaterally in terms of narrow RealPolitik interest.

- “The ethical dimension”: Britain should be a good force in the world where human rights all over the world would be respected. It should also be committed to economic, social and political development worldwide. Blair’s doctrine of humanitarian intervention was introduced within the framework of an interdependent, multilateral world which Blair believed in to advance human rights, security and safety worldwide.

- “The vision of good international citizenship”: Inclusive of the former point, this image also entails the concern for the internationalist agenda on global challenges. The good international citizenship must act as a
moderator for the struggle for power by strengthening the rules and norms of international order. It seeks to tame the element of brute power and looks to the recognition of order and justice in world politics. Being a permanent member of the UNSC, leader of the Commonwealth and a major player in the EU will help Britain further the principles of good citizenship in a diplomatic manner backed by military action only if legitimized by the UN.

These teachings were reflected by Blair on numerous occasions mainly the 1999 speech where he highlighted his Doctrine of the International Community at the Economic Club in Chicago. This doctrine was socialist as he explained, “socialism…is a moral purpose for life, a set of values, and a belief in society, in cooperation… it is how I try to live my life…I am worth no more than any other man…this is my socialism…let us {then} rouse ourselves to a new moral purpose for our nation. In the speech, he highlighted the need for new rules for international cooperation as a consequence of an ever increasing interdependent world. The doctrine of isolationism cannot be applicable in a world of globalization; rather a doctrine of ‘international community’ should become a natural alternative as Blair suggests. He explains that “being dependent on each other, just as within domestic politics, the notion of community—the belief that partnership and cooperation are essential to advance self-interest— is coming into its own. Global financial markets, the global environment, global security and disarmament issues; none of these can be solved without intense international cooperation: {Here he suggests close EU-US cooperation to achieve this end}” (1999). Blair even introduced in this speech the principle of humanitarian intervention as a tool to spread the values of liberty, rule of law, human rights and democracy. The Westphalian principle of non-interference should not be overruled except in cases of acts of Genocide and/or oppression. Blair
highlighted 5 tests of when warlike humanitarian intervention must be applicable (1999):

- Are we sure of the case?
- Have we exhausted all diplomatic means?
- Based on practical assessment, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake?
- Are we prepared for the long term?
- Do we have national interest at stake?

As we can see here, Blair’s speech mirrored many aspects of his ‘Third Way’ Labourism of internationalism, interdependence, and humanitarianism that were also touched upon in his 9/11 speech as well as his address to the nation prior to the Iraq war. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Blair highlighted his ethical interventionist doctrine as part of a British global foreign policy that would ensure peace and security and protect human rights. He stated: “the starving, the wretched, the dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor from the deserts of north Africa to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan: they too are our cause. This is a moment to seize... the pieces are in flux, soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder the world around us”, (2001). In his address to the Nation in 20 March 2003, Blair used these principles extensively to prove to both his nation and party that taking part in military action in Iraq alongside the US is the right thing to do that comes with Britain’s national interest. He explained that the world faces a new global security problem that necessitates the use of international community to face this “new threat of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq, armed with weapons of mass destruction; or of extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our way of life, our freedom and democracy” (2003). In this speech, Blair also emphasized the ethical side of the military action against Iraq embodied mainly in the humanitarian effort. He added, “Our commitment to the post-Saddam humanitarian effort will be total. We shall help Iraq move towards democracy...
Removing Saddam will be a blessing to the Iraqi people. Four million Iraqis are in exile. 60% of the population are dependent on food aid. Thousands of children die every year through malnutrition and disease. Hundreds of thousands have been driven from their homes and murdered”, (2003). Blair also accentuated that this military action against Iraq is in the framework of preserving world peace, order and stability that dictators like Saddam Hussein threaten to undermine; therefore Britain, under New Labour, should secure the respect for both world peace and human rights worldwide through cooperating with the interdependent world of modern states hinting at both the EU and the US.

Blair believes that cooperation between those sides of the Atlantic is necessary to materialize his doctrine of international community especially in the war against terrorism. According to Stephens, Blair, just like previous British Prime Ministers, believe in the dispensability of the special relationship with the United States as the nexus of historical, cultural, economic and security ties alongside a shared language (2004, 104). But what differentiates Blair from his predecessors is his belief of the necessity to balance such strong Atlanticism with a deep commitment to Europe within the framework of the values of international community and interdependence previously mentioned. As a leader, Blair believed that Britain should be a leading member of the EU, shaping it to become more outward-looking and effective. But at the same time Britain should be a loyal partner of the US, showing it that multilateralism and working with allies pay. Blair is not the first prime minister to talk about Britain as a “bridge” between the US and Europe, but he has emphasised it more than most, and argues that Britain must avoid having to choose between its European and Atlanticist relationships. According to Blair, “It is absurd to imaging that for, Britain; there is a choice between the relationship with Europe and that with
America. On the contrary, the real value to the US of the British role in Europe lies in the influence we can still and will exert to keep Europe firmly linked to the US in defence, outward looking and open to trade and investment”, (as quoted in Riddell 2003, 71).

Coates and Krieger argue that the aforementioned Blairite New Labour principles stem from the socialist tradition of the British Labourism. According to Blair in a lecture at the commemoration organized by the Fabian Society to mark the 15th anniversary of the 1954 General Election in year 1995:

“Socialism is based on a moral assertion that individuals are interdependent, that they owe duties to one another as well as themselves, and that common humanity demands that everyone be given a platform on which to stand. It has objective basis too, rooted in the belief that only by recognizing their interdependence will individuals flourish, because the good of each depends on the good for all. This concept requires a form of politics in which we share responsibility to fight poverty, prejudice, unemployment (in our case ‘terrorism’ would be included)”, (as quoted in Coates and Krieger 2004, 108).

This definition captures the central themes of Blair’s New Labour policy in which both domestic and foreign policies are connected by a set of principles mainly: interdependence rather than conflict; commonality of values and aims defined in terms of community or humanity and the responsibility of individual citizens towards each other. British foreign policy involves clear ethical principles, a commitment to third force neutralism and building of multilateral institutions that should act as counterweight to pure national interests emphasized in traditional Labour foreign policy. These values, as Blair argues, should not only result in respect for his government abroad but would command more support at
home, and a government strong at home, in turn, would have a louder voice abroad. Coates and Krieger further argue that Blair’s New Labour’s notion of community, just as within domestic politics, cuts its way in foreign policy in which the belief of partnership, multilateralism, and cooperation in the economic, environmental and security dimensions of foreign affairs is necessary to secure human rights worldwide”, (2004, 110).

To sum up, Blair’s Chicago speech outlined the most important guiding principles for British foreign and domestic policies. He believed that the forces of globalization necessitates global interdependence among countries in which the notion of international community, collaboration and the institutions that deliver them obliges those countries not to retreat to isolationism but interventionism-when necessary through war - in order to establish humanitarian policy and spread the pluralist values of human rights, democracy, liberty and security.

2.1.3 Blair’s Political Action in the Iraq War 2003

Now coming to the case of the Iraq war, Blair has stood shoulder to shoulder with the United States. In doing so, however, a divergence between the previously presented policy and his actual decision making has emerged starkly. Prior attempting to suggest realism, rather than pluralism or idealism, as a school of thought capable of resolving this paradox, an overview of Blair’s behaviour in the war will be presented below.

2.2 The Divergence between Policy and Politics

2.2.1 Multilateralism and Internationalism

In the preparations to the Iraq war, “Blair played a multilateralist expressing his commitment to the international institution of the UN; however, he would often say that this commitment was conditional and could not be an excuse of
inaction” (Stephens 2004, 208). In fact, this has the insinuation that the war would be inevitable despite the lack of international legitimacy necessary for Blair’s interventionism presented in his New Labour policy as mentioned above. Even the tests put by Blair to justify what he calls “humanitarian intervention” were not totally met. For example, Blair’s emphasis on exhausting all the diplomatic means prior military intervention in a certain country was overruled when Blair along with Bush ignored Saddam’s attempt to comply with demands of the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). In fact, they publicly declared that “Saddam’s 12,000 page document disclosing his weapons programs-in a response to resolution 1441⁵- was full of gaps and evasions, so Iraq could already be said to be in material breach of the UNSCR 1441 which was itself written in demanding ambiguous terms so that a (false) disclosure would be a material breach, as would be the refusal to allow key personnel in the Iraqi Program to be interrogated outside of Iraq”, (Freedman 2004, 29). In addition, Blair, along with Bush of course, was dismissive of the report submitted by Blix, head of the (UNMOVIC) which stated that the Iraqi cooperation concerning the disarmament demands was progressing well (Kramer 2003). These were seen as removing the principal pretexts for war.

Blair’s insistence on the principle of international community and multilateralism rather unilateralism as a means for conflict resolution to world issues has been manipulated when Blair willingly decided to alter one multilaterist route: France, Germany, Russia and most non-permanent members of the Security Council that went against his interests (in going to war alongside the US) with another one that he tried to convince on his side: Mexico, Chile, Pakistan, Cameroon, Angola, and Guinea. His failure to secure a Second UN Resolution mandating the

military intervention did not inhibit him from joining the attack on Iraq despite advice from his senior government figures such as Jack Straw. On the contrary, he manipulated the French position (to veto the Resolution under any circumstances) for his benefit after he failed to secure a Second Resolution. Curtis states that “Blair’s government abandoned the attempt to secure a UN resolution explicitly in the face of opposition from France, Germany, Russia and most non-permanent members of the Security Council. Bribes, sweeteners and pressure were being used to bring other states into the line making a mockery of multilateral cooperation. Blair even introduced a new concept to justify ignoring the UN- the ‘unreasonable veto’, that could be cast by other permanent members of the Security Council”, (2003, 10). It seems contradictory on the part of Blair to see him violate the international law in going to war without UN authorization while at the same time building the case for waging the war against Saddam on the basis of the latter’s breach of past UN resolutions.

Furthermore, Blair, in his course of action, in the Iraq war, threatened to damage the interdependent world he spoke of in his New Labour policy as necessary to tighten the will of the international community in preserving world peace, order and protection of human rights. Blair’s behaviour with his European peers could hardly be understood in the framework of interdependence that tilted to the side of the Americans only. All the way in trying to persuade Bush, Blair played on the rhetoric of the necessity of the international community’s support. He said on April 7, 2003 in a speech at the Bush Presidential Library, “The international coalition matters. Where it operates, the unintended consequences of action are limited, the diplomatic parameters better fixed. The US and the EU together are preconditions of such alliances”, (as quoted in Riddell 2003, 200). However, what we have seen during the course of war that Blair’s main foreign policy pillar of
integrating both the EU and the US has been undermined for the benefit of the American side. In the pretext that “the world’s superpower would act in an unpredictable manner in the wake of 9/11 attacks, Blair offered an unprecedented support to Bush’s reassurances staking his own reputation among his European allies mainly France and Germany” (Stephens 2004, 206). This has resulted in shaking the European end of the transatlantic bridge which Blair has always sought to enforce in attempt to tighten the values of international community and collective will (Kramer 2003). Hill hints that Blair was not concerned about his European ties as much as he is concerned about his American relations. “He neglected to consult properly with his European partners assuming that they would come to his position in the end. In fact, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was barely relevant to the day-to-day conduct of Blair’s foreign policy with a concern for European multilateralism being merely an empty phrase of New Labour rhetoric (Stephens 2004, 95). According to Kramer, Blair wanted to commit the United Kingdom to Europe, a line which Blair’s New Labour has taken upon the defeat of the hard-line Euro-sceptics Conservative party (2003). Nonetheless, the Iraq crisis proved that commitment wrong making Blair adopt a more unilateralist view of the world as opposed to that multilateral view of the Europeans who refused to see the world simply in terms of good and evil as Blair and Bush did or assumed they did. Stephens further argues, “Europe believed that security was anchored in the multilateral institutions that had kept peace in the post-cold war era. However, America treated those institutions as an irrelevant relic of the past” (2004, 222).

The ideological tension between both sides was deepened when Washington (and later Britain) described the endorsement of a second UNSCR would be nice
but not necessary. The fragile transatlantic unity that followed the UNSCR 1441 was cracking especially when France had demanded an explicit commitment to a second resolution before any military action would be contemplated. Commenting on this, Riddell states that “Blair was not concerned about either France’s or Germany’s demands as much as he was about America’s which meant power, security, and survival to him. Even though Blair spent hours on the phone with both Chirac and Schroeder, reaching agreement with them seemed a lower priority”, (2003, 296). Blair even added fuels to the fires, according to Riddell, by attaching his signature along with those of seven other European leaders- including the right wing prime ministers of Spain and Italy- to an article in the Wall Street Journal backing the US stance and demonstrating that France and Germany could not speak for Europe thus leading to the paralysis of the European Coalition (2003, 243). This obviously signifies Blair’s rift with Europe especially the socialist-oriented countries like France and Germany which shared his Third Way Labourism or Neue Mitte for the benefit of his partnership with the US. It seems, according to Kagan, that “Blair, in divergence from his New Labourists, endorsed the idea of international double standard for power. He has tried to lead Britain in to the rule-based Kantian world of the European Union. But as his solidarity with President Bush on the Iraq war has shown, Blair wanted to lead Europe, although against its will, back to the Hobbesian world, where military power remains a key feature of international relations”, (2003, 128-129).

2.2.2 Blair’s Style of Leadership

Another divergence between Blair’s policy and politics that has surfaced in the Iraq war is the issue of the sensitivity to the public. As it would seem in harmony with Blair’s Third Way New Labour, a referendum on the decision to go to Iraq
would follow naturally just like the referendum on UK’s possible joining of the Euro. Nevertheless, the preparations to the Iraq war have witnessed the least sensitivity Blair could offer to his public which is considered the legitimizing power for his premiership. As Ramesh argues, “the rift between the Prime Minister and the British public over the war was exposed by an opinion poll, taken over that weekend of the famous one million public protest in the cities of London, which showed that a clear majority of British voters opposed a military attack. Blair’s personal ratings had dropped through the floor to -20 points”, (2003, 75). Throughout the year of 2003, polls like MORI’S and YouGov revealed more dissatisfaction than satisfaction with the government’s especially Blair’s handling of the Iraq war. The percentages satisfied/dissatisfied with the government were 24/67 and for Blair 30/63”, (Rallings and Thrasher 2004, 383).

Despite this public outrage and its utter opposition to the US-led war against Iraq especially without a second UN resolution, Blair consciously decided to go to this war for the sake of what he described as the ‘conviction’. This conviction Blair is describing relates to his sense of international community obligating him to spread the values of peace, equality, justice and most of all democracy. Nonetheless, what Blair did was that he overrode the democratic underpinning of the same values at home when he deliberately chose not to respond to the people’s will for the favour of supporting the United States. In fact, he overruled the people’s will that ‘democratically’ legitimizes his position as a Prime Minister. Not only that, but he has been dismissive of the cabinet as an important collective body in decision-making process preferring to work in small group of individuals and advisors.

Instead of being inclusive in the decision-making process, the public was excluded almost totally from that process- leading to the decision of attacking Iraq- due to Blair’s style of leadership which authors tend to coin as “prime
ministership” in which the electorate, cabinet and sometimes parliament would be, to a great extent, alienated by the Prime Minister who, primarily, lends a listening ear to his close aides mainly appointed by him.

However, it is customary of all prime ministers to appoint like-minded supporters to their ‘kitchen cabinets’, and Blair was no exception. According to Jones and Kavanagh, “Blair’s personal imprint is reflected in his decision to import his press secretary and many others of his personal staff into Downing Street. His policy unit (13 staff) is the largest ever. As a result, cabinet’s influence declined sharply as Blair relied on bilateral meetings with ministers, and the parliament became less significant because of Labour’s huge majority”, (2003, 182). This form of leadership through which Blair would rely on unelected aides to pass certain decisions that are of particular interest to him created what Jones and Kavanagh called a “PM’s Department that may have a unique significant institutional legacy in the future”, (183). Nevertheless, such tendency in policy-making was criticized in June 2003 by a number of cabinet members in which the decision to go to Iraq had been made by Blair in close collaboration with his close advisors. According to MP Claire Short following the debate of the Iraq war, “the problem in the second term of the New Labour is the centralization of power into the hands of the Prime Minister and an increasingly small number of advisors who make decisions without proper discussion. It is increasingly clear that there is no real collective responsibility because there is no collective; just dictates in favour of policy issues that comes from high” (as quoted in Riddell 2003, 264).

This style of leadership has given Blair the space to pursue foreign policy decision of going to war independently of the domestic internal pressure, in our case, the public protest of one million people marching through the streets of London. Such negligence of such magnitude contradicts Blair’s previous
emphasis that people should decide, and their leaders should be responsive to their concerns in order to gain their trust. It seems that Blair was willing to forsake that trust for the benefit of his partnership with the US. However, according to Martin et al, “British national interests—whether of low policy such as economic prosperity, pursuit of world order, promotion of advantageous values (as Blair claims) or of high policy such as military security and defence of homeland—should emerge from below, from the people. Any idea that they are imposed from above and reflect the interests of the state represented in its statesmen, of course, at the expense of its subject is quite alien to the democratic tradition in Britain. Domestic opinion should play a central role in decision-making regarding foreign policy issues” (1992, 74).

It might be said that decisions to go to war constitute part of the royal prerogative exercised by the PM; yet this does not justify the centrality of decision-making in the hand of Blair and a number of his advisors to an extent that lead, on some case like ours, to neglecting the public. According to Judge, “this contradicts Blair’s New Labour’s policy that unveiled an extensive array of initiatives designed to provide citizens with the opportunity to influence and participate in debate”, (2004, 699).

Counterarguments would suggest that representative government’s such as Blair’s should not listen to such sentimental outbursts expressed by public demonstrations or marches since policy-makers are more politically aware and knowledgeable of what is in the interest of both their country and people to survive in a world of chaos. However, when the following factors, according to Beetham (2003, 604), characterize a certain demonstration, policy makers such as
Blair should take public opinion seriously and bypass the royal duty of autonomously deciding upon a war:

- A national issue that touches the future of the entire nature;
- The mass protests involve large numbers of people for this gives weight to the campaign;
- The organized mobilization of opinion should be supported by a clear majority in opinion polls;
- The issue in subject, Iraq war for example, should have been subject to extensive public debate.

Not only did Blair ignore his nation’s will by dismissing all these factors collectively, but he also manipulated the parliament as well as his own party into his favourable direction, in our case, voting for war. As Norton argues, “control and centralization of power characterizing Blair’s leadership under New Labour has constrained these entities (party and parliament) to act as policy influencing collective bodies which can modify and sometimes reject measures put forward by the executive” (2000, 245). In doing this, Blair has diverged from the sense of collective community which he has emphasized in his Third Way Labourism: the community whose wills and concerns are met; the community that is strong at home will be also strong abroad; foreign policy cannot be detached from domestic one; on the contrary, one is continuation for the other and goals across borders cannot be achieved or separated with goals at home. All these principles mirror the sense of collective community which Blair emphasized in his Third Way Labourism. However, what has been witnessed of rebellion in Blair’s party (and his reliance on support for the war on the Opposition Party that disagrees with his socialist Third Way Labourism) and misleading of the parliament to win a vote (through relying on false intelligence reports and the legal advice of Lord
Goldsmith which he manipulated) suggests that Blair’s consideration for such factors as party, cabinet or parliament is secondary to what he perceives as the interests of his country.

According to Stephens, “121 Labour Members of Parliament (MP) voted against war on February 26, 2003. At the beginning of March, over 200 MP’s –more than half of the total-of Blair’s own party threatened to vote against the war. Although scarcely surviving a vote of no confidence from his MP’s, Blair ironically was assured he could go to war using the support of the opposition pro-war party whose beliefs and ideologies are at the extreme contrary to that of the New Labourism of Blair” (2004, 234). As Hill argues, Blair’s decision to blindly support the United States without a UN authorization made the majority of Labour party members feel uneasy about the conduct of Blair’s foreign policy (prioritizing his relationship with the US over his commitment to the international institutions such as the UN and the EU, the bedrock of global stability and the basis for Britain’s convinced multilateralism (as quoted in Kampfner 2003); a fact which followed the resignations of three Ministers. Those oldest and closest labour allies of Blair has abandoned him not accepting the rationale of war. In fact, this labour outrage and historical revolt reflects the fact that Blair used the vote of Parliament to secure his benefits of not risking the special relationship with the US while pretending at the same time that he followed the proper constitutional channels in decision making when handing the parliament the power to debate and vote as Ramesh argues, (2003, 54-55). Indeed, the speech Blair delivered to the Parliament was “full of arguments that the public grew wary of suspecting them being attenuated, circumscribed and distorted by political calculations on top of which the UK-US special relationship” (2003, 76). On one hand, the speech to the Parliament on March 18, 2003 highlighted Blair’s ideology of collective
responsibility, humanitarian intervention, and world justice to rid the world of tyrannies and dictatorship such as Saddam’s so as to allow the Iraqi people live freely and safely, this was perceived by Blair as an interest for Britain. On the other hand, his speech to the more private setting of the parliament on March 14, 2003, Blair said: ‘In the final analysis, disarming Iraq of WMD is necessary for the long-term security of the world and to the collective interests of our historic allies; therefore, it is manifestly in the national interest of this country’, (quoted in Saraceni 2003, 12). This point stressing the national interests is in striking contrast with the one about the improvement of the Iraqi people’s condition as part of Britain’s interest.

The unclear ends embedded in Blair’s speeches “produced a large-scale revolt among the Labour members of Parliament. Blair’s decision to support the war and to engage Britain without a second UN resolution defied two strong and ancient currents in New Labour: pacifism and collective community. It even broke his promise to the parliament that Saddam’s non-compliance would not automatically trigger a war according to 1441: “To those who fear this resolution is just an automatic trigger point, without any further discussion point, paragraph 12 of the resolution makes it clear that it is not”6. The number of MP’s who favoured was fewer than 100 out of 659, according to Ramesh, although Blair eventually ironically got the votes he needed from the Opposition side which offered full-throated support (2003, 99).

### 2.2.3 Blair’s Moral Argument

Another dimension in which Blair’s action has diverged from the announced Third Way policies is his commitment to the ethical dimension of foreign policy. Blair has manipulatively used the argument of intervening in Iraq for moral and

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humanitarian reasons as a cover for his true incentives to be discussed in the fourth chapter.

To be a good citizen in the world and force for good, intervention in other states domestic affairs for humanitarian purposes should be only legitimized and authorized by the international community of the UN. Although the term state sovereignty ‘where state exercises absolute power over its territory, system of government and population’ has been the cornerstone of international relations according to the Westphalian order, Dunaev states that humanitarian reasoning behind intervening in other states’ domestic affairs has been a revolutionary feature in international relations inherent in the twentieth century and supported by the UN whose Charter speaks of ‘fundamental human rights’, ‘dignity and worth of the human person’ and the obligation of states to uphold certain standards domestically and to account for its actions to the international community(2005). The UN essentially, following its Charter, is able to legitimize the intervening in other countries affairs to protect any internationally recognized rights that have been abused there.

Addressing the human rights doctrine as postulated by the UN and driven by the sense of international community described above, Blair accentuated these pluralist values in his Third Way Labourism. He states, “foreign policy should not be defined in terms of narrow RealPolitik but one with human rights and development at the centre (Blair 1998). Maintaining New Labour’s role a force of good might require the use of what Coates and Krieger describe as ‘warlike humanitarianism’ approach in which states are obliged to take action against those countries which forfeited their right to sovereignty when they abuse their
own people. For Blair, this was the basis for the first Gulf war, Kosovo, Sierra Leone as well as the third Iraq war (2003, 107).

However, Dunaev argues that the Iraq crisis has proved that both the US and Britain have abused the multilateral agreements of the United Nations acknowledging the obligation of the international community to act against the violators, for instance, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; a fact which made the infringement of Iraq’s sovereignty to deliver humanitarian salvation or human rights reinforcement only a façade protecting the underlying layer of self-interest pursuit (2005). In fact, the latest military US and Britain campaign in Iraq exemplifies the engagement in a military armed conflict against the collective will of the UN Security Council; thus reducing the multilateral agreements, by which they should abide by when intervening for the purposes of human rights violations, to inefficient mechanisms incapable of assuring the peace that they boast about spreading. Blair’s insistence on supporting Bush’s unilateral decision to attack Iraq puts not only the legitimacy of the humanitarian intervention argument into doubt but also Blair’s rhetoric about the need to act within the multilateral consent of the international community. Such unilateral decision to indulge into the war heightens the possibility that such intervention -claimed to be based on the protection of human rights- was mainly for pursuit of self-interest as would the realist school of thought suggest. Advocates of such school such as Morgenthau do not find any explanation for sacrifice of military power and financial repercussions but those of having individual interests.

Even if we attempt to apply the five tests Blair has put for himself when intervening in other states’ affairs, we notice that abiding by the rules and regulations of the UN with regard to humanitarian intervention was not even
mentioned in those considerations putting in mind that he is a believer of the institution of international community. Acting without the authorization of the UN body drifts Blair away from Article 2 of the UN Charter which says: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”

Furthermore, the interest Tony Blair has spoken of in his famous Kosovo speech in 1999 about spreading the pluralist values of democracy, human rights, liberty, etc… seemed to be misleading when observing closely what had happened on the ground in the Iraq war. According to him, “Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end, values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer(1999).

However, the Iraq case proved that those pluralist values which Blair consistently mentions in his discourse were only a disguise for pure geopolitical interests as seen by Blair. Critics such as Curtis suggest that even if Blair was truthfully loyal to those values mentioned above, he has definitely abused the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and global democratization outlined in Third Way Labourism and used human rights as a cover for a more complex mix of motives. Joining the US in a democratization process is really questionable taking into consideration the patchy record of democratization and liberation which showed support of the actual removal of democratically elected regimes (such in Salvador, Chile, Brazil, Guatemala, Argentina, etc…).

Hence, joining an alliance with a country of a history of anti-democratic moves raises a big question mark on Blair’s political behavior and once again highlights
the contradiction existent between Blair’s discourse displaying the promotion of democracy and human rights as part of his Third Way Labourism and Blair’s actual action in the war that apparently defied those same principles. As a matter of fact, the policy of supporting elites in the Gulf and aiding their internal repression has also been a consistent British foreign policy even under Blair’s reign, (Curtis 2003, 256). Blair, for example, has described Saudi Arabia “as a good friend in the international coalition against terrorism”. Despite human rights abuse, suppression of opposing parties, undemocratic political structures, Blair has been supportive of the Saudi’s ruling family believing that this relationship between Saudi Arabia and the UK will become stronger in the future. Blair even believed that a patient and discreet dialogue with the Saudi authorities regarding human rights abuses and domestic repression is the best way to make progress. Blair has been also supportive of the Bahraini regime which was criticized by Human Rights Watch for its wide range abuse of human rights. He even hinted that, although the Bahraini regime is not perfect, we should not write it off (as quoted in Curtis 2003, 259). This comes in total contradiction with what Blair believes about the necessity for warlike humanitarianism in countries which are undemocratic and abuse human rights on a large scale.

Anderson also argues that this moral rectitude which Blair relied on heavily in the run up to the war proved to be contradictory when looking on the actual actions on the ground. Anderson lists a number of counter-arguments to rebut that claim of morality and universal values as Blair’s main motive for war arguing that: 1. “the apparent willingness on the side of Blair (allying with Bush) to engage in the killing of large numbers of wholly innocent people reduces him to the same moral status as Saddam for the pretence to the moral-high ground on
the basis that fewer deaths ensued from the invasion than allegedly would have from inactivity is morally unjustified; 2. How would the world be a safer place with the US and its allies mainly Britain using power without obtaining lawful authorization from the UN?”, (2003, 146). This not only refutes the claim that the invasion was morally right but also positions both the UK and the US in the same camp as the so called ‘rogue (outlaw) states’ which makes the argument for fighting those states for breaching the international law meaningless as a rationale for military action.

Anderson adds in his argument that the moral justification for military argument used by Blair was a facade from the start. The coalition troops were provided amply to secure the oil fields and the Ministry of Oil while looting of hospital equipment and medical supplies(which the Iraqi were in urgent need of) was carried out massively; a fact which makes the whole claim suspicious and questionable(2003). In fact, the prioritization of the oil resources at the expense of the Iraqi suffering (which Blair committed to alleviate by invading Iraq and getting rid out of Saddam’s rogue regime) makes the whole moral argument deceitful. Curtis adds that the Blair’s government which now professes its commitment to the human rights of the Iraqis, has for the previous decade consistently rejected the overwhelming evidence about the negative impacts of sanctions arguing that there is no evidence that such suffering is ensued from the sanctions, while in fact this embargo has contributed to the death of thousands of Iraqis through the US and UK governments’ imposed constraints on the ‘oil-for-food-program (2003, 30). In fact, every month, 8,000 Iraqis die as a direct result of the sanctions. In total, this has resulted in the death of nearly 2 million civilians in about a decade, half of whom have been children according to The United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
(2003, 31). However, Blair has been consistently adamant to confess that these sanctions are behind the Iraqi people suffering. Instead, he would argue that the undemocratic regime of Saddam is the root cause. Therefore, it should be changed. If this is the line of argument, how come Blair did not believe the same thing towards Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, for instance, for both would be considered evil if we followed Blair’s line of thinking? Blair’s main motivation behind joining the US in its attack against Iraq is his belief that the “Iraqi regime is evil that it is a moral duty to change it”, (Ingle 2004, 273). One would deduce that Blair would take a similar action against those regimes in the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia, but he did not. That is because Iraq represented by Saddam served his interests no more contrary to those Gulf regimes which still retain Britain’s influence in the region, continue to provide Britain with oil limitlessly, spend their oil incomes on British arms and invest the revenues in British banking (Curtis 2003, 256). Therefore, the morality justification which Blair reiterates in his discourse as his primary motivation against Iraq seems contradictory and inconsistent with his Third Way Labourism.

As can be deduced from the above debate, Blair’s New Labour Policy was barely existent in his foreign policy decision making in the Iraq crisis. On the contrary, what has been presented so far has proven that there has been a wide divergence between policy and politics with reference to our case. In fact, notions of international collaboration, community, multilateralism, interdependence and ethical foreign policy have been obviously contradicted by Blair’s real course of action when he chose to defy his nation, act out of step with his European allies, launch a war without the legitimate authorization of the UN, and behave within a double standard framework of an ethical foreign policy. How can we explain this divergence? Has been Blair a contradictory statesman? Why was Blair willing to gamble
on his political support and leadership? Why has he threatened to damage the transatlantic relationship between the EU and the US when he chose to ignore some of his socialist European allies like France and Germany who opposed the war? Why did he, instead, ally with right wing European leaders such as the Spanish and Italian leaders? How can we describe Blair’s allying with the US against Iraq in the context of Blair’s foreign policy? How does the Blair’s alliance to act as a partner to US global power help it maximize its interests? Which matters more to Blair, the support of his public or the interests? If Blair promotes the concept of international community, how come he did not insist on a second Security Council Resolution in the UN to authorize the war? Instead he adopted the unilateral pre-emption doctrine of Bush that ignored the international community and made him aside with the US hegemonic power?

2.3 Possible Explanations

Some authors attempted to find answers to these questions so as to arrive at an understanding of Blair’s paradox. Among of which is Tom Bentley who argues that Blair’s political action in the Iraq war is a mix of evangelical concern for the world’s “dispossessed” and a determination to maximize Britain’s influence and strategic influence in a post colonial era. According to Bentley, Blair has put himself in a position where he took vast political risks in diverging from his Third Way Labourism for three reasons: “pragmatism, moral conviction and leverage”, (2003, 5). These values, Blair believed, should be reinforced by influence. His strategy is, therefore, to offer unwavering support and loyalty to the US taking into consideration that it is the world’s superpower. Such support is driven by Blair’s sense of international community that obligates him, along others, to galvanize the necessary response to threats, such as posed by Saddam or Milosevic, in order to maintain world peace and order. Attempting to carve a new influential role for Britain in managing international conflict, Blair believes,
contrary to his most of his European peers, that Europe will never be able to exercise a proper influence on the world stage unless it develops its own capacity for strategic and military action such as the NATO. However, if the strategy to construct a grand coalition against the security threats of the world and engage opportunistically in those parts of the world such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq for the purpose of spreading long term social justice and peace, why is that Blair’s government strangely quiet and not influential about what is happening from human rights violations in Palestine, for example? And why is Blair negligent of how law represented by the body of the UN should be the basis of international relations especially in times of crisis?

Despite all contradictions and divergences, Blair believes that Britain's interests in the world are best secured by a close; even unquestioning alignment with its bigger brother across the Atlantic that overrides all other issues (Riddell 2003). However, Riddell agrees with Bentley that the moral conviction constitutes part of Blair’s paradoxical performance especially his remarkably close relationship with an American president who is in so many ways his complete opposite, as opposed to his European colleagues (2003). Nonetheless, on the issue of Iraq, these two very different leaders have been complete souls in which they perceived that launching an attack against the “tyranny” and “barbarity” of Saddam was the right thing to do.

On the other hand, BBC News Online political correspondent, Nick Assinder, argues, in an attempt to explain Blair’s paradox, that Blair’s speech at Brighton in October 2001 addressed to the Labour believers set forth his vision of a new world order following the events of 9/11. This order is based on his moral imperatives of fighting alongside the US against international terrorism at whatever cost, whether at the domestic level or the foreign one (2001). Blair’s
alliance with the US in its fight against “terrorism” has also offered him a unique opportunity to take a leading and influential role on the world stage especially at forging the coalition of states opposing international terrorism.

However, the anti-terrorism argument surfaced as the main justification for military action in the Iraq case, seemed totally invalid. According to Curtis, the war could not be legitimized based on the unproven linkage between Saddam and the terrorist group of Al-Qaeda especially that the Iraqi regime was a prime example of the kind of corrupt secular regime that Al-Qaeda wished to see replaced by an Islamic fundamentalist one. In fact, Al-Qaeda consistently sought to protect Saudi Arabia from those secular national leaders such as Saddam (Curtis 2003, 19). Hence, it runs logically from here that if the US and the UK wish to fight what they claim as ‘terrorism’ then Saudi Arabia should be their target which harbors the fundamentalists and supports them financially especially the Wahhabi schools across the Middle East. Yet, the Saudis were far from being targeted by the US-UK alliance because, as Coates and Krieger state, “for decades, the Saudi royal family has been a main support in the oil fields and markets that are so vital to the Western democracies. Those oil interests seem to prevail over terrorism concerns breeding from Islamic fundamentalism but not in the case of a more moderately Islamic Iraq”, (2004, 76). Therefore, it is proven from here that the US-UK alliance was inconsistent in its argument of fighting terrorism; if so it should have targeted Saudi Arabia rather than Iraq. Nevertheless Iraq, unlike Saudi Arabia, embodied a defiant regime that refused to be controlled by the Western hegemony especially the United States, a fact which exposed the US interests in the region and rendered its economic position as vulnerable as in the 1970’s. Hence, the argument of Iraq’s linkage to Al-Qaeda and world terrorism would fit normally into place especially following the 9/11
attacks against US targets as a justifiable argument for military intervention yet without damaging the US-UK interests in the rest of the region. As Freedman adds, “the US-UK alliance exerted so much effort in demonstrating a link between Iraq and world terrorism, which by itself in the post 9/11 atmosphere would have sufficed as casus bellum; however, no such link could be proven”, (2004, 9).

Other researchers such as Paul Skidmore, a researcher at the British think-tank, Demos, and also an adviser to a Minister in the Blair government, argues that Blair paradoxical political action can be understood in terms of the special relationship which Blair seeks to strengthen especially after the events of 9/11 that made him closer to the Bush Administration and its decisions (October 2004). That relationship transcends any limitations or constraints including the internal political dissent and the Europeans’ opposition.

In addition, Stephens agrees with Bentley and Riddell that Blair’s paradoxical political action on the ground is a result of mixing morality with hard-headed RealPolitik (2004, 201); a fact which makes it difficult sometimes to separate principle from self interest especially in regions such as Iraq in which Britain cannot claim to be entirely benign for it has clear energy interests in the Gulf region as well as a complicated historical role of maintaining influence. Yet, as Stephens further argues, Blair insists that his hard-edged action in Iraq results from his moral impulse “to be a force for good in the world” whereby Britain should adopt preventive military interventions overseas (warlike humanitarianism) in which Britain must not wait for crises to develop but be ready to take the leadership preemptively like in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq at any possible rate to maintain world order and peace (2004, 247).
John Kampfner, on the other hand, believes that the Iraq war is a series of four preceding wars throughout six years in which Blair’s motivation for launching it alongside the United States was a combination of Atlanticism, evangelism, and idealism pursued when necessary through murky means and justifications (2004, 387). Such justifications included Blair’s insistence on Iraq’s linkage to terrorism, the moral necessity to alter Saddam’s regime that incurs human rights violation and Iraq’s possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction; all of which failed to be valid arguments as have been argued above. Even the argument of WMD proliferation proved to be a total manipulation to win the support of both the party and nation. According to Zankaneh, the argument of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction proved to be as weak as a spider’s web which pushed Blair later on to retreat to a position less affirmative saying that Iraq may not necessarily possess WMD but certainly has the capability to produce them”, (2005). The reliance on the intelligence dossiers of both September 2002 and February 2003 proved to have stretched the truth by saying that Iraq is an immediate threat; for the war demonstrated clearly that Iraq does not possess any of those weapons claimed by the US-UK alliance.

Nonetheless, Blair, as Naughtie states, had to establish such an ‘imminent threat’ in those intelligence dossiers in order to persuade his party to take a path that might lead to war, (2004, 139). In fact, he had turned dangerous possibilities emanating from Iraq’s capabilities into seemingly clear realities. Although it was not publicly known prior to the invasion (it certainly became quickly known after the attack), it is clear now after the war that both Bush and Blair had grossly manipulated their resources of intelligence about the WMD in the run up to that war, argue Coates and Krieger (2004, 80). Their main line of defense was that doubters should have a little patience for WMD do exist in Iraq and they will
eventually be found by the coalition forces. However, Robin Cook responds to this “wait and see” policy in a twofold manner: “1. this policy shows double standards on the side of Blair (and Bush) who failed to show that patience with Hans Blix when he demanded more time for inspection; and 2. if there is certainty that these WMD do exist in Iraq, how come the UK government shared the US administration its reluctance on allowing UN inspectors back to Iraq”, (Independent 2003).

Relating to the same subject matter, a BBC program titled ‘Panorama’ stated that PM Blair had actually manipulated the intelligence dossiers leading to the war. According to the program, “Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of the MI6 (a British Intelligence apparatus) briefed Blair on July 23, 2002 that the quality of intelligence sourcing for some claims made in the run-up to the publication of the intelligence dossier was developmental and unproven. Nevertheless, Blair told MPs two weeks later that the intelligence picture is extensive, detailed and authoritative”, (2005).

Blair’s unjustified justifications such as the previous one prove the fact what Kampfner suggests about understanding Blair’s paradoxical political action in the Iraq war. Those mentioned justifications were only means exploited by Blair to cover his real nationalistic incentives represented in his 1997 Bridgewater Hall speech in which he publicly said: “I am a British patriot and I am proud to be a British patriot. I love my country. I will always put the interests of my country first. The Britain in my vision . . . is a Britain confident of its place in the world, sure of itself, able to negotiate with the world and provide leadership in the world”, (as quoted in Parmar 2005, 226).

2.3.1 International Relations Perspectives
What have been surveyed earlier about the possible understandings of Blair’s paradoxical behavior in the Iraq war can be interpreted from different international relations perspectives. Through screening various IR schools, I have chosen three namely the normative point of view, pluralism and realism. One reason behind that choice is suggested by a first analysis of the British politics which incorporates elements of morality and idealism; respect of international organizations; inseparability of both foreign and domestic politics; responsiveness and accountability to the public and parliament; and above all the reassertion of Britain’s national interests. To understand those elements, which at some point appeared contradictory to me as a researcher, I resorted to three different IR frameworks to try comprehending Blair’s foreign policy decision emanating naturally from that version of British foreign policy molded by Blair in 1997. Another reason for choosing those theories especially pluralism and realism is that they are two prominent schools of thoughts in International Relations. Both are seen as images that contain assumptions about world politics concerning critical actors, issues and processes in world politics. These two schools have been used extensively by analysts to address the puzzle of war in an attempt to build a causal pattern that leads them to a better understanding for waging a war.

The normative viewpoint, on other hand, was chosen to explain the moral argument present recurrently in Blair’s discourse especially when lobbying for offensive initiatives just like in Kosovo, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, etc...

However, through applying the assumptions of the three IR schools on the case mentioned, I proved, through the following analysis, that neither the normative
theory nor the pluralist school of thought could explain fully Blair’s decision to go to war and unravel the seemingly paradoxical behavior. On the other hand, the realist school of thought was perceived as superior to the other two in the sense that it was capable of grasping all the particularities of Blair’s decision and the reason(s) behind it. In a sense, it managed to explain what the other two schools failed to unravel.
2.3.1.1 Normative Point of View

The first among those perspectives is a normative point of view or value consideration of foreign policy choices in which the rational model for foreign policy decision is not driven by pure power maximization but by a value approach whereby certain values are pursued, defined and implemented by statesmen to achieve the goals and interests of a wider community. Such ideas are reflected mainly in the works of Immanuel Kant and E.H. Carr, who believe that it is incorrect to view maximization of power and interests (the more important considerations in the realist tradition) and values as if they were mutually exclusive approaches. As E. H. Carr noted: “The utopian who dreams that it is possible to eliminate self-assertion from politics and to base a political system on morality alone is just as wide of the mark as the realist who believes that altruism is an illusion and that all political action is self-seeking”, (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 423). As has been demonstrated by some authors above, Blair’s foreign policy particularly in the Iraq war has shown that Blair’s insistence on using power against Iraq is necessarily emanating from that conviction of his that human rights, world order and peace should be preserved at all costs even if it requires ‘warlike’ actions.

Kant in his Perpetual Peace agrees with Carr arguing that politics and morality can be united in the world of international relations. “I can easily conceive of a moral politician; i.e. one who so chooses political principles that are consistent with those of morality” (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 417). This reflects Blair’s announced foreign policy particularly when dealing with world issues. For him, “terrorism”, “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, “violation of human
“rights” are worldwide concerns which should be tackled from an ethical point from view rather from limited interest-based motivations.

However, Blair’s action during the Iraq war, and as discussed earlier, shows clearly that, in opposition to Kant hypothesis, he is a “political moralist; one who forges morality in such a way that it conforms to his advantage”, (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 417). Blair has given the priority to the power of interests (represented mainly in his alliance with the United States) over morality and ethics which he exploited fully in his discourse to rally the public support on his side and win the parliamentary vote to go to war. It seems that Blair’s jumping on various pretexts for attacking Iraq, as mentioned previously in the text, cannot be explained from a moralist point of view. He had to exploit ideas and principles as tools to sell the war on Iraq as the right thing to do. In fact, the inconsistency in seizing upon different justifications proved that Blair considered his population, party, parliament and EU allies as hurdles to be overcome in order to achieve his objectives, instead of including them as active actors involved in the decision-making process.

2.3.1.2 Pluralist Perspective

This also suggests that Blair’s foreign policy decision making cannot be explained from a pluralist point of view (as would some of the previously mentioned authors suggest) in which its main pillars emphasize the role of international institutions in solving world problems, believe in the multiplicity of actors involved in the decision-making process, consider that state interests are not only limited to its security-related benefits but extends to social, economic and environmental issues and emphasize the positive role played by public opinion in providing guidance to state officials and producing good public policy including foreign policy (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 199-200). According to Moravscsik, “the state-
society relations – the relations of states to the domestic and trans-national social context in which they are embedded- have a fundamental impact on state behaviour in world politics”, (1997, 513). Moravcsik further elaborates that “societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behaviour by shaping the state’s preferences, that is the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments”, (513). This is in line with Robert Putnam’s argument which accentuates the importance of the domestic factors in shaping foreign policy. As mentioned above, this line of thought was present in Blair’s foreign policy through which he described that foreign policy as an extension of and continuation for domestic politics. According to Putnam, , “international causes –such as waging war against another country-might have negative repercussions on the domestic audiences which perceive this as an adversary rather than an ally”, (1988, 456). This might be verbalized in terms of demonstrations and public protests in attempt by the people to influence their governments’ decisions. Here, Putnam labels the domestic outcomes as non-exogenous from the international sphere. However, some leaders choose to pursue their conceptions of the national interests in the international context regardless of the domestic pressure. Putnam argues that this might be damaging to the leader’s political life had he purposely ignored the political will of the public. So what he believes is “a two-level game which recognizes the inevitability of domestic conflict about the national interest in a certain foreign policy issue”, (1988, 460). Nonetheless, in our case here, both domestic and international politics for Blair were a struggle for power, modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and in the international spheres as would the Morgenthau, the classical realist suggest, (1985, 39). Blair has intentionally defied the public will prioritizing the national interests, as he perceive them of course, over his political life that is legitimately
dependent on the public voice. Although gambling over his political leadership, Blair relied on the parliamentary vote of which he was sure of winning especially that the Conservative Parliament members were, to the irony, totally behind his back. Therefore, neither the public opinion nor his cabinet members particularly those Labour members were of any concern to him. Blair use of a structure of arguments some of which turned to be controversial following the war is a proof of that. He shifted inconsistently from the linkage of Saddam’s regime to Al-Qaeda group then his possession of WMD that could be a security to the entire world. On some other cases, he would deploy the moral responsibility of the coalition which should get rid of Saddam as a dictator of his own country and people. According to Goldstein and Keohane, “such ideas, world views, principled beliefs and causal beliefs influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actor’s clarity about goals or end means relationships”, (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 297). However, Blair has only used those ideas as hooks to propagate and legitimize his elitist interests, but the ideas themselves do not play a casual role in his foreign policy. According to Azubuike, Blair was only using them as tools to commit himself to a war of which interests are its sole end, the dearest of which is his relationship with the United States (2003, 77).

In addition, Blair’s political action throughout the Iraqi war had left gapping wounds in the international institutions as well as the European multilateralism which he himself had earlier nurtured in his New Labour rhetoric. Risking the trust of both his party and people indicates that Blair’s decision cannot be understood in the framework of the Pluralist school of thought. International institutions such as the UN were meant only to support the American will in its war against ‘terrorism’ as his discourse would indicate on a number of cases. UN
should reform its structure so as to meet the American global agenda in fighting terrorism and promoting democracy; such words were used as beliefs and convictions displaying an embedded morality to cover up for Blair’s alliance with the US for a cause that his public, European allies and party deemed unilateral and unnecessary. Blair’s style of leadership centralized in a few aides surrounding him paved the way for the decision to go to war; that decision-making process was overtly pluralist involving the party and parliament; however, the process was purely unitary in the hands of Blair and his closest colleagues who underestimated the weight of the parliament by resorting to it lastly following the failure of guaranteeing a second UN resolution and hiding sensitive war-related information from it (such as Lord Goldsmith’s legal advice which Blair purposefully concealed from exposure to MP’s at the excuse that they were not trustworthy). According to Lord Butler, “Blair’s government reaches conclusions in rather small groups of people who are not necessarily representative of all the groups of interests in government, and there is insufficient opportunity for people to debate dissent and modify decisions”, (as quoted in Wintour 2004). This cannot be explained from a pluralist tradition that accentuates the multiplicity of actors, interests groups, public, etc... in formulating the decision-making process. Indeed, this style of leadership emphasizes that decisions are only rationally made by the statesmen who prioritize national interests over domestic interests. For Blair, the US-UK alliance was untouchable even if it caused him risky domestic troubles.

Blair’s disrespect for institutions reflected also at home when he manipulated the legal advice of Lord Goldsmith so as to serve his interests in allying with the US; again the institution was only a by-product that reflected pure interests without
altering the behaviour of an already set mind of Blair who was then focusing solely on keeping the US-UK relationship as close as ever.

In fact, the published advice shows that the attorney general told Tony Blair on 7 March 2003 a second UN resolution was the safest legal course. Ten days later Lord Goldsmith's final advice was published, but included no concerns about the legality of the war. In this document, Goldsmith found a legal way-out of the use-of force dilemma when he altered his own words saying that Authority to use force against Iraq exists from the combined effect of Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441. Following that, the war started on 20 March 2003. In the earlier advice, however; Lord Goldsmith raised possible legal arguments which could be made against the Iraq war. He warned there were "a number of ways" in which opponents of the war could bring legal action. "We cannot be certain that they would not succeed," he said, adding a second UN resolution might be the way of preventing such legal action succeeding" (BBC News 2005).

As Goldsmith stated on the 7 March, “I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorize the use of force. [...] The key point is that it should establish that the Council has concluded that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled. However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorization to use force in resolution 678 will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity. In other words, we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation” (BBC News 2005). This statement reveals the attorney General’s less than

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7 See link for Full UNSCR on: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1450113.html
8 See link for Full UNSCR on: http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9547153.html
enthusiastic advice on the legality of the war. However, Blair decided to bury the original version when he felt that Goldsmith advice was contrary to his political needs at that moment (Porter 2005). Lord Goldsmith's 7 March advice was never shown to the Cabinet - instead, the 17 March advice was. Porter further states that Blair style of leadership “has been manipulative of parliament and shown a preference for taking crucial decisions away from cabinet in un-accounted meetings held with a few trusted - and usually unelected - advisers. The cabinet was not privy to that initial advice from Lord Goldsmith. Yet we can be sure that he did not air the doubts of March 7, otherwise we would certainly have heard about it” (Porter 2005). The fact that Goldsmith’s doubts were not disclosed suggests that the MP’s, the cabinet and the public were misled into believing that the war had the legal authorization. According to the Scotsman News, “Blair by deliberately withholding the Attorney General’s full advice from ministers and MPs, has subverted Cabinet government and come close to deliberately misleading Parliament. Mr Blair’s secretive approach over the legal advice on regime change exposed British service personnel to the risk of international legal action without their being properly aware of it. Blair’s style of presidential leadership has been reflected on the way he concealed the detailed caveats of Lord Goldsmith’s legal assessment. He has side shadowed the cabinet and behaved as if the electorate is incapable of ever making an informed decision, and so must always be protected from the truth. So to ensure the parliamentary vote for the war, MPs and the public received a carefully-slanted view of the legal minefield surrounding military action by the coalition in order to garner as much support as possible” (2005). As John Kampfner comments on keeping Goldsmiths’ 7 march document secret to the parliament, “Blair was fully aware of the attorney's legal reservations, for that reason he instructed him not to declare his position formally. He even refused to circulate that 7 March
Committing to the US, Blair had to make the facts fit”, (Independent 2005).

Furthermore, what also cannot be explained from a pluralist point of view is his distance from his European allies which believe in the international multilateral solutions of world problems as opposed to the unilateral approach of the United States. Blair’s close alliance with right-wing governments such as Bush’s, Berlusconi’s, and Aznar’s highlights that contradiction in Blair’s foreign policy outlook outlined in his Third Way New Labourism. According to Coates and Krieger, “New Labour stood for a coherent and progressive foreign policy framework, one which saw that British foreign hold of the Old Labour model of imperialism and Atlanticism as inappropriate. However, Blair’s post 9/11 foreign policy posture has retreated to that model in an ungainly manner. His policy retained an internationalist perspective delivered with a set of laudable moral instincts; it has insisted that Britain actively participate in a robust global agenda; but it has sacrificed that multilateralism of New Labour’s original vision to the Bush Administration’s insistence that the US alone call the tune whether or not it pays the fiddler”, (2004, 110). In fact, it surrendered the principles and aims that guided the New Labour’s foreign policy. Throwing in his lot with the US, Blair has transformed his foreign policy to one that was described earlier as defiant internationalism; Blair’s foreign policy was characterized as Coates and Krieger further elaborate “by risk taking strategy to advance British interests and maximize national power and prestige, while simultaneously justifying this war by appeals to the international community, to the demands of interdependence and to a commitment to multilateral institutions”, (2004, 112). Indeed, Blair’s concur with the American government in the Iraqi war has contradicted those
New Labourist values when he defied the international community, the nation
and his party.

Blair’s use of public morally-related diplomacy and producing manipulative
dossiers - whether relating Iraq to terrorism or confirming it possession of
Weapons of Mass Destruction - to manage public opinion towards accepting a
military intervention has shown that Blair’s argument for acting for the sake of
the larger international community reiterated in his Third Way Labourism is
barely true. Blair’s alliance with the US in its unilateral action against Iraq despite
all divergences discussed above failed to demonstrate that true evangelical
concern for the ‘world’s dispossessed’ which he terms Ethical Policy of New
Labour.

2.3.1.3 Realist Perspective

Based on this discussion, I shall assume that Blair’s foreign policy decision
making in the Iraqi war shall be best understood in terms of the realist school of
thought which shall put answers to my aforementioned questions for neither the
normative viewpoint of international relations nor the pluralist school of thought
were able to explain fully the paradoxical behavior of Blair as have been seen.
Therefore, this following chapter shall highlight the main pillars of realism that
are expected to assist me in capturing the whole picture.
3. Realist School of Thought

Before attempting to explain Blair’s foreign policy decision of going to war, I shall begin with highlighting the main pillars of the realist school of thought. Throughout presenting its main assumptions, I shall relate them with the questions that I have arrived at in the previous chapter (p. 59). Applying the tools of the realist school of thought on the aforementioned questions is expected to assist me in explaining our case of Blair’s behaviour in the Iraq war that seems paradoxical and contradictory with his outlined Third Way Labourism. This will be achieved through testing two realist-based hypotheses:

- Following the 9/11 events, the international system has changed dramatically witnessing a more hegemonic, militaristic, unilateral, unipolar superpower such as the United States that acts in such a manner to shape a post 9/11 order which advances the American interests. As a result, Blair has seized the opportunity to tighten his country’s special relationship with that hegemon through the form of bandwagoning to taste the fruits of victory resultant from projecting offensive power overseas along the US under the name of ‘international terrorism’;

- When pursuing the national interests of Britain (ensued from such alliance) mainly security, military power, oil and influential power in the international arena, other domestic or transnational factors such as the public opinion or the European Union or the United Nations were considered to be irrelevant for Blair. This irrelevance was concealed by the various moral and ethical pretexts and justifications used by Blair during the course of war as shown in the above chapter.
3.1 Main Pillars

Realism is the most dominant theoretical tradition in understanding International Relations. “It depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war”, (Walt 1998, 31).

Realism is not a single theory; there are the classical theorists such as Morgenthau who believe that states, like human beings, had an innate desire to dominate others, which led them to fight wars, (1978, 4). There are the structural realists such Kenneth Waltz who focused on the effects of the international system. For Waltz, the international system consisted of a number of great powers, each seeking to survive on its own due to the anarchic nature of that system which lacks a central authority that protects states from one another, (1979). This defensive modality of realism is countered by an offensive one represented in several scholars among of which is John Mearsheimer who argues, contrary to defensive realists, that the state of anarchy encourages states to try maximizing their relative power and gains through conquest. Such military expansion or power projection has stopped to be considered cost-inefficient for states; i.e., the costs of conquest outweighing its benefits. On the contrary, war is seen now as profitable (2002).

According to Viotti and Kauppi, realism is based on a number of assumptions. *States* are the most important actors in world politics; world politics is analyzed with states taken as *unitary rational actors*, carefully calculating costs of alternative courses of action and seeking to *maximize* expected utility, although doing so under conditions of uncertainty and insufficient information about alternatives; states seek *power* (both the ability to influence others and resources
that can be used to exercise influence); and most importantly in structural realism is that “states pursue their interests in ways it judges best (Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 157). Force is a means of achieving the external goals of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interests that arise among similar units in a condition of anarchic self-help system” (Waltz 1959, 238). In realism, international institutions as the UN are considered as merely by-products of the interests and capabilities of the state. They have little causal importance apart from power and interest; they will continue to influence behaviour if the interests of the political actors change. Unlike in neoliberal institutionalism, these institutions are unable to mitigate system’s anarchy’s constraining effects on the behaviour of the states (Grieco 1988, 485).

Kenneth Walz’s Theory of International Relations (1979) is considered one of the main theoretical pieces of structural realism. In this work, Waltz emphasizes the system; by changing the nature of the system, international relations can change. This work is dependent on his previous one Man, the State and War (1954). In this latter, Waltz identifies three images behind the causes of war. The first one is that human nature is the cause of war. If human nature is evil, corrupt, power-hungry then the same must be true of state behaviour since states are made up of and governed by people (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 131). The second image holds that the causes of war are found within states; domestic society conditions human behaviour. If so, then different types of social organization should cause different behaviours. Bad states cause war and good states seek peace. Such theories argue that a world of democracies, or a world of capitalist states, or a world of socialist states would bring peace while it is the absence of democracy or capitalism or socialism which leads to war. However, Waltz does not find enough evidence to advocate one form of state above the others; he says
that he is unable to establish a causal link between one type of state and war (132). The third image is what related to his Theory of international Relations in which he emphasizes the system as the main cause for war; the nature of the system conditions state behaviour. According to Waltz, the best way to understand human behaviours is to understand it as conditioned by society; we are products of a social environment. The same holds true for international relations. Anarchy is the key characteristic of the international system and results from the absence of a central authority, a world government, for example, able to maintain order. In anarchy, order is a result of the interactions of states (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 134). However, Waltz rejects the idea that a balance of power is inevitable, inherent or natural. Instead, states will use force to get what they want if they value that interest more than peace. This means that states engage in cost-benefit analyses and will choose war if they believe the benefits of a use of force outweigh its costs (135).

In his Theory of International Relations, Waltz elaborates more on this concept of system. Waltz believes that a proper understanding of international politics begins with the system. A system is a set of interacting units. But to this idea Waltz adds the structure, the organization of units. The purpose of a system theory is to explain how structures affect systemic interactions and how interactions influence the structure. What best explains the pattern observed in international politics is anarchy as opposed to hierarchy which prevails at the unit level. The most basic self-interest in such an anarchic environment is survival. To survive, states tend to emulate those who are most successful. This means that all states look alike functionally but differ in power capabilities. States
do as best they can for themselves, and they avoid, as much as possible, dependence on others\textsuperscript{9}.

Consequently, what goes on within a state does not matter. History, culture, ideology, political institutions, economic organization, people’s will – none of this matters. All that matters is that some states are more successful than others doing what all states try to do. Some states are better able to survive than others and it is this degree of success and failure, this distribution of capabilities that creates the structure. The structure constrains and limits state behaviour by limiting choices. Another way of thinking about this – since structure is based on state capabilities; states constrain and limit each other. By understanding the structure and the impact of the structure on the system it is possible to not only explain state behaviour but also predict it. By understanding where a state is in the structure, it should be possible to predict the behaviour of that state, although we cannot know with certainty what a state will do.

In such an international system, realists focus on the distribution of capabilities. The states power is measured by its capabilities and power relative to other states. The distribution of capabilities among states is what alters the system into unipolar (one hegemon possessing the greatest capabilities), bipolar (two-state system) or multipolar (several great powers). Achieving the national security and survival in an anarchic self-help system is the primary goal of states; that is why stated tend to build alliances and balance the most dominant power in the system in what Waltz describes as “Balance of power” (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 72). Given the assumptions that the system is anarchic, and the state is both rational and unitary seeking to survive, states inevitably interact in

\textsuperscript{9}http://www.cascadia.ctc.edu/Faculty/jmiller/realism.html (Accessed 19/9/2005)
the competitive environment of international relations in order to achieve equilibrium/balance of power or system stability. “This balance of power is imposed by events on statesmen in which these latter can do little in affecting their surroundings”, (Waltz 1979, 121).

This analysis is expected to assist me in explaining the behaviour of Blair to use or threaten to use force against Iraq to attain his objectives regardless of the domestic opposition to his aggressive policies. I propose to use Waltz’s system’s characteristics (1979, 93) summarized in as follows for this purpose:

• Anarchic rather than hierarchic
• Interaction is among units with similar function,
• Distribution of capabilities varies from system to system and over time.

The most significant capabilities are those of the most powerful structures.

The link between system structure and actor behaviour is forged by rationality which will enable me as an analyst to analyze how Blair responded to the incentives and constraints imposed by his surrounding international environment(particularly after the 9/11 attacks) he described as “ the risk of terrorism and states developing weapons of mass destruction”, (Blair 2003). That action was manifested in allying with the US so as to maximise Britain’s power and capabilities relevant to other states in the international structure in order to remain influential both domestically, trans-nationally (among EU members) and most importantly, internationally.

However, what happened in the Iraqi war is against what Waltz would predict in terms of “balance of power”. If complying with Waltz’s prediction, then Blair should balance the United States as a unipole in order to prevent it from triumphing or dominating others including Britain. Blair’s action might be
argued that it is a function of the international system prevalent after the 9/11 attacks and the war on terrorism which motivated him to ensure that the historical Anglo-American relationship remains close as ever; however, Blair attempted to bandwagon with rather than balance this ever-rising superpower. How can this be understood?

3.1.1. Bandwagoning vs. Balancing

In an article by Fritz and Sweeney, interest similarity between two allying states is the main motivation for bandwagoning as opposed to what would Waltz would argue that states balance each other to achieve security, survival and stability (2004, 429). However, Walt notes that statesmen often operated as though bandwagoning was the most common alliance behaviour, that over-large winning coalitions were prevalent during systemic wars such as WWII, and that the decision of the Western European Great Powers to ally with the United States after World War Two all fly in the face of the balance of power argument. Walt amends balance of power theory, by arguing that states do not balance power, per se, but balance threat. He further upholds that notion that states balance by allyng with the least threatening option and rarely bandwagon with the most threatening side (as quoted in Fritz and Sweeney 2004, 430).

Despite agreeing with Walt on the fact that threat might be a determinant factor for states alliances, Fritz and Sweeney disagree with him on the definitions of balancing and bandwagoning. They both define these terms in terms of power capability: “a Great power bandwagons if it chooses to ally with the stronger option and balances if it chooses to ally with the weaker option”, (2004, 430).
Fritz and Sweeney used a censored model of Great Power alliance formation for the period of 1816-1992 to generalize that states ally based on interest rather than power (Fritz and Sweeney 2004, 428). This pattern has three mechanisms to explain (433):

- If state interests vary from pure security seeking to unlimited non-security-related set of interests, it is easy to imagine that states with similar dispositions find it worthwhile to ally no matter the distribution of power among states in the international system.

- In considering state interests, both security and non-security issues should be included. That is, states may ally either to provide themselves additional security against a perceived threat or to advance interests in terms of gains they can make in the international arena. States’ motives to bandwagon go beyond security issues and maintaining the status quo to sharing in the gains of victory-territory, resources or reputation. In short, allying can be a defensive measure as well as a means to profit.

- Since states do not constantly face high-insecurity environments, they are free to follow their interest unconstrained by the need to balance power or threat. Consequently, bandwagoning would be the optimal option to gain in the international system.

According to Schweller (1994), if states value what they covet more than what they possess, allying with a strong partner than can help to achieve these ends is an efficient way to profit in the international system (as quoted in Donnelly 2000, 10).
“Tying together all the above motivations for allying with the stronger side is common interest among states. This, combined with the notion that under certain circumstances bandwagoning can provide states with the means to advance their security and non-security interest, makes it not at all surprising that states join the stronger side quite frequently. It is the consideration of interests first that drives alliance formation”, (Fritz and Sweeney 2004, 437).

Rather than driven by motives of threat, regime type, or geographic proximity for forming alliances, Sweeney and Fritz conclude in their study that security and non-security interests may provide a wider picture for alliance formation because simply alliances are simple tools of statecraft to achieve certain ends which are determined by interests rather than considerations of power. Furthermore, both authors believe that the balance of power explanations describe alliance decisions only in high security environments but when survival is not at stake; bandwagoning is likely common to occur especially in spheres of influence (2004).

This argument does not marginalize the importance of security as a value that combines both relative and absolute gains along with other set of state interests. However, it draws a wider picture for reasons for alliance formation that go beyond pure security motives. Nonetheless, states might still want to bandwagon (ally with the stronger) to maximize their relative power against an existent or illusive security threatening reason such as terrorism for example. Here, as Zakaria argues, “the best solution to the perennial problem of the uncertainty of

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international life is for a state to increase its control over that environment through the persistent expansion of its political interests abroad”, (1998, 20). In this case, states conceive of their security in competitive (offensive) rather fearful (defensive) ways depending on whether one invades for safety or for gain (Donnelly 2000).

Donnelly (2000) agrees with Schweller arguing that “political actors whether great or middle powers tend to bandwagon, not only in a hierarchy but also in an anarchy, with the growing power in order to increase their chance of gaining in the spoils of victory. Because the risks of survival tend to be relatively low, even the diffident can focus most of their efforts on the pursuit of absolute gains”, (2000, 117). “Whether bandwagoning is a rational strategy depends on the relative risks and benefits of following and opposing a leader - which change from issue to issue and from leader to leader. And lesser powers may ally with a superpower to pursue gain rather than out of fear of the other superpower or the threatening power of a neighbour” (118).

Schweller (1994) argues that bandwagoning does not necessarily contradict with balancing; for this depends on the surrounding environment in the international system and whether the state wants to pursue relative gains or absolute ones. He notes that while scholars have argued that states balance against threatening increases in others' power, foreign-policy practitioners through the ages have believed that states bandwagon with power. Seeking to explain this discrepancy, Schweller argues that it is a mistake to view balancing and bandwagoning as opposite behaviours motivated by the same goal of achieving security. He argues that states frequently bandwagon opportunistically, as well as when threatened,
and that thus bandwagoning may indeed be far more common than balancing (1994, 72).

This type of alliance is expected to assist me in explaining Britain’s alliance with the US especially after WWII particularly following the events of 9/11.

3.1.2 Public Opinion in Realism

Realist accounts of international relations are based on a theory of strong leadership of domestic public opinion. Realists and neorealists argue that domestic elite actors’ participation in foreign policy making is the critical intervening process that connects a state’s behaviour with the imperatives of its external environment. Opinion leadership by chief executives is especially critical in representative democracies. Policy makers are expected to exercise both strong direction of public opinion and minimal intentional responsiveness to the public's policy preferences; "responsible" elites mobilize or create public support behind a foreign policy that they have independently identified as best advancing the nation's international positions and interests (Jacobs and Shapiro 1999, 1).

Jacobs and Shapiro (1999) further argue that effective government depends on officeholders combining insulation from the public's policy preferences with the pursuit of coherent policies that prompt the public and other elites to modify, as needed, their attitudes and behaviour. The citizenry's role should be limited to selecting leaders in competitive struggles; once elected, officeholders are expected to assert decisive leadership in reaching substantive decisions and mobilizing public support for their policies.
Realist theory of opinion leadership is consistent with this tradition of elites providing strong direction. Realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz assume that governments must independently formulate foreign policy and then lobby public opinion to secure public approval for its initiative.

According to realism, elites are expected to minimize responsiveness to public opinion in choosing “between a good foreign policy [designed by the expert statesman] and a bad one that public opinion demands”. The problem, Hans Morgenthau (1978) and others argue, is the “unavoidable gap” between public attitudes and the “kind of thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy”. Elites are uniquely qualified to make foreign policy because they possess substantial objective knowledge and capacity for complex and hard-headed reasoning about the realities of global power struggles; a “statesman's thinking” includes such superior "qualities" as the tendency to “take the long view” and accept "small losses for great future advantage." In contrast, the public goes back and forth, fluctuating among different positions based on the “simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil”; public attitudes are driven by shifting "moods" and a hunger for “quick results” that “sacrifice tomorrow's real benefit” (Morgenthau 1978, 135, 146-47).

Realists, then, expect “responsible” government to shield foreign policy making from the distorting influence of public thinking even “at the risk of its own political futures.” “Bad” policy is likely to be the result when officeholders assume that public beliefs can be “discovered and classified by public-opinion polls as plants are by botanists.” A government’s decision to respond to public preferences amounts to "sacrificing ... good policy upon the altar of public opinion ... and exchanging short-lived political advantage for the permanent interests of the country" (Morgenthau 1978, 146-48).
In the following chapter, I shall examine this realist expectation of the minimal responsiveness to and strong manipulation of public opinion in the context of Blair’s exaggeration of the threat posed by Iraq in order to shape public opinion toward accepting the military attack against Iraq. Although a Prime Minister of a democratic state in which listening to the will of the public opinion is part of the participatory approach in formulating foreign policy, Blair chose to act as a “Presidential Prime Minister” just like his predecessor Margaret Thatcher; i.e. he operated in a manner where he believed fit for the pursuit of the national interest regardless of the public interest. As Doig and Phythian argue, highlighting the national interests of a states are considered to be part of the high politics which might be seen as continuing core executive responsibilities in terms of policy formulation and implementation (2005, 369). This reflects what has been described in the previous chapter about Blair’s style of leadership that has the capacity to work on a centralized and unified basis on key strategic issues such as waging war with little concern over public opinion.

3.1.3 Power of Interests

Within this framework of formulating the state’s national interest and in an anarchic self-help system, states aim at achieving their interests that are embodied mainly in the national security and survival. This comes by enhancing the power capabilities as relevant to the other states. Such interests-based motivations were described by one of the most important theorists of realism, that is Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1978). In his essay, Morgenthau referred to the “concept of interest defined in terms of power which provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood”, (1978, 4). The main
signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power”, (Morgenthau 1954, 5). He adds that “the objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and must be supported with the adequate power. We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, (Morgenthau 1978, 5). “This fact comes against two popular fallacies: the concern with moral motives and the concern with ideological preferences”, (5). One might argue that Blair’s foreign policy in the Iraqi war was inspired by the ethical policy presented in his Third Way Labourism which sought to preserve world order and protect human rights worldwide. Yet, his policies along the United States brought war and misery to both his people and the Iraqi people. Hence, what is important in understanding the behaviour of the statesman such as Blair’s is not primarily the motives and intentions he might pronounce in his speeches but the political ability that leads him in performing into a certain political action (Morgenthau 1978, 6). To Morgenthau, ”statesmen may well make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in terms of their philosophic sympathies only in order to gain popular support for them. Yet, they will think and act in terms of the national interest”, (6). These interests, not the ideas or ideals, determined the political action of Blair when he decided to unilaterally ally with the US despite all divergences and paradoxes. For Morgenthau, states, living in a self-help anarchic world, tend to maximize their power capabilities defined as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”, (1978, 8). Hence, statesmen think in terms of interest defined as power whereby the appropriate question to be asked: “How does this policy affect the power of the nation?” The political ethics that might be used these statesmen is not judged by its conformity with the moral law but rather by its political consequences, mainly the national survival. That is why he tends to subordinate
these other moral standards including nationalism, patriotism and ideology to those of politics and disguise the bare political truth to ensure the maximization of the national interests (9).

States living in a state of war, whether real or imaginative, tend to enhance their power capabilities in relation to other states’ capabilities in order to maintain security and survival within a system that obligates them to behave in a certain manner in order to preserve their existence despite the will of the people.

Machiavelli, on the other hand, in his famous work, *The Prince*, believed that the moral obligations of the rulers are only considered to guarantee survival of the state. In this framework, the end – represented mainly by the state’s security and survival – is understood to justify any means necessary to achieve that end especially in a self help system characterized by anarchy and chaos. Therefore, the very existence and stability of the state are of great paramount that they might justify immoral actions by the statesmen who consistently think of how to gain, maintain and expand power to achieve those goals (as quoted in Viotti and Kauppi 1999, 59). According to Machiavelli, ethics and politics should be divorced from each other as requires the world as is not the world as would or ought to be. If statesmen abandoned what is done for what should be done, then they would bring about their ruin rather than their preservation (60).

Based on the above survey of realism’s main assumptions, we can summarize the following:

1. International system is a self-help one that is characterized by anarchy;
2. Basic units are states which interact within that system to maximise their interests in order to survive that system;
3. To maintain their security and survival, states tend either to form alliances either by balancing or bandwagoning;

4. Institutions whether in the form of bodies such as the UN or patterns such as multilateralism are irrelevant in the cost-benefit calculations of the statesmen who only think of power in terms of interests;

5. The natural state of the system is war in which force is used to attain military and economic benefits.

Based on those main pillars, one can explain the reasons for Blair’ decision which seemed to diverge to a great extent from his Third Way Labourism. In fact, Blair’s involvement in the Iraq war was motivated by pure national interests of which Iraq and its people were almost irrelevant. Blair’s government’s task in defining the national interest in the Iraq case lay in balancing the demands of three key political relationships – the ‘Trans-Atlantic Alliance' with the US, the so-called ‘special relationship', the membership of the European Union and, Britain’s position with the United Nations- in terms of pro-US war faction and anti-US war faction 11. On the basis of these considerations, Britain, and therefore Blair in our case here, defined its national interests both economic (mainly oil-based interest) and military (capabilities) as being best served by preserving its close working relationship with the US, even if this meant taking Britain into a war in Iraq at almost all costs and divergences such as opposing European Union members and defying the will of both his people and the United Nations.

Putting this into context and taking the aforementioned hypotheses in mind, the argument of explaining Blair’s decision in the Iraqi war becomes that Blair, aware

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of the international structure dominated by one single hegemon, saw the war as an opportunity to maximize his country’s national interests to enable him to “punch above Britain’s weight” in the international affairs and boost Britain’s influence in the world. Ensuring the support of the US behind his back will strengthen his political position both in Europe and the rest of the world. Not only that, but it will bolster its security and military capabilities. In addition, it will guarantee the unrestricted flow of oil resources to an industrialized Britain, a fact which adds to its power and secures its survival and existence in the self-help anarchic system. A form of bandwagoning, rather than a traditional balance of power, characterized Blair’s response to the new hegemonic structure through which Britain accepted the unipolarity of the US by strengthening the US-UK special relationship despite all domestic and regional contradictions. That is why, Blair offered unprecedented support to the US following the 9/11 attacks to tighten the historical special relationship that ties both countries in an attempt to achieve his aims that were concealed by multiple justifications as described in the previous chapter. Public opinion, European opposition, and parliamentary outrage were secondary factors of concern to Blair in the face of the above. Shielding information or not sharing it with the rest of the societal factors is perceived by the realism as necessary in order not to jeopardize foreign policy gains and interests.
4. A Realist Explanation of Blair’s Decision Making in the Iraq war 2003

According to realists, Blair’s decision to join the US mission to disarm Iraq by force is deeply emanating from the sense of national interests that he wishes to maximise. What motivated the Prime Minister to send 46,000\textsuperscript{12} UK troops to fight a war which lacked UN Security Council authorization, not to mention being opposed by 139 MPs in his own party and a significant proportion of the British people lies in maintaining the Anglo-American special relationship in a desire to advance the British national interests; i.e. guaranteeing oil supplies, securing a world status in the international arena, remaking the world or at least a significant portion of it, buying insurance against possible security threats, etc…

So in order to understand Blair’s decision in the Iraq war, one should emphasize the role of the international order characterizing the hegemonic power of the United States especially after the 9/11 events and the war on terrorism and its impact on the Anglo-American relations. This variable has intensified Blair’s motivations to tighten that Anglo-American relationship to gain as much benefits as possible in the name of fighting the global terror. The other variable existent in our realist-based hypothesis above is the national interest: Military build-up and oil shares which are considered as the most driving factor for survival in the world of politics especially for an industrial country just like Britain and of course, the United States.

Within this framework, the sensitivity to the public or the European friends were issues of little concern when it came to the national interests of Britain as

perceived by Tony Blair. More will be explained on this point during the course of this chapter based on what have been discussed earlier.

Therefore, in accordance with the assumptions of the realist school of thought, Blair’s decision was a function of the international system that is characterized by anarchy and self-help as described by Waltz. In an anarchic world, states will use force to get what they want if they value that interest more than peace. This coincides with Hobbes that states engage in cost-benefit analyses and will choose war if they believe the benefits of a use of force outweigh its costs. This is applicable to our case here in the sense that Blair magnified the threat of terrorism to prove that the costs of not responding to this risk might outweigh those when responding although based on unclear or mistaken intelligence information. On 5 March 2004, Tony Blair gave a speech in his Sedgefield constituency in which he sought to justify his actions in Iraq by emphasising the unprecedented threat that global terrorism poses to the civilised world. He called this threat ‘real and existential’, and argued that politicians had no choice but to confront it ‘whatever the political cost’, (Runicman 2004). By seeking to present the Iraq case in terms of costs and benefits, Blair, taking all the rational choices and strategies that he expects to best advance national interests within the constraints imposed by capabilities and information, believed the war as the optimal option. Perceiving the threat of terrorism, Blair’s rational choice was to join the most hegemonic power in the international arena; that is the US, in its ‘claimed’ fight against global terrorism in the events of 9/11 in order to ensure survival in the face of the imminent existential threat of terrorism. Despite erroneous intelligence information about the existence of WMD in Iraq ready to be launched against Britain in 45 minutes, as the September JIC Intelligence Dossier suggested, Blair would defend himself on the basis of the precautionary / pre-emptive rule; i.e., to err on the cautionary side is much safer and less costly.
A rational risk assessment, according to the assumption of realism, would have meant laying bare the real necessities and the real incidents at each stage of the decision-making process. It would also have laid bare the really stark choice: either politicians do what the risk assessors tell them, in which case they have no judgment, or they make up their own minds, in which case they have full judgment. The September dossier was an attempt to blur this distinction. The job of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) is to weigh the risks associated with different pieces of intelligence, including the risk that some of them might be wrong, so that politicians can exercise their judgment. But the dossier, which was said to reflect the view of the JIC and not the politicians, made no mention of risk. It merely judged the intelligence to be true which allowed Blair to judge that it had to be acted on and to persuade Parliament of the same although he did not provide that parliament with the all the risk assessments on which to make an appropriate decision. From a realist viewpoint: in the face of a threat (whether existential or illusive), some risks are just not worth considering (Runicman 2004). Obscuring part of the information using his power as a Prime Minister proves the fact that Blair, whether intentionally or unintentionally, manipulated the parliament and his people into believing that the war was the rationally justified.

In fact, Blair was willing to sacrifice his people’s trust, the alliance with some of his European friends and the credibility of both his party and parliament to stay “shoulder in shoulder” with the United States and ensure ensued interests. Perceiving no threat from the side of that hegemon in the orbit of the new international structure whereby that hegemon is the dominant, Britain under Blair’s leadership decides to bandwagon with it so as to share the cake of benefits
and gains arising from the war on global terrorism of which the Iraqi case is a microcosmic incident facing the Anglo-American historical partnership.

For sixty years since WWII, Britain's foreign policy has been all but inextricably linked with that of the senior partner in the most significant international alliance; the United States. The nature of US power has tremendous bearing on the fate of the UK. Understanding that power, its motives and the British government's relationship with it are essential if we are to properly judge Blair's decision in this Iraq war. As US dominance has increased in the post Cold War era, the nature of Britain's closest ally has been changing accordingly. Now in the early 21st century, Blair’s Britain is faced with an ambitious, militaristic and aggressive hyper power - one that accepts no limits and tolerates not even the slightest challenge to its dominance. Within this order shaped by the perception of the imminent threat of terrorism, Blair acted opportunistically in the name of this global terrorism to get closer to the historical partner to guarantee an influential role in the international arena especially among his European peers who are relatively militaristically weak/ unwilling to invest in military power/ compared to Britain's power. This would give him the leverage to influence the political environment at both sides of the Atlantic as well as in the rest of world issues since Britain will be perceived as America’s closest ally; one which has the power to impact and bring about change.

4.1 Blair’s Response to the Surrounding System of American Pre-eminence and Dominance

American global power – military, economic, technological, cultural, and political – is one of the great realities of our age. Never before has one country been so powerful and unrivalled. The United States began the 1990s as the world’s only
superpower and its advantages continued to grow through the decade. After the Cold War, the United States reduced its military spending at a slower rate than other countries and its economy grew at a faster pace. The globalization of the world economy has reinforced American economic and political dominance. More recently and, in response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States has embarked on a massive military build-up. In the National Security Strategy that followed that catastrophe, the Bush administration has articulated an ambitious and provocative global military role for the United States in confronting new-age threats. Overall, American power advantages are multidimensional and unprecedented.

According to Ikenberry, American unipolarity is manifested in a number of characteristics. First, the United States is a unique sort of global superpower. That is, it has a distinctive cluster of capabilities, institutions, attractions, and impulses. Indeed, American power is manifest in complex and paradoxical ways. That is why it is difficult for countries to decide to work with or against this once liberal power working to promote multilateralism and partnership, and once imperial power working against the interests and goals of other states. Second, America is considered to be the underwriter of American capitalism and globalization and the leader of a global political and military alliance system. Third, the United States has the largest power capabilities in the world that makes it hard to easily counterbalance it. In fact, the American military expenditures are greater than the next fourteen countries combined – and if current trends continue, the United States military expenditures will be equal to the rest of the world combined by 2007. Fourth, the American unipolar order is also organized around democratic polities and a complex web of intergovernmental institutions – which serves the interest of the United States by
making its power more legitimate, expansive, and durable. This would make Western Democracies less able or willing to use power in an arbitrary and indiscriminate manner against other democracies, according to Kantian Democratic Peace Theory (2003).

The unipolarity formed in the wake of the Cold War has intensified and grew more obvious since the 9/11 attacks, a fact which created a new geopolitical context that required adaptation from the world countries. However, this adaptation has not been in the form of traditional balance of power as would structural realists suggest. Although the power capabilities of one of the units in the world structure has altered but this does not necessary entail a new balance of power would result in order to achieve systemic equilibrium.

According to Ikenberry,

“the major powers – Russia, China, Germany, France, Britain and Japan – will attempt to resist, work around, and counter American power -- even as they also engage and work with American power. But they are not likely to join in an anti-American countervailing coalition that will break the world up into hostile, competing camps. The balance of power is the most time-honoured way of thinking about politics among the great powers. In this classical view, however, when confronted with a rising and dominant state, weaker states flock together and build an alternative power bloc. The classical geological tool of balance of power will not remedy the concern of those states regarding the ever-rising American power”, (2003).

Since forming a counter-coalition to balance the United States and seek to loosen ties and undercut or block its power is neither sufficient nor easy to assemble based on the previously mentioned features of that superpower, the best
A geopolitical tool to deal with the American hegemony would be bandwagoning with the superpower; i.e., entailing appeasement methods and building cooperative ties in the hope of gaining opportunities and absolute gains (Ikenberry 2003).

There are two strategies to deal with this concerted power; either by balancing and forming a counter-alliance to resist this rising power or bandwagoning/bonding with the hegemon power; i.e. making the dominant state less threatening to weaker states by embedding that power in rules and institutions that channel and limit the ways that power is exercised. The strategy to balance the US proves to be costly and impossible at both military and economic levels, based on the above. Therefore, the best strategy to deal with this unprecedented unipolarity of the United States is the bandwagoning/bonding strategy. Bandwagoning is a strategy that can encompass a wide range of state behaviour but it essentially entails policies that support and accommodate the dominant power. Weaker states seek to work with rather than resist the dominant state – and they look for opportunities to advance their interests without directly challenging the dominant state. Bandwagoning can take various forms – ranging from simple appeasement to more active attempts to work with and manipulate the policies of the leading state.

During the Iraq war, British Prime Minister Tony Blair pursued that form of bandwagoning which Ikenberry called the bonding strategy in which Blair has got as close as possible to the Bush administration. The strategy was to be so close and supportive of the American exercise of power that Britain would ultimately get some say in how policy unfolds in the international arena (2003).
4.2 Anglo-American Special Relationship: Historical Synopsis and Impact of 9/11 Events

This close relationship manifested itself as a continuation of the Anglo-American special relationship which Blair sought to strengthen in the wake of 9/11 attacks and America’s global war on terrorism. His publicized justifications of regime change, existence of WMD and the morality of the war against Iraq were only pretexts to bandwagon with that hegemon for interest-based motivations. What seems more persuasive and explanatory of Blair’s deep involvement in the Iraqi war, according to Azubuike, is his motivation to advance British national interests through strengthening the special relationship with the US in all its aspects (2003, 64).

Prior elaborating more on the benefits resulting from Blair’s support of the American-led war; let us first highlight the main aspects of the Anglo-American special relationship, for the Iraq war was microcosmic to that relationship and a continuation of it.

According to Rachman, “it remains true that the country retains a special relationship with the United States in intelligence, in nuclear affairs, in a military alliance, and more amorphously, but perhaps most importantly, in cultural and intellectual life” (2001, 8). In fact, Britain continues to share security and intelligence information (formerly to face Communism and now ‘terrorism’) with the US along other English-speaking countries that it does not share with its European allies. This closeness of the intelligence relationship is linked to Great Britain’s nuclear relationship with the United States. Along with its permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, Great Britain’s possession of a small nuclear deterrent is crucial to its claim to be more than just another middle-
ranking power. Historically, Britain saw that this closeness to an enormous power such as the USA’s is needed in order achieve global goals that best serve its interests especially after the relative decline in Britain’s power and its challenge by other powers such as France, Germany and Russia. Intelligence and nuclear weapons lead naturally to the third element—close military and diplomatic cooperation since the eruption of WWI. Allies during the first and second world wars, Great Britain and the United States also shared a Cold War experience as occupying powers in Germany and allies within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). According to Dumbrell (2001), although displaying different views concerning the Vietnam War and the Bosnia conflict, both regained harmony in the Kosovo conflict (to a certain degree) and the Gulf war 1991(Dumbrell 2001). The final element is the economic cooperation between both countries for both countries adopted the Washington consensus on economic liberalization and opening up of global markets. Not only that, but the US also constitutes Britain’s biggest and most lucrative export market as well as a friendly magnet for the largest British business and oil corporations despite the asymmetry of both economies and the Europeanization of the British economy. In fact, the economic interdependence of both countries had and still has considerable benefits on the British market. In numbers, an Observer article published the following facts regarding the economic transactions between both countries (2003):

- The US/UK investment relationship is worth $376bn, split almost equally between the countries;
- About 35 per cent of overseas direct investment in the UK is from the US;
- One million Britons are employed by US companies in the UK and about a million Americans are employed by UK companies in the US;
• 39 cents from every American dollar invested in the EU stops in the UK;
• The US/UK trade relationship is worth $74bn, equally balanced between US and UK;
• Nearly 40 per cent of UK outward investment goes to the US; and
• The single largest country destination for UK exports is the US.

**After the 9/11 attacks**, the Anglo-American relations were impacted in the sense that Britain has found itself entangled in a new world order dominated entirely by the United States which is politically willing to reorder the world in a manner that best suits its national and security interest. In fact, the events of 9/11 have represented an extraordinary opportunity for Tony Blair. According to Parmar, “9/11 was seen as a repudiation of the Major’s squandering of the advantages of the special relationship and of cutting British military spending, and as a chance to consolidate and promote Britain’s interests (perceived by Blair) as leader of Europe and a loyal influential ally of the United States in fighting global terrorism”, (2005, 218). These interests were manifested in Blair’s foreign policy speech in 1997, mentioned above; when he expressed his pride in his country and determination to ensure that “it provides leadership to the world”.

Blair emphasized that this relationship can be relied on in order to tighten Britain’s global standing in the world and make others “listen”. By having the US backing Britain, Blair sees the increasing capability of his country to exercise a role in the international stage that would influence others for the benefit of Britain of course even if that required the exploitation and manipulation of information like what happened in our case here when Blair used a series of pretexts and justifications to sell the Iraq war to both his people and party as a justified war against terrorist regime threatening the world peace and order. This was in order to hide the real incentives behind that war; i.e., maintaining a strong
Anglo-American relationship that guarantees the protection of Britain’s national interests within the new unilateral world order among of which are the influential role of Britain in the world, and economic prosperity and well-being.

The political environment after 9/11 has been characterized by the message of President Bush is that the United States has to concern itself intimately with the rest of the world to ensure the safety and security of the nation and its citizens regardless of any multilateral approaches of which he described as “restraints”. Blair appealed to that ideology and nationalized its significance in the sense that a threat to the United States would be a threat to the United Kingdom. He fully accepted that bandwagoning with the US as the best approach to better achieve shared benefits and highlighted the danger allowing a number of competitive different poles to balance the US forces.

In a unipolar world, a strategy of dependence on the US might have been the rational course, according to Dunne, capable of delivering the goals and interests of British foreign and security policy in a world newly order by the alliance of both the US and the UK (2004). The British government, faced with the new realities of a world dominated by a supersized power, found itself with no hard choices but to follow the steps of that hegemon in which acting outside the UNSC would be interpreted as in the national security and where the evil means of war would be reconciled with the national interests. Giving up the UK’s goals of internationalism, multilateralism and morality outlined in the Strategic priorities of the FCO’s documents was an outcome of Blair’s loyalty to the US unipolarity. According to Dunne(2004), being a loyal ally in the context of a hostile international system generated a convergence of interests across a range of security and defense issues especially following the events of 9/11; a fact which pushed Blair to recalculate Britain’s interests and power differently. This
has resulted in the incompatibility between the US unipolarity, of which Blair sympathized with, and the British internationalism and multilateralism of which Blair had set as the main pillars of the UK foreign policy.

The new international rules of the post 9/11 and the factors constituting the “war on terrorism” have incurred a systemic change in Blair’s thinking that could unravel that incompatibility or contradiction. Such change obligated him to bandwagon with the US although seen as a revisionist state by his European peers which seeks to alter the configuration of rules and institutions for pure national interests and power. For Blair, the relationship with the US represents a bargain in which full loyalty is bargained with influence over the direction of world affairs. Blair’s strategic vision and opportunity within this unipolar world of the US and its war against ‘terrorism’ was embodied in increasing the effectiveness of Britain’s global role in the world especially after decades of the relative economic decline coupled with an uncertain detached role in the international affairs. This would only be achieved through Britain’s ‘historical alliances’. Of course, a historical alliance might also refer to the European allies as much as the Anglo-American special relationship. But Blair refrained from falling in the trap verbally choosing one over the other claiming that Britain should be the bridge between both sides of the Atlantic. However, his deeds on the ground gave preference to the latter in which Europe represented another sphere of potential global influence to Blair’s Britain.

According to Dunne, the primacy of the bilateral relationship with the US is not new in post 1945 British foreign policy. However, what is new is the replacement of the old rules by which the United States wished to play especially across a range of international issues for the purpose increasing its power and securing its national interest (2004, 908). Blair’s appeal to this unilateral disposition of the US
was affected by that systemic environment in which he decided to bandwagon with the US, although still allied with the Europeans on defense matters, in return of valuable deliverables most importantly the military update and oil.

In such a unipolar world highly dominated by the US which sets the rules of the game and shapes the international agenda, Blair, unlike European allies, was convinced of a one state imposing its own response to a major international threat. Through that, he aspired to share the prestigious triumph of the Iraq war in order to exploit his victor’s prestige to sign Britain up for both the European single currency and a new European Constitution. He would do so with the praiseworthy intention of leading a pro-American bloc within the EU and cementing the Atlantic alliance although this might be a far-fetched ambition since the EU constitution has its own rules and regulations that might restrain Blair.

In sum, and restating Harries words, the idea of trying to act as an independent force or with partners other than the Americans was no longer seen as viable. As mentioned above, theorists of international relations have coined the term bandwagoning to describe the policy of states attaching themselves to a dominant power in the hope of sharing the benefits accruing from its domination. Ever since the Suez Crisis, Britain has been the world’s biggest practitioner of bandwagoning accommodating the American power for pure geo-strategic interests(2001).

So for Blair, the Anglo-American relationship remained a top priority in British foreign policy regardless of the language, terminology or approach of the ruling party in Britain. Among others, two main in-returns followed:
4.3 Nuclear Power

Although part of the European Union’s Strategy for Defence, the military alliance with the US is indispensable as mentioned above. Blair is aware of the fact that the military establishment of the UK is highly dependable on one nation and that is, the US. The reasons are common knowledge. Since the end of the Cold War, America’s technical superiority on the battlefield has advanced by leaps and bounds beyond that of its allies. However, the British and other European allies spent the 1990s giving ever-higher priority to welfare over weaponry, cutting back defence spending accordingly.

Hence, consulting his party, the parliament or the public opinion was not of a substantive prerequisite for Blair’s decision to go to war along the US. What was more important to Blair in this self help system is to maximize Britain’s military capability particularly the nuclear deterrent which can only be updated based on the American Programme. Britain cannot be independent when dealing with world affairs requiring the use of military force as happening nowadays. According to the defence white papers released in December 2003, “the most demanding expeditionary operations, involving intervention against state adversaries, can only be plausibly conducted if US forces are engaged. In fact, UK forces were required to become adjunct of the US command and control structures” (as quoted in newstatesmen, November 2005). Therefore, any upgrade in high-tech military programmes especially the nuclear one is dependent on the US. That is why Blair has renewed the 1958 mutual defence agreement underpinning nuclear cooperation with the US. This renewal of the agreement is best understood by the realist school of thought which emphasizes the military build-up as the primary tools for security and survival against threats of which Blair names ‘terrorism’ and ‘rogue states possessing WMD’. For
Blair, the best way to deter threats is by obtaining a counter threat. This is what is identified in realism as relative power by which a nation state can act, influence and manipulate other nation states to its own benefit.

4.4 Oil

The United States and the United Kingdom did not wage war on Iraq for the officially stated reasons as was explained previously. The world’s superpower and its key ally were not acting because they feared the Iraqi government’s weapons of mass destruction or its ties with the terrorist group al-Qaeda. Nor were they fighting to bring democracy to the Middle East, a region where the two governments had long supported reactionary monarchs and horrible dictators, including Iraqi president Saddam Hussein himself.

According to Paul, “war was primarily a “war for oil” in which large, multinational oil companies and their host governments acted in secret concert to gain control of Iraq’s fabulous oil reserves and to gain leverage over other national oil producers”, (2003).

To understand the special “national security” status enjoyed by the oil companies, we must first consider oil’s economic importance and then its central role in the war.

Oil provides nearly all the energy for transportation (cars, trucks, buses airplanes, and many railroad engines). Oil also has an important share of other energy inputs – it heats many buildings and fuels industrial and farm equipment, for example. In addition, modern warfare particularly depends on oil, because virtually all weapons systems rely on oil-based fuel – tanks, trucks, armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery pieces, airplanes, and naval ships. For this
reason, industrial countries’ governments view their companies’ global interests as synonymous with the national interest and they readily support their companies’ efforts to control new production sources, to overwhelm foreign rivals, and to gain the most favorable pipeline routes and other transportation and distribution channels. Just as governments like the US and the UK need oil companies to secure fuel for their global war-making capacity, so the oil companies need their governments’ military power to secure control over global oilfields and transportation routes. It is no accident, then, that the world’s largest oil companies are located in the world’s most powerful countries.

In fact, according to Paul, “the oil companies have always enjoyed “insider” privileges with the US and UK governments, resulting in many unique favours in the name of national security”, (2003). Even personal ties have existed between governments and executives in the famous oil companies. UK oil executives speak almost as unofficial members of government. In recent years, a number of personal ties stand out, especially the close friendship between Prime Minister Tony Blair and BP CEO John Browne (Lord Browne of Maddingley), (2003). In sum, both governments and oil companies supported each other to provide the nation with more oil supplies crucial for its wellbeing and economic welfare.

The Iraq war 2003 was no exception in a series of six previous conflicts dating back to 1914 to ensure full control over the Iraqi oil reserves. According to Paul,

“Constant wars hint at the exceptional lure of Iraq’s oil fields. Iraq’s oil is of good quality, it exists in great quantity, and it is very cheap to produce, offering the world’s most extraordinary and profitable oil rents. Iraq’s oil is the world’s cheapest to produce, at a cost of only about $1 per barrel. The gigantic “rent” on Iraq’s oil, during decades of production, could
yield company profits in the range of $4-5 trillion dollars. Assuming fifty years of production and 40% royalties, Iraq could yield annual profits of $80-90 billion per year – more than the total annual profits of the top five companies, even in the banner year of 2003”, (2003).

Such astonishing numbers encouraged many countries including France, Germany, Russia, China and the US to sign oil contracts. However, as soon as the UK and the US signed those agreements in 1997, they started to deploy military forces near the country’s borders in a very threatening forward posture of which Operation Phoenix Scorpion and Operation Desert Thunder took place. In 2001, and nine days after the 9/11 attacks, “the Bush administration seems to have reached a near-decision on war with Iraq in the late spring of 2001. The events of September 11, 2001 and the US war on Afghanistan, postponed the timetable of operations, but may have helped solidify the support of the UK ally”, (Paul 2003).

In 2002/03, US-UK forces invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003, seizing the major oilfields and refineries almost immediately. When coalition forces later entered Baghdad, they set a protective cordon around the Oil Ministry, while leaving all other institutions unguarded, allowing looting and burning of other government ministries, hospitals and cultural institutions. Looters sacked the National Museum and burned a wing of the National Library, but the Oil Ministry stood relatively unscathed, with its thousands of valuable seismic maps safe for future oil exploration (Paul 2003) which means that after the Iraq War of 2003, United States and United Kingdom oil giants are certain to gain privileged access to Iraq’s oil resources. Excluded from control over Iraqi oil since the nationalization of 1972, Exxon, BP, Shell and Chevron will now gain the lion’s share of the world’s most profitable oil fields.
So, since the aftermath of the 11th September terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Bush administration has been gearing up for a new war on Iraq to fulfil that aim. Plans existed to input 100,000 US troops into the country, coupled with a new bombing campaign to topple Saddam and install pro-West elements of the Iraqi opposition. The US and British governments do not want democracy in the region. They do not want freedom and prosperity for the Iraqi people as they used in their justification to war. In fact, they never did, as is obvious from the fact that they were ultimately behind the installation and arming of Saddam himself. This is because the freedom and self-determination of the Iraqi people would mean that they utilize domestic resources as they please.

Thus, according to Ahmed, the Anglo-American partners hope to re-install a brutal military dictatorship that suppresses the Iraqi people in order to secure unimpeded Western access to Persian Gulf oil reserves - albeit absent disobedient Saddam. In other words, they want a new Saddam-type entity to replace the old one who cannot be redeemed because he disobeyed Western orders. And like all previous Western military invasions of Iraq, the results are likely to be extremely bloody, with thousands of Iraqi civilian fatalities and casualties, and only more brutality and repression under yet another tyrant installed by the West. However, these costs and risks are unmentionable when it comes to pure national interests of both countries as would realists such as Machiavelli suggest (2002).
5. **A Literature Review of the Realist Reading of Blair’s Foreign Policy**

**Decision in the Iraq War**

Behind the security case, the global case and the moralizing case which Blair has used extensively to manipulate his party, the parliament and his people into discovering the real causes behind the war, there exists a real motivation. This is the need to secure some world role by bandwagoning with the US and ensure Britain’s safety against unknown security threats. Dumbrell argues that, “the special relationship has transcended this influence to fall within the realist interpretations of international relations in which Britain makes use of the American power to preserve and protect its power position” (2001, 9). On the other hand, hyperrealists such as Kissinger argue that: “Middle powers used various strategies to enhance their security without undue sacrifice of sovereignty. Britain chose the ‘special relationship’ to achieve its aims” (as quoted in Dumbrell 2001, 13).

‘Waxing fat on war’, the Iraq war came as a reflection to the customary relations between both countries since WWI. Wither argues that claiming that Iraq has linkage to world terrorism and is capable of deploying weapons of mass destruction aggressively against Western countries, Blair was convinced of the inevitability of launching a war along with its most dependable ally to contain the security threat posed by the anarchic environment of the Iraqi regime as he perceived it to be a national interest (2003). As the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw put it in his comment on the lessons of 9/11 events: “The UK’s best interests are best served by an active and engaged global foreign policy working with our closest allies to push back the boundaries of chaos and resolve those persistent conflicts which threaten our security” (as quoted in Coates and Krieger 2004, 48).
Furthermore and based on what have been discussed earlier of the realist school of thought, Blair decided to bandwagon with the US, since it cannot be a threat to Britain’s survival. This was Blair’s best option to secure Britain’s survival in an anarchic environment (described earlier by Waltz) dominated by what he labels as ‘terrorism’ in order to increase his country’s control over that environment through expanding its spheres of influence and political interests abroad. This might take the form of offensive pre-emptive rather than defensive actions in an attempt to maintain both safety and gain as what happened in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003.

To maintain the basic interests mainly security and survival of a middle-power Britain against the uncertainties of world terrorism and use of weapons of mass destruction, Blair was convinced that bandwagoning with the hegemon with its vast military capabilities will reinforce Britain’s moderate military power (often called defensive diplomacy due to its inability to carry out a military offensive unilaterally) and guarantee through the use of pre-emptive force to secure Britain’s survival in such a self-help-system as well other influential external interests that maximize its power both military and economic. Blair argues that “States developing weapons of mass destruction, proliferating them, importing or exporting the scientific expertise, the ballistic missile technology, the companies and individuals helping them don’t operate within any international treaties. They don’t conform to any rules. The threat therefore is not imagined. The history of Saddam and WMD is not American or British propaganda. The history and the present threat are real.” (quoted in The Observer 2003). It is ironical; however, for Blair performed without abiding by the rules of international rules, yet he perceives states such as Iraq as a threat to Britain’s security, survival, economy, etc… Hence, intervening militarily under the cover
of morality and ethics (that are irrelevant to international relations) is a natural
cost-efficient choice for Blair, according to the realist school of thought.

Realism also holds that because security and survival are never assured in the
international system, states seek to maximize their security by maximizing their
relative power and influence where the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. As
John Mearsheimer has put it, “the greater the military advantage one state has
over other states, the more secure it is.” (Quoted in Labs 1999). When states
confront specific threats, states will attempt to increase their relative power. In
the absence of specific threats such as in Blair’s case, however, states will still
seek to maximize their power and influence because they cannot be sure when or
where the next threat will arise. When they are presented with opportunities that
will easily and cheaply increase their relative power, states will take advantage of
them. A strategy that seeks to maximize security through a maximum of relative
power is the rational response to anarchy. That is why bandwagoning with the
United States was a prime strategic national interest for Blair despite his
alienation from the international rule of the UN, his public, his party, and his EU
neighbors. The benefits (sharing the economic profits of the claimed liberalization
of economy which opens the door for British and American trade and investment
businesses to exploit Iraq oil market free from government restrictions) of
maintaining the special relationship with the US exceeded those costs accrued
from losing the trust of the parties mentioned above (Curtis 2003).

Curtis further argues that the ‘war on terrorism’ and punishment of perpetuators
has provided a cover for a new military intervention carried out under Blair’s
reign reconfiguring the country’s defensive role into an overtly offensive one. In
this context, Blair is now taking Britain into a new focus of expeditionary warfare
termed also as ‘preemptive war’ in which military power is projected overseas
coercively under many pretexts (as has been discussed earlier) for the advancement of the national interests described above (2003, 82).

Another benefit which motivated Blair to keep full loyalty to the US is described by Kettle who sees that Blair’s involvement in the Iraq war (although displaying all sorts of justifications) had the aim of staying by the side of the US in an attempt to help Britain in shaping the world order in a manner that best serves its interests (2003). Bentley reiterating argues that Blair is trying to carve out a new and influential role for Britain in mediating and managing international conflict, as well as in influencing the decisions of the US (2003). Although playing a secondary role in that Anglo-American alliance to advance those benefits, Blair has continued, in the event of the Iraq war, the historical role of supporting the United States in “sustaining the family elites in the Gulf states (who acted completely in disregard of Blair’s assumed moral standards but at the same time offered unrestrained loyalty to the special relationship) to maintain the traditional Middle East order and the global oil regime; promoting the economic liberalization in the world economy to benefit US and British businesses; and finally shaping the parameters of action of the UN Security Council” (Curtis 2003, 102). Within the framework of Blair’s unchanged foreign policy rhetoric, Blair says, “Britain’s national interest lay in staying closely allied with the United States. I tell you that we must stay close to America” (as quoted in Bowles 2003).

“Blair’s claim of maintaining the international order and stability of the UN entails upholding the privileged position of the Anglo-American regime ensuring that key countries and regions particularly those key oil-producing countries remain under their overall control” (Curtis 2003, 14). In this framework, Iraq, being the world’s second largest oil reserve, must be brought firmly under the Anglo-American control especially that Iraq has proved to be defiant non-
submissive to that control; a fact which appeared to threaten the oil interests of the Western countries mainly the US’s and Britain’s. As a matter of fact, “overthrowing that disobedient regime of Saddam under the pretext of maintaining the international order and protecting human rights offers oil companies of both counties such BP and Chevron the prospect of privatizing oil operations. The prize is indeed immense estimating at over $1 trillion foreign oil contract once the regime has changed” (Curtis 2003, 17).

Zankaneh agrees with both Curtis and Azubuike that Blair’s deep involvement in the Iraq war has emanated from pure geopolitical realist motivations. She argues that Iraq constituted a natural choice for a ‘rogue state’ to be targeted in the name of ‘world terrorism’. Being the world’s second largest oil reserve containing more than 60% of the world’s known reserves (112.5 billion barrels) with weak military capabilities made it a vulnerable susceptible candidate for receiving the Anglo-American ‘forced democracy’ and a great opportunity through which Blair can advance the military, economic and diplomatic interests of Britain by allying with the hegemon (2005).

The American-led war against Iraq has taken over the Iraqi oil fields which meant full accessibility to the oil supplies, control of oil prices and development oil contracts in favor of US and British companies that will in turn result in large economic profits and higher GDP’s. According to Chapman, “Blair has fervently supported Bush under the pretext of economic liberalization for pure geo-strategic grounds mainly the exploitation of Iraq’s oil resources especially that the UK North Sea oil output has fallen by on-sixth since 2000. British oil exports now barely cover its imports; a fact which shall transform Britain shortly into a net oil importer” (2004). However, the British oil industry can be put back to track where the oil reserves in Iraq were privatized. In fact, the benefits accrued
could estimate at 87.5 billion a year taking into consideration that the Iraqi oil could cost as little as 97 cents a barrel to produce compared to the UK’s North Sea oil produced at $3 to $4 per barrel (Macewan 2003).

Blair’s bandwagoning with the US serves the mutual longstanding interests in the Middle East. Invading Iraq under the pretexts of regime change, Iraq’s disarmament of WMD, promoting democracy and human rights as well as fighting terrorism shall buy both countries a long-term presence in the region.

According to Harris, this involves securing the oil fields, taking the means of oil production from the hands of the state, raising the production, controlling the oil price and benefiting the US and UK largest transnational oil corporations such as Exxon-Mobil (with profit of $15 billion in 2002), BP/ Amoco($8 billion), Anglo-Dutch Shell($11 billion) and Chevron-Texaco(profits of which came in with $3.3 billion) (2003, 60).

The Iraq war is considered to be a geopolitical war for interests whose aim is securing the oil supply (perceived a strategic interest for both Bush and Blair) by controlling the region especially that both the American and British economies have become energy intensive whereby oil constitutes the lifeline of the economies well-being. Peter (2004) further argues that an oil insecurity whether in terms of quantity, quality or price might leave these economies vulnerable and drive the concerned governments to coerce a war under various pretexts and justifications to prevent any disobedient government from controlling the market especially that the demand for oil resources is expected to reach at a growth rate of 1.9% / year which means 111.5 million oil barrels/ day. And since Blair knows the military limitations of his country to project power in the Iraq region unilaterally for the purpose of securing those oil fields, he had to join the US in
its war against Iraq with all the military capabilities it possessed to share gained
profits and capabilities. This proved the realist assumption that in a self-help
system, Blair acted rationally by bandwagoning with the US waged so as to
preserve a national interest and in this case free and stable access to the Gulf oil.

So in sum, despite several contradictions and inconsistencies causing the largest
parliamentary rebellion in over a hundred years, opposition of over 120 of his
Labour Party colleagues, protest of more than one million people, disagreement
of the UK’s major partners in Europe—France and Germany, and personal attacks
by the media against the PM, Blair has decided eagerly to join the US-led war
against Iraq based on several factors of which the realist school of thought was
able to unravel. Of these factors were Blair’s Prime ministerial power which was
exploited fully for his favorable rational course of action, the present
international structure dominated by the hegemonic power of the US, the long-
standing special Anglo-American relationship inclusive of the institutionalized
pattern of security and economic cooperation between the two countries, and an
ambitious perception of Britain’s role and power in the modern world.

Putting the above into context and relying on the realist assumption of security,
survival and power, one would easily explain Blair’s insensitivity to both the
domestic and European scenes. For Blair, what really mattered was the power of
interests as he perceived them and those interests lied in “hugging” the US as
close as possible to share geo-strategic benefits. Any other constraints or factors
meant little to him.

Indeed, Britain’s position as a leading global player has been greatly enhanced in
large part due to Blair’s standing “shoulder to shoulder” with President Bush
after the 9/11 attacks. Britain is the only nation in Europe able to project
substantial military strength beyond the European continent and has emerged as
the world's second most powerful military and political force in the new century.
This power could not be achieved if Blair’s Britain sufficed from the defense
agreements with the EU. According to Riddell, by backing the Americans on
Iraq, Blair was simply following a pattern of British support for the US in a
security crisis. Blair has been in a long line of British prime ministers in often
putting the claims of transatlantic solidarity ahead of those of European unity.
The most consistent feature of transatlantic relations has been the desire of British
prime ministers to be insiders in the Washington policy debate. Indeed, every
prime minister since 1945 except Ted Heath wanted a special relationship with
the US on defense and intelligence. Even Harold Wilson, who refused American
requests for British troops in Vietnam, gave strong diplomatic backing to the US
in that war (Riddell 2003, 57). So for Blair, in terms of cost-benefit terms, the
Anglo-American relationship outweighs that of the Anglo-European and, thus,
prioritized.

Another reason for not responding to Britain’s key European allies is best
explained by Kampfner who suggests that Blair’s view of reordering the world
suggests deliberately using armed forces overseas. This cannot be achieved
unless the British forces are interoperable with the American forces and military
technology of which the Europeans lack. In addition, Blair is well convinced that
his way of approaching world affairs is incompatible with the European view
that believes in multilateralism and diplomacy of which Blair is selective when to
exploit and in what cases (2005). For Blair, it would have been inconceivable to
follow Chirac and Schröder in opposing military action in Iraq reversing the 60-
year-old foundation of British foreign policy, as well as endangering American
cooperation which was vital for the operations of Britain’s Trident submarines
and for satellite intelligence since WWII. Nor would it have been feasible for Britain to have adopted a policy of neutrality or mere diplomatic support as would any other country of less importance would do. Thus, Blair’s optimal decision was to join the US and deliberately has chosen the Atlantic over the European by claiming that being strong on the former side would entail, by default, strength on the latter one.

Returning to the domestic scene especially the public opinion, realism can also easily explain its negligence by Blair. However, before explaining it, let us remind the reader of the public opinion at the time of running up to the war. In a 2002 August ICM poll quoted in the Guardian found that 52 percent of Britons were opposed to military action and just 33 percent were in favor. However, Blair was not worried much about both the overt and covert public protest since the majority of the British print media supported British participation in a regime change in Baghdad. The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Sun, and The Mail, with a combined readership of 19.2 million, all supported military action. The Labour-supporting publications, The Guardian, Independent, and Mirror, with 7.3 million readers, are firmly opposed (Gardiner, 2002)

Ironically, the hugely popular tabloid newspaper The Sun, with a daily circulation of 4 million copies, is loudly beating the drum for war. The Sun played a leading role in bringing Blair to power in the last two general elections and has provided powerful backing for the Prime Minister over the Iraq issue (Gardiner, 2002). This proves the fact that Blair was at comfort regarding the level of support from the public although that support came from the right both at the public level and the parliamentary majority. For him, this was no huge a concern. His concern was to lobby as much as possible in favor for his decision to go to the war. That is why he exploited a number of justifications and several
intelligence reports to support his political judgment which he already arrived at in April 2002 in agreement with President Bush. As a PM, he deployed his authorities as a PM and pursued a policy of threat exaggeration in a bid to persuade the public on the urgency of the war.

Based in the realist assumptions and Blair’s style of leadership, the domestic scene was marginalized when it came to Britain’s strategic interests. According to Doig and Phythian, Blair, as a Presidential Prime Minister, has allowed himself to operate in opposition of the public interest for the sake of the national interests (2005, 375). So whatever is said about democratic processes for taking a hard-power-related decision, the government has the capability of taking the decision solely such as defense and international relations when it feels that such decisions. This might ignore the traditional constitutional approach of parliamentary accountability, the political constraints of the party policies and the will of the people. As Doig and Pythian further argue:

“Such traditions continue to nurture the willingness of government to continue to take the lead on issues it sees as relating to the national interest but for which the rationale and justification to do so often restrains to harmonize with the demands of the democratic orthodoxy. The pragmatic development of British political and governmental institutions and practices has meant that alongside expectations about openness, democracy, public accountability and the like, there have developed strong traditions and practices concerning the day-to-day nation’s business which live very uneasily with those expectations”, (2005, 370).
In a realist framework, Blair is seen to prefer the world of high politics where issues of security, survival and interest matter in the international dimension. That is why Blair operated in terms of reasserting the British national interests stressing decisive leadership and authority. Consultation and responsiveness to the domestic scene can be seen as advisable but not obligatory especially on issues of the state interests. The decision to go to war was made among a group of elites and state officials close to Blair through which most of the details were concealed from other political figures mainly in the cabinet and parliament leaving them behind inhibiting them by a view that it is damaging to the national interest in case they defied or attempted to defy. For Blair, the decision was neither a collective one nor requiring a legal justification despite the UN’s and Attorney General’s advice of the need of a legal framework. However, to achieve his goals, Blair intentionally chose to ignore those voices of institutionalism and multilateralism to find the legal justification in an outdated intelligence report of September 2002 where facts were exaggerated to garner a public support which would, if not taken seriously, might prevent the government from going into a war already committed to. Following the reports of both Hutton and Butler, the government was vindicated and so Blair has to pinpoint the failure of the intelligence (which served both the cause and camouflage to side with the US in the run up to the war) is to be blamed and consequently started to look for other justifications to face the skeptical domestic scene only in order to maintain his commitment to the US without revealing the real motivations.

13 As per two memos leaked to the Daily Telegraph and Sunday Times in 2004 and 2005 consecutively, the decision to go to war was taken in April 2002 when Blair met with Bush in his ranch in Crawford, Texas despite the advise from both the intelligence officials, Jack Straw, Defense Secretary and Attorney General that the case against Saddam was extremely thin and lacks the legal basis, (Doig and Pythian 2005, 372.)
6. Conclusion

Throughout my thesis, I attempted to explain the seemingly contradictory behaviour of Blair during the Iraq war 2003 and the real explanations that contributed to Blair’s foreign policy decision to join the US-led war. Surveying the discrepancy between Blair’s New Labour Policy and Blair’s political action in the war, I established the hypothesis that both the pluralist and moralist rhetoric borrowed by Blair’s from his Third Way Labourism was only cleverly exploited to generate justifications-mainly three-to try to gain the public support of his decision to join the US on its war against Iraq.

In an attempt to understand that discrepancy, I divided the main hypothesis into two main realist-based hypotheses with particular focus on the international structure (9/11 events and dominance of the US) and the vitality of interests: military power and oil shares. This was in attempt to explain the case clearly.

Blair’s unprecedented support to the US following the 9/11 attacks has been unconditionally generous both verbally and militarily compared to any other American ally. Seeking the American goodwill has been the utmost priority for British policy-makers for decades and the September 11th attacks have appeared to give Blair the chance to cement Britain’s position as the number one ally to the US, a country on whose friendship and cooperation Britain’s diplomatic influence, security, and world role still largely depend (Azubuike 2003, 77). Blair’s closeness to the US was needed “to secure a world role and buy Britain an insurance against some unknown rainy day especially after 1956 Suez had highlighted Britain’s inability to play an independent world role” (2003, 72). Blair’s insistence on maintaining a strong relationship with the US remains in the advancement of Britain’s national interests if explained from the viewpoint of the
anarchical self-help structure described by Waltz above. In fact, through the policy of bandwagoning rather than balancing, the US offers a tremendous reinforcement of British power and capabilities; thus guaranteeing its security and international influence. It also offers Britain the support it needs to upgrade its military build-up, mainly the nuclear one, and secure the oil shares necessary for its well-being especially in the absence of unrestricted flow of other energy resources worldwide.

I resorted to the realist school of thought following the failure of both the normative viewpoint of international relations and the pluralist school of thought of understanding the seemingly contradictory policy of Blair as well as his real motivation for the war. After discussing the arguments and counterarguments of the justifications used by Blair—which are based in his Third Way Labourism—both approaches proved their incapability of explaining the case. Why?

The answer would be in Blair’s negligence of both the UN, as an international institution, and the public as part of the British society, Blair’s preference of bandwagoning with the US over his alliance with his European allies’ mainly France and Germany, underestimation of the UN for the benefit of the Americans, ignorance of the public protest, dependence on the pro-war Conservative party rather than his own in winning a parliamentary vote over Iraq, the defiance and manipulation of the legal institution embodied in the advice given by Attorney General Goldsmith, and the misuse of morals and values to publicize his agenda and garner support for his cause.

It can be concluded, based on the above arguments and evidences in the preceding three chapters, that the Iraq war has nothing to do with what Blair revealed about the need to maintain the international order, the proliferation of
the weapons of mass destruction and the moral duty to fight terrorism and protect the Iraqi human rights. In fact, those were only pretexts exploited by Blair to legitimize his interests embodied in maintaining the close relationship with the US (unchangeable foreign policy pillar), guaranteeing Britain’s influential role on the international table, securing the oil supply along with other related strategic interests whether economic, military, or diplomatic ones.

That has been facilitated by Blair’s style of leadership displaying elements of centralization in the hands of the PM along with a number of (usually) unelected elites which transformed the Cabinet government into a prime ministerial one with huge power invested in ‘one single man’ whose powers have steadily increased. Influencing the PM’s government policy through parliament, focus groups, party members, or even the public has been minimal. This has paved the way for Blair to make the decision of the Iraq war with the consultation of a relatively small number of people without properly consulting either cabinet members or parliament members. As mentioned above, this centralization of power called ‘elective dictatorship’ by Lord Hailsham in 1976 has also led to the ignorance of the public, the legitimizing power behind Blair’s leadership.

According to realism, exchanging short-term political advantages for the national interest of the state is what characterizes the behaviour of the statesmen who think and act only in terms of the power of interests. That can explain why Blair insisted on joining the war knowing that this might highly damage his reputation domestically, at home, and regionally, at the European level.

In conclusion, preserving his country’s interests (special relationship with the US, security, survival, economic welfare, oil shares, diplomatic influence, and military enhancement) Blair could not operate on the basis of laws and open
cooperative security. But rather revert to the methods of force, pre-emptive attack, and deception, whatever is necessary to secure his country’s strategic interests. Although convincing both the domestic and international players that he is behaving according to the world of law and order, Blair, in the Iraq war, has proved, that he only propagated for this argument to conceal his true belief of the Hobbesian world, where military power remains a key feature of international relations whereby only national interests count.

Throughout my thesis, I utilized the assumptions of the realist school of thought mentioned above to explain Tony Blair’s foreign policy decision in the Iraq War 2003. Based on that school, I concluded that Blair’s choice of joining the war is the rational alternative given the circumstances present in the international system particularly following 9/11 events, the dominance of the US as the hegemon of the world and the benefits ensued from tightening the special relationship with that hegemon. That choice made him sacrifice the moral argument (whether he believed in it or not) in his New Labourist discourse and loose the idealist set of values to the realist argument. Machiavelli tries to explain that by stating that there are times when doing what is necessary to promote the interests of the state contradict the morality of the community. A decision maker must have moral flexibility, knowing when and when not to conform to the ordinary morality of the masses. A Prince knows when to obey the morality of the state, the morality of politics which dictates that right behavior maximizes the power of the state and the national interests. An action is immoral (politically) if it does not serve the interest of the state even though that action might be considered moral by conventional standards. For Machiavelli, and all those who consider themselves realists, if a political decision-maker is more concerned with his or her soul than
the interest of the state, they have no business being in politics\textsuperscript{14}. According to Morgenthau, “there can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics”, (1978, 4-15). For realism, Blair has weighed both costs and benefits to the consequence of his decision and reached the choice of going to war so as to incur as much long-term possible interests as possible within the framework of reviving the Anglo-American special relationship following 9/11 events particularly that America has become the hegemon that has the power to change the world to suit its interests.

Although the realist school of thought gave rational explanation for Blair’s behavior in the Iraq war particularly comprehending the reasons for Blair to ignore public, international organizations and most importantly the moral set of values displayed in Blair’s discourse, I feel the urge to criticize Blair for his decision.

Blair’s concealment behind a whole set of justifications such punishing the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks, fighting rogue states that threaten world peace and human rights through developing WMD, spread of democracy and eradication of poverty and injustice proved to hide realist motivations. The security-related justifications were contradicted by the British Intelligence Agencies themselves; the moral arguments were scorned by a significant section of the public aware of the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by the Anglo-American driven sanctions on Iraq. The argument of spreading democracy is in

\textsuperscript{14} http://www.cascadia.ctc.edu/Faculty/jmiller/POL102/realism.html. Accessed 19/9/2005
itself contradictory and ironic when one looks at the list of the repressive regimes supported by Britain under the rule of Blair such as Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia which are known for their human rights violations and . Not only that, but Blair has preempted democracy as a principle from all meanings when he deliberately chose not to listen to either his public or parliament. Even the consultations that he made with the Attorney General and the parliament were only to ensure the support of a decision he had already made with President Bush when the Prime Minister “promised to be 'solidly behind' US invasion with or without UN backing”, (Taylor 2006). According to Taylor, a memo of a two-hour meeting between the two leaders at the White House on January 31 2003 - nearly two months before the invasion - reveals that Mr. Bush made it clear the US intended to invade whether or not there was a second UN resolution and even if UN inspectors found no evidence of a banned Iraqi weapons programme. "The diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning", the president told Mr. Blair. The prime minister is said to have raised no objection. He is quoted as saying he was "solidly with the president and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam" (Taylor 2006). This shows that all the justifications exploited were only a camouflage to run away from the democratic constraints which normally obligate a democratically elected leader to behave in a certain manner; a fact which portrays Blair as a liar who deceived his own people and dragged them into a web of deceitful arguments. Blair’s hypocrite messianic promise to reorder the world so as to preserve peace and harmony is only an embodiment of pure imperialism and double standards.
6.1 Recommendation

Kofi Anan, in September 2004, has said: “The US-led invasion of Iraq was an illegal act that contravened the UN Charter”.

A report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur in Iraq described the Anglo-American practice of denying food and water to the Iraqi civilians in order to force them to leave their towns and villages as a “flagrant violation” of the Geneva Convention.

I would like to recommend studying Blair’s behaviour in the Iraq war in terms of the legal point of view. Was he really behaving in terms of the International Law, treaties and agreements? If not, will the world allow him to escape justice or will they speak for the rule of law and put him on trial as it is the case with Saddam?
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